Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2009 22:19:56 +0200
>Maudlin's point is that the causal structure has no physical role
But I'm not convinced that the basic Olympia machine he describes doesn't
already have a complex causal structure--the causal structure would be in the
way different troughs influence each other via the pipe system he describes,
not in the motion of the armature.
>But read the movie graph which shows the same thing without going through the
>question of the counterfactuals.
Where can I find the movie graph argument?
>If you believe that consciousness supervene on the physical implementation, or
>even just one universal machine computation, then you will associate
>consciousness to a description of that computation.
But why must I do that? Why can't I associate consciousness to a causal
structure in the real world that's isomorphic to the causal structure of the
computation, not just a passive description of the computation? Is there a
fatal flaw in my suggestion about defining "causal structure" in terms of
propositions about events and the way certain propositions logically imply
others (if you take into account the basic laws of whatever 'universe' you're
describing with these propositions, whether it's the laws of physics in the
real universe or the laws governing a cellular automaton)?
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