Re: Let There Be Something

2005-11-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 29-oct.-05, à 00:57, Hal Finney a écrit : I would suggest that the multiverse concept is better thought of in somewhat different terms. It's goal is not really to explain where the universe comes from. (In fact, that question does not even make sense to me.) I think we should not confu

Re: Quantum Immortality (was Re: Quantum Suicide)

2005-11-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 28-oct.-05, à 17:54, GottferDamnt a écrit (for-list): Hi, I would like talk about this quote from an old topic: This is a rather shocking conclusion. We are conscious here and now because our (computational state) belongs to aleph_1 (or 2^aleph_0 for those who doesn't want to rely on Ca

Re: Let There Be Something

2005-11-01 Thread daddycaylor
My phrase "something from nothing" was not meant to restrict my inquiry to origins, in the sense of time or causality, but can be viewed in terms of information in general. It seems that the discussion has not contradicted my initial idea that, when it comes to explaining why things are the way t

Re: Quantum Immortality (was Re: Quantum Suicide)

2005-11-01 Thread daddycaylor
Bruno, So why is it that from the 3rd person point of view everyone dies? Also along the lines of the "Let There Be Something" thread, isn't it also true that a finite set of finite histories, or even a countable set of infinite histories, is of measure zero in the continuum? If this is the

Re: Quantum Immortality (was Re: Quantum Suicide)

2005-11-01 Thread daddycaylor
I should have said "a countable set of countable histories". Tom -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tue, 01 Nov 2005 15:05:39 -0500 Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality (was Re: Quantum Suicide) Bruno,    So why is it that f

Re: Let There Be Something

2005-11-01 Thread "Hal Finney"
Tom Caylor writes: > I believe that my statement before: > > >...simply bringing in the hypothetical set of all unobservable things > >doesn't explain rationally in any way (deeper than our direct > >experience) the existence of observable things. > > applies to the multiverse as well, since > the

Re: Let There Be Something

2005-11-01 Thread Russell Standish
Perhaps I'm missing your argument here, but I gather you are claiming that the assumption of a plenitude is on an equal ontological footing as the assumption of a single reality, as both are ab initio moves, not derived from any other principle. Whilst I agree that nothing mandates one case or the

Re: Let There Be Something

2005-11-01 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Hi, as I said before I don't think/feel that single universe is on the same level as multiverse... Just by using "absurd" feeling I was talking about. If there is a single reality, you have to anwser why this one ? why like this ? what is the ultimate reason for the reality to be limited to thi

Re: Let There Be Something

2005-11-01 Thread Hal Ruhl
Unfortunately lately I do not have the time to read and think through each post but I would like to briefly point out that my approach has the Godelian ingredients of completeness/incompleteness, consistency/inconsistency and self reference. The power set of divisions of the list provides [I t

Re: Let There Be Something

2005-11-01 Thread Stephen Paul King
Hi Tom, I second Russell on this and would add that Leibniz's question "why this and not some other" (or whatever the exact quote is) really bring the question to a head. I would also point out that the so called "initial conditions" and "fine tuning" problem is a version of this. Personal