I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather than is
On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 11:23 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comjavascript:; wrote: The universe is algorithmic insofar as a small number of physical rules gives rise to everything that we see around us. Only if we infer that is the case. Physical rules don't give rise to anything, especially beings which experience some version of 'seeing everything around them'. I'm not sure if you really don't understand what is meant by a small number of physical rules gives rise to everything that we see around us. It means there are certain regularities in the universe which we call rules or laws of nature. For example, the total momentum of two bodies before they collide is the same as the total momentum after they collide, which is called the law of conservation of momentum. This is not a law from a parliament or a law from God but a description of what happens. A philosophical zombie is not charged with an expectation of anything mental, that is one of its defining characteristics. That's what I mean by charged. If you define something as having no mental experience and give it a name of a generic undead person, you are charging your definition with an expectation of absent personhood. If I say puppet, there is no supernatural absence of personhood, there is a common sense notion of prosthetically extended personhood of the puppeteer through an inanimate object. There's no puppeteer if the computer acts autonomously. If you are going to insist that since the computer was programmed it is not acting autonomously then consider the same computer that came about through matter falling together randomly - certainly physically possible if very improbable. We have two apparently identical computers, one manufactured and programmed by humans, the other generated spontaneously. Is one potentially conscious and the other not? It's begging the question if I make the assumption in the premises of an argument that purports to prove it. But I propose it as a theory: if Bugs Bunny does do this in an interactive way, such as a real rabbit would, then Bugs Bunny is indeed as conscious as a real rabbit. If I see an old YouTube of a dead celebrity talking to Johnny Carson, does that mean that both of them are indeed conscious? Playing the YouTube has a power of resurrection? If not, please explain in detail why not. Why do you keep bringing up this example? It is obvious to anyone within a second that the video will not interact with you like the real Johnny Carson through a video link would. What we observe is that when certain physical processes happen, consciousness happens. We observe that physical processes coincide with reports of particular kinds of conscious experiences. We have no theory to link the two causally and even lack an understanding of anesthesia. A theory is that consciousness happens whenever a system interacts with the environment in the way conscious entities do, and that in fact consciousness is no more than this. Anaesthetics knock out this interaction and so knock out consciousness. Death also knocks out this interaction and so knocks out consciousness. This is a minimal theory. It's like observing the inverse square law for gravitational attraction. As a minimal theory, it is enough until new facts come along requiring further explanation. Enough to send us in the completely wrong direction. So you say, but you need to explain what aspect of the theory goes against observation. In light of The fact that intelligence has no pragmatic reason or opportunity to create or use consciousness to accomplish any unconscious purpose (even accidentally). The fact that intelligence in all observed cases evolves naturally through the development of an infant into a child and from primitive to more recent species. The fact that attempts at artificial intelligence thus far not only show no glimmer of consciousness but to the contrary continue to embody the emptiness of mechanism. The fact that the regions of the human brain involving intelligence are preceded by limbic-emotional and thalamic-sensory consciousness. The fact that human beings cannot function as intelligent agents while unconscious, but can be conscious without developing intelligence. It seems human level intelligence is sufficient but not necessary for consciousness. A minimal ability to perceive and interact with the environment seems to be necessary. Biological processes per se however are *not* sufficient. A anaesthetised human has most of his low level neurological and other biological processes functioning normally but is not conscious. That is consistent with functionalism but not with the idea that consciousness originates at the cellular or molecular level. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather than is
The quote might be wrong, as you answer statements which are not mine. On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:49, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/10 Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com 2012/10/10 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote: It may be a zombie or not. I can´t know. The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made of zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in the conventional thing. Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, after that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be good for my success in society. Then, I doubt that I will have any surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist epistemology. However there are people that believe these strange things. Some autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of evolutionary epistemology. If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber. I don't bet or believe in solipsism. But you were saying that a *conscious* robot can lack a soul. See the quote just below. That is what I don't understand. Bruno I think that It is not comp what leads to solipsism but any existential stance that only accept what is certain and discard what is only belief based on conjectures. It can go no further than cogito ergo sum And therefore only believing I can be a social being I did not write It can go no further than cogito ergo sum. Nor do I agree with it or not, depending of the context. Nor do I understand your comment, here. You might elaborate perhaps. Bruno 2012/10/9 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 09 Oct 2012, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But still after this reasoning, I doubt that the self conscious philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I have. ? You mean it is a zombie? I can't conceive consciousness without a soul. Even if only the universal one. So I am not sure what you mean by soul. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather than is
