On Sun, Jun 26, 2005 at 10:53:31AM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote:
You can be in two places at the same time, but you can't
enjoy two different scenarios, or think individual thoughts.
I disagree. Again, you slide back and forth between instantiations
and programs, which, as you know, are not
Lee Corbin wrote
Again, I think that the first-person point of view can lead to
errors just as incorrect as those of Ptolemaic astronomy.
I disagree because, almost by definition, the first-person point of
view is incorrigible.
The error you point on is more subtle: it consists to
Title: Message
I reply to Prof. Pruss:
BH: I have the vague suspicion here that by using words like
physical/matter/concrete/chunk, you're skirting the issue of how worlds are
specified in the general case, by narrowing the scope to worlds whose only
constituents are material --
Le 27-juin-05, à 17:12, Brian Holtz a écrit :
I reply to Prof. Pruss:
BH: I have the vague suspicion here that by using words like physical/matter/concrete/chunk, you're skirting the issue of how worlds are specified in the general case, by narrowing the scope to worlds whose only constituents
Hi Brian,
May I quote you?
You (Brian Holtz) wrote at:
http://groups-beta.google.com/group/talk.philosophy.misc/msg/dfa50fbc7a2ce31?hl=enlr=
x-tad-bigger.../x-tad-bigger
x-tad-biggerNote that, while the Life thought experiment depends on mind being
computable, the logically possible universe
Brent. thanks for reason.
How about staarting with that silly word:
possible? According to what? Our imagination?
Can we devise circumstances beyond our mind? Is it reasonable to judge
whether something is possible that is beyond our mental capability? Or
informational space? Is the world
On 6/27/05, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Sorry for going on about this, but I'm still trying to understand: what
possible difference could it make to anyone - you or your copy - if you
suddenly disintegrated and were replaced a microsecond later with an exact
copy?
To
Eric Cavalcanti writes:
But even in a MWI perspective, they are surely very different
processes, as someone else argued. Tossing a coin does not increase
the number of copies of yourself in the multiverse. Pushing the button
does. There is a symmetry between the two versions of yourself in the
Lee Corbin writes (replying to Jesse Mazer):
Obviously my sadness is not because the death of the copy here
means that there are only 10^10^29 - 1 copies of that person...
By the way, this figure 10^10^29 is a *distance*. It is, according
to Tegmark, very approximately how close in terms of
Eugen writes
A program can run in two different places at the same time, and
the program (treated as the pattern) is perfectly capable of
receiving input X in one location at the same time that it
No, program is the wrong model. You can have identical pieces of a bit
pattern (CD-ROM,
10 matches
Mail list logo
