2009/4/29 John Mikes :
> The Financial Crisis Explained
>
> Heidi is the proprietor of a bar in Berlin . In order to increase sales, she
> decides to allow her loyal customers - most of whom are unemployed
> alcoholics - to drink now but pay later. She keeps track of the drinks
> consumed on a le
2009/4/29 Brent Meeker :
>> I'm not sure I understand. Are you saying that the information in most
>> physical processes, but not consciousness, can be discrete? I would
>> have said just the opposite: that even if it turns out that physics is
>> continuous and time is real, it would still be pos
Hi,
2009/4/29 Stathis Papaioannou :
>
> 2009/4/29 Brent Meeker :
>
>>> I'm not sure I understand. Are you saying that the information in most
>>> physical processes, but not consciousness, can be discrete? I would
>>> have said just the opposite: that even if it turns out that physics is
>>> cont
2009/4/29 Jesse Mazer :
>
> Kelly wrote:
>>
>> Not if information exists platonically. So the question is, what does
>> it mean for a physical system to "represent" a certain piece of
>> information? With the correct "one-time pad", any desired information
>> can be extracted from any random block
2009/4/29 Quentin Anciaux :
>>> In Bruno's Washington/Moscow thought experiment that information isn't
>>> in your consciousness, although it's available via third persons. My
>>> view of the experiment is that you would lose a bit of consciousness,
>>> that you can't slice consciousness arbitrar
> From: stath...@gmail.com
> Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2009 23:24:35 +1000
> Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
>
> 2009/4/29 Jesse Mazer :
>>
>> Kelly wrote:
>>>
>>> Not if information exists platonically. So the question is, what does
>>> it mean for
2009/4/29 Stathis Papaioannou :
>
> 2009/4/29 Quentin Anciaux :
>
In Bruno's Washington/Moscow thought experiment that information isn't
in your consciousness, although it's available via third persons. My
view of the experiment is that you would lose a bit of consciousness,
th
2009/4/29 Jesse Mazer :
>>And in the possibility space of weird alien
>> computers it seems to me that there will always be a computer
>> isomorphic with the vibration of atoms in a given rock.
>
> What do you mean by "weird alien computers"? If we had a way of defining the
> notion of "causal st
On Wed, Apr 29, 2009 at 1:05 AM, russell standish wrote:
>
> What you are talking about is what I call the "Occam catastrophe" in
> my book. The resolution of the paradox has to be that the
> random/white-noise filled OMs are in fact unable to be observed. In
> order for the Anthropic Principle t
On 29 Apr 2009, at 00:25, Jesse Mazer wrote:
>
> Kelly wrote:
>
> >
> > Not if information exists platonically. So the question is, what
> does
> > it mean for a physical system to "represent" a certain piece of
> > information? With the correct "one-time pad", any desired
> information
> > c
On Wed, 2009-04-29 at 10:28 -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
> It
> would seem the way the brain is organized it doesn't accept perception
> of pure randomness (at least not for long, I have not yet tried the
> experiment myself). If it can't find patterns from the senses it
> looks like it gives up an
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/4/29 Brent Meeker :
>
>
>>> I'm not sure I understand. Are you saying that the information in most
>>> physical processes, but not consciousness, can be discrete? I would
>>> have said just the opposite: that even if it turns out that physics is
>>> continuous
On 28 Apr 2009, at 22:14, Kelly wrote:
>
>
> On Apr 27, 12:23 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> So you have indeed the necessity to abandon comp to maintain your
>> form
>> of immaterialist platonism, but then you lose the tool for
>> questioning
>> nature. It almost look like choosing a theor
Bruno wrote:
On 29 Apr 2009, at 00:25, Jesse Mazer wrote:
and I think it's also the idea behind Maudlin's Olympia thought experiment as
well.
>Maudlin's Olympia, or the Movie Graph Argument are completely different. Those
>are arguments showing that computationalism is incompatible with the
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/4/29 Quentin Anciaux :
>
>
In Bruno's Washington/Moscow thought experiment that information isn't
in your consciousness, although it's available via third persons. My
view of the experiment is that you would lose a bit of consciousness,
that
Maudlin's point is that the causal structure has no physical role, so
if you maintain the association of consciousness with the causal,
actually computational structure, you have to abandon the physical
supervenience. Or you reintroduce some magic, like if neurons have
some knowledge of the
Jason Resch wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 29, 2009 at 1:05 AM, russell standish
> wrote:
>
>> What you are talking about is what I call the "Occam catastrophe" in
>> my book. The resolution of the paradox has to be that the
>> random/white-noise filled OMs are in fact unable to be observed. In
>> orde
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2009 22:19:56 +0200
>Maudlin's point is that the causal structure has no physical role
But I'm not convinced that the basic Olympia machine he describes doesn't
already hav
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