Re: Doesn't the UTM insure that comp is true ?
On 13 Dec 2012, at 19:39, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/13/2012 1:01 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Dec 2012, at 14:09, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal What I don't understand about comp is if there is a UTM that can calculate whatever is needed to emulate our behavior, how can comp ever be false (except possibly by those aspects hidden by Godel ) ? Well if there is a UTM that can calculate whatever needed to emulate our behavior, and if you still want comp, you need zombie to make comp false. That an UTM can emulate our behavior is the BEHAVIORAL-MECHANISM hypothesis. That such UTM is conscious, is the STRONG AI hypothesis. That we are such UTM emulable machine is the COMP, alias CTM hypothesis. COMP -> STRONG-AI -> BEH-MEC And Gödel's theorem is really just the first theorem in exact machine's self-reference theory, it is really a chance for the mechanist philosophy. Judson Webb is right on that. It locally protects Church thesis, and it makes the universal machine a sort of universal dissident, allergic to authoritative arguments (at least at the start!). Bruno Dear Bruno, Comp implies virtual zombies, not physical zombies, no? Comp implies no zombie at all. It makes the concept meaningless. In *some* sense, there can be "apparent zombie", because there are apparent bodies, and we attribute some "real time" consciousness to some bodies that we can observe, but that is part of the illusion of bodies and time, not of of the consciousness of other person. For someone *disbelieving* comp, you are right, this would entail the existence of an infinity of virtual zombies in arithmetic. Bruno -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Doesn't the UTM insure that comp is true ?
On 12/13/2012 1:01 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Dec 2012, at 14:09, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal What I don't understand about comp is if there is a UTM that can calculate whatever is needed to emulate our behavior, how can comp ever be false (except possibly by those aspects hidden by Godel ) ? Well if there is a UTM that can calculate whatever needed to emulate our behavior, and if you still want comp, you need zombie to make comp false. That an UTM can emulate our behavior is the BEHAVIORAL-MECHANISM hypothesis. That such UTM is conscious, is the STRONG AI hypothesis. That we are such UTM emulable machine is the COMP, alias CTM hypothesis. COMP -> STRONG-AI -> BEH-MEC And Gödel's theorem is really just the first theorem in exact machine's self-reference theory, it is really a chance for the mechanist philosophy. Judson Webb is right on that. It locally protects Church thesis, and it makes the universal machine a sort of universal dissident, allergic to authoritative arguments (at least at the start!). Bruno Dear Bruno, Comp implies virtual zombies, not physical zombies, no? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Doesn't the UTM insure that comp is true ?
On 13 Dec 2012, at 14:09, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal What I don't understand about comp is if there is a UTM that can calculate whatever is needed to emulate our behavior, how can comp ever be false (except possibly by those aspects hidden by Godel ) ? Well if there is a UTM that can calculate whatever needed to emulate our behavior, and if you still want comp, you need zombie to make comp false. That an UTM can emulate our behavior is the BEHAVIORAL-MECHANISM hypothesis. That such UTM is conscious, is the STRONG AI hypothesis. That we are such UTM emulable machine is the COMP, alias CTM hypothesis. COMP -> STRONG-AI -> BEH-MEC And Gödel's theorem is really just the first theorem in exact machine's self-reference theory, it is really a chance for the mechanist philosophy. Judson Webb is right on that. It locally protects Church thesis, and it makes the universal machine a sort of universal dissident, allergic to authoritative arguments (at least at the start!). Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/13/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-13, 05:22:45 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On 12 Dec 2012, at 20:00, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 10:49:16 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal > wrote: > > On 12 Dec 2012, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > > On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 4:03:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal > wrote: > > > > On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Your servitor: > > > > > > 1) Arithmetic (comp) > > > > > > :) > > > > > > Bruno > > > > > > To which I add: > > > > > > 0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise > > > to comp. > > > > > > OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding comp. > > > > No, it reveals that comp takes the machine that it runs on for > > granted. > > Not at all. The machine existence, and its relative running existence, > are theorem in the tiny arithmetic. > > Tiny compared to what though? Tiny in the sense of needing few K to be described. > As far as I'm concerned, the appearance of arithmetic truth from > nothing is an oceanic gulf - far greater than that of a sensory- > motor primitive, which has no possible explanation. First we cannot explain the numbers with less than the number (or Turing equivalent). So we have to assume them, if only to make sense of any theory in which you can define what you mean by sensory-motor. Then in arithmetic many things have no possible explanation. > Arithmetic is easily explained as one of the many types of experiences Keep in mind that "experiences" is what I want explain. > which allow us to refer to other experiences, but nothing in > arithmetic will ever point to the taste of a carrot or a feeling of > frustration. In your theory which deprived machine of having consciousness. > It may leave room for undefined, non-comp 1p content, but that's all > it is: room. Nothing points positively to realism and concrete > sensory participation, only simulations...but what simulates the > Turing machine itself? What props up the stability and erasure > capacities of it's tape? What allows numbers to detect numbers? > > > > > > > Comp doesn't need to be avoided when you realize that it isn't > > necessary in the first place. > > By postulating what we want to explain. > > There is no more need to explain it than there is a need to explain > arithmetic truth. The difference is that we have no experience of > arithmetic truth outside of sense, but we are surrounded by sense > which persists in spite of having no arithmetic value. If you say so ... > > > > > > You get the whole unsolved mind-body problem back. > > > > It isn't a problem, it is the fundamental symmetry of Universe. If > > you don't have a mind-body distinction, then you are in a non- > > ordinary state of consciousness which does not commute to other > > beings in public space. > > You take the problem, and then say it is the solution. > > The cosmos isn't a problem, it is the source of all problems and > solutions. Well, the cosmos is a problem with comp, and which makes comp interesting. > > That's the god- > of-the-gap mistake. > > No, it's the recognition of the superlative nature of cosmos - > beneath all gods and gaps, beneath all problems and solutions, is > sense itself. We don't even know if there is one. > > We have of course already discuss this. You are > just saying "don't search". > > You are welcome to search, I only say that I have already found the > only answer that can ever be universally true. Hmm... > > It looks *you* are talking everything for > granted at the start, in the theory. > > I take only sense for granted because s
Doesn't the UTM insure that comp is true ?
