Le 30-juin-06, à 21:06, John M a écrit :
> "I agree. Other people are part of the model of the
> world we form. And in the same way the existence of
> myself, as a durable entity, is also a part of that
> model.
> Brent Meeker"
> *
> Does this agreed double(?) statement not rub too close
> on
Le 30-juin-06, à 21:34, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>> John M:
>> Does this agreed double(?) statement not rub too close
>> on solipsism?
>
> Not if you accept that *all* our ideas of reality are models. The
> fact that they work well and are
> coherent makes me believe they are models of an exter
Le 30-juin-06, à 20:43, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> There is no false 1-memories. Only an association between some
> 1-memory and some 3-reality can be false. If someone succeeds in
> implementing correctly (more than just coherently) false beliefs (like
> I am Napoleon just
Hal Finney writes:
> > OK, this is the old ASSA versus RSSA distinction. But leaving this> > argument aside, I don't see how teleportation could be analogous to a> > risky, measure reducing activity if it seemed to be a reliable process> > from a third person perspective. If someone plays Russi
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 30-juin-06, à 21:06, John M a écrit :
>
>
>>"I agree. Other people are part of the model of the
>>world we form. And in the same way the existence of
>>myself, as a durable entity, is also a part of that
>>model.
>>Brent Meeker"
>>*
>>Does this agreed double(?) sta
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 30-juin-06, à 21:34, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
>
>
>>>John M:
>>>Does this agreed double(?) statement not rub too close
>>>on solipsism?
>>
>>Not if you accept that *all* our ideas of reality are models. The
>>fact that they work well and are
>>coherent makes me be
The notions of observed/observing, of first vs third,
and all such round robin banter .. all fall down as nonsense
conversation because -no one- has in any real sense
specified the new-functions required to make such
concepts ... a "calculus".
There are conflated criteria involved - as well as a
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 30-juin-06, à 20:43, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
>
>>Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>There is no false 1-memories. Only an association between some
>>1-memory and some 3-reality can be false. If someone succeeds in
>>implementing correctly (more than just coherently) false belie
Addendum to my previous:
TO make math sensitive to frame of reference distinctions
and useful in an expanded way added parameter-dimensions
might be useful.
Color coding for example. With new translation operators.
Equations written in red might indicate that attention
be maintained that the v
Jamie,
your highly critical post is worthwhile reading.
I like your antithesis for 'reductive operands' and
would almost like what you wrote:
> "Personal Identity" is a de-fault resultant of the
> structure of the universe.<
unless I had this idiosyncrasy against axioms, givens,
accepted de-faul
Stathis wrote
> Sent: Wednesday, June 28, 2006 5:53 AM
> which is why in symmetrical duplication experiments I anticipate
> that I will become one of the duplicates with equal probability.
What do you think of your survival chances if you happen to know
that after you fall asleep tonight, you w
Tom writes
> The difference between a quark and a lepton can be described with
> mathematics, even though perhaps it's harder to pin down than the
> difference between 3 and 34. I think most of us wouldn't have a
> crucial problem with that. But alas the difference between 3 and 34 is
> in the
Lee Corbin wrote:
> Tom writes
>
> > The difference between a quark and a lepton can be described with
> > mathematics, even though perhaps it's harder to pin down than the
> > difference between 3 and 34. I think most of us wouldn't have a
> > crucial problem with that. But alas the difference
Hal writes
> What I argued was that it would be easier to find the trace of a person's
> thoughts in a universe where he had a physically continuous record than
> where there were discontinuities (easier in the sense that a smaller
> program would suffice). In my framework, this means that the u
Stephen writes
> > In my previous post I tried to point out that *existence* is not a
> > first-order (or n-th order) predicate and thus does nothing to distinguish
> > one Form, Number, Algorithm, or what-have-you from another.
>
> [LC]
> I don't know about that; I do know that 34 and 3 are
15 matches
Mail list logo