Hi Bruno Marchal What I don't understand about comp is if there is a UTM that can calculate whatever is needed to emulate our behavior, how can comp ever be false (except possibly by those aspects hidden by Godel ) ? [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/13/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-13, 05:22:45 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On 12 Dec 2012, at 20:00, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 10:49:16 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal > wrote: > > On 12 Dec 2012, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > > On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 4:03:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal > wrote: > > > > On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Your servitor: > > > > > > 1) Arithmetic (comp) > > > > > > :) > > > > > > Bruno > > > > > > To which I add: > > > > > > 0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise > > > to comp. > > > > > > OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding comp. > > > > No, it reveals that comp takes the machine that it runs on for > > granted. > > Not at all. The machine existence, and its relative running existence, > are theorem in the tiny arithmetic. > > Tiny compared to what though? Tiny in the sense of needing few K to be described. > As far as I'm concerned, the appearance of arithmetic truth from > nothing is an oceanic gulf - far greater than that of a sensory- > motor primitive, which has no possible explanation. First we cannot explain the numbers with less than the number (or Turing equivalent). So we have to assume them, if only to make sense of any theory in which you can define what you mean by sensory-motor. Then in arithmetic many things have no possible explanation. > Arithmetic is easily explained as one of the many types of experiences Keep in mind that "experiences" is what I want explain. > which allow us to refer to other experiences, but nothing in > arithmetic will ever point to the taste of a carrot or a feeling of > frustration. In your theory which deprived machine of having consciousness. > It may leave room for undefined, non-comp 1p content, but that's all > it is: room. Nothing points positively to realism and concrete > sensory participation, only simulations...but what simulates the > Turing machine itself? What props up the stability and erasure > capacities of it's tape? What allows numbers to detect numbers? > > > > > > > Comp doesn't need to be avoided when you realize that it isn't > > necessary in the first place. > > By postulating what we want to explain. > > There is no more need to explain it than there is a need to explain > arithmetic truth. The difference is that we have no experience of > arithmetic truth outside of sense, but we are surrounded by sense > which persists in spite of having no arithmetic value. If you say so ... > > > > > > You get the whole unsolved mind-body problem back. > > > > It isn't a problem, it is the fundamental symmetry of Universe. If > > you don't have a mind-body distinction, then you are in a non- > > ordinary state of consciousness which does not commute to other > > beings in public space. > > You take the problem, and then say it is the solution. > > The cosmos isn't a problem, it is the source of all problems and > solutions. Well, the cosmos is a problem with comp, and which makes comp interesting. > > That's the god- > of-the-gap mistake. > > No, it's the recognition of the superlative nature of cosmos - > beneath all gods and gaps, beneath all problems and solutions, is > sense itself. We don't even know if there is one. > > We have of course already discuss this. You are > just saying "don't search". > > You are welcome to search, I only say that I have already found the > only answer that can ever be universally true. Hmm... > > It looks *you* are talking everything for > granted at the start, in the theory. > > I take only sense for granted because sense cannot be broken down > into any more primitive elements. Everything else can be broken down > to sense. The CTM + classical theory of knowledge can explain that feeling. > > > > > > > > > With the CTM ( a > > better name for comp), that which perceives, understands, > participates > > and discovers comp is explained entirely (except 1% of its > > consciousness) by the only two laws: > > > > Kxy = x > > Sxyz = xz(yz) > > > > Laws? What are those? How do they govern? > > Kxy is a shorhand for ((K x) y), and you are told by the first > equation above that for all x and y, ((K x) y) = x. > > So ((K K) K) = K, or to use again the shorthand (which consists in > eleimnainating the left parentheses): > KKK = K. > > For the same reason > > KSK = S > KSS = S > K(S K) K = (S K) >