OK, This post is clearer. forget my early reply. On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:55, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/11 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 10 Oct 2012, at 20:13, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/10 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote: It may be a zombie or not. I can´t know. The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made of zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in the conventional thing. Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, after that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be good for my success in society. Then, I doubt that I will have any surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist epistemology. However there are people that believe these strange things. Some autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of evolutionary epistemology. If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber. I don't bet or believe in solipsism. But you were saying that a *conscious* robot can lack a soul. See the quote just below. That is what I don't understand. Bruno I think that It is not comp what leads to solipsism but any existential stance that only accept what is certain and discard what is only belief based on conjectures. It can go no further than cogito ergo sum OK. But that has nothing to do with comp. That would conflate the 8 person points in only one of them (the feeler, probably). Only the feeler is that solipsist, at the level were he feels, but the machine's self manage all different points of view, and the living solipsist (each of us) is not mandate to defend the solipsist doctrine (he is the only one existing)/ he is the only one he can feel, that's all. That does not imply the non existence of others and other things. That pressuposes a lot of things that I have not for granted. It does no pressuppose anything more than the computationalist hypothesis. If you think it does, please tell me what. I have to accept my beliefs as such beliefs to be at the same time rational and functional. With respect to the others consciousness, being humans or robots, I can only have faith. No matter if I accept that this is a matter of faith or not. I agree with you, so I guess I miss something. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather than is
2012/10/10 Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com 2012/10/10 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote: It may be a zombie or not. I can´t know. The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made of zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in the conventional thing. Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, after that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be good for my success in society. Then, I doubt that I will have any surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist epistemology. However there are people that believe these strange things. Some autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of evolutionary epistemology. If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber. I don't bet or believe in solipsism. But you were saying that a *conscious* robot can lack a soul. See the quote just below. That is what I don't understand. Bruno I think that It is not comp what leads to solipsism but any existential stance that only accept what is certain and discard what is only belief based on conjectures. It can go no further than cogito ergo sum And therefore only believing I can be a social being 2012/10/9 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 09 Oct 2012, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But still after this reasoning, I doubt that the self conscious philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I have. ? You mean it is a zombie? I can't conceive consciousness without a soul. Even if only the universal one. So I am not sure what you mean by soul. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather than is
2012/10/11 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 10 Oct 2012, at 20:13, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/10 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote: It may be a zombie or not. I can´t know. The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made of zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in the conventional thing. Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, after that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be good for my success in society. Then, I doubt that I will have any surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist epistemology. However there are people that believe these strange things. Some autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of evolutionary epistemology. If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber. I don't bet or believe in solipsism. But you were saying that a *conscious* robot can lack a soul. See the quote just below. That is what I don't understand. Bruno I think that It is not comp what leads to solipsism but any existential stance that only accept what is certain and discard what is only belief based on conjectures. It can go no further than cogito ergo sum OK. But that has nothing to do with comp. That would conflate the 8 person points in only one of them (the feeler, probably). Only the feeler is that solipsist, at the level were he feels, but the machine's self manage all different points of view, and the living solipsist (each of us) is not mandate to defend the solipsist doctrine (he is the only one existing)/ he is the only one he can feel, that's all. That does not imply the non existence of others and other things. That pressuposes a lot of things that I have not for granted. I have to accept my beliefs as such beliefs to be at the same time rational and functional. With respect to the others consciousness, being humans or robots, I can only have faith. No matter if I accept that this is a matter of faith or not. I still don't see what you mean by consciousness without a soul. Bruno 2012/10/9 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 09 Oct 2012, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But still after this reasoning, I doubt that the self conscious philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I have. ? You mean it is a zombie? I can't conceive consciousness without a soul. Even if only the universal one. So I am not sure what you mean by soul. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.** com everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/**group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/**group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/**group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/**
Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather than is
On 10 Oct 2012, at 20:13, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/10 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote: It may be a zombie or not. I can´t know. The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made of zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in the conventional thing. Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, after that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be good for my success in society. Then, I doubt that I will have any surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist epistemology. However there are people that believe these strange things. Some autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of evolutionary epistemology. If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber. I don't bet or believe in solipsism. But you were saying that a *conscious* robot can lack a soul. See the quote just below. That is what I don't understand. Bruno I think that It is not comp what leads to solipsism but any existential stance that only accept what is certain and discard what is only belief based on conjectures. It can go no further than cogito ergo sum OK. But that has nothing to do with comp. That would conflate the 8 person points in only one of them (the feeler, probably). Only the feeler is that solipsist, at the level were he feels, but the machine's self manage all different points of view, and the living solipsist (each of us) is not mandate to defend the solipsist doctrine (he is the only one existing)/ he is the only one he can feel, that's all. That does not imply the non existence of others and other things. I still don't see what you mean by consciousness without a soul. Bruno 2012/10/9 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 09 Oct 2012, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But still after this reasoning, I doubt that the self conscious philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I have. ? You mean it is a zombie? I can't conceive consciousness without a soul. Even if only the universal one. So I am not sure what you mean by soul. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather than is
On Tue, Oct 9, 2012 at 5:50 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Comp seems to avoid this insurmountable problem by avoiding the issue of whether the computer actually had an experience, only that it appeared to have an experience. So comp's requirement is as if rather than is. In other words exactly precisely the same procedure you have used every hour of every day of every year of your waking life to determine if your fellow human beings are behaving as if they are conscious or not. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather than is
2012/10/10 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote: It may be a zombie or not. I can´t know. The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made of zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in the conventional thing. Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, after that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be good for my success in society. Then, I doubt that I will have any surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist epistemology. However there are people that believe these strange things. Some autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of evolutionary epistemology. If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber. I don't bet or believe in solipsism. But you were saying that a *conscious* robot can lack a soul. See the quote just below. That is what I don't understand. Bruno I think that It is not comp what leads to solipsism but any existential stance that only accept what is certain and discard what is only belief based on conjectures. It can go no further than cogito ergo sum 2012/10/9 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 09 Oct 2012, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But still after this reasoning, I doubt that the self conscious philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I have. ? You mean it is a zombie? I can't conceive consciousness without a soul. Even if only the universal one. So I am not sure what you mean by soul. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather than is
Hi Alberto G. Corona and Bruno, Perhaps I can express the problem of solipsism as this. To have a mind means that one can experience. Experiences are subjective and thus cannot be actually shared, the best one can do is share a description of the experience. If one cannot actually share another's experience, one cannot know if they actually had an experience-- that is, that they actually have a mind. Comp seems to avoid this insurmountable problem by avoiding the issue of whether the computer actually had an experience, only that it appeared to have an experience. So comp's requirement is as if rather than is. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/9/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-08, 15:12:22 Subject: Re: What Kant did: Consciousness is a top-down structuring ofbottom-up sensory info Bruno: It could be that the indeterminacy in the I means that everything else is not a machine, but supposedly, an hallucination. But this hallucination has a well defined set of mathematical properties that are communicable to other hallucinated expectators. This means that something is keeping the picture coherent. If that something is not computation or computations, what is the nature of this well behaving hallucination according with your point of view? 2012/10/7 Bruno Marchal : On 07 Oct 2012, at 15:11, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/7 Bruno Marchal On 07 Oct 2012, at 12:32, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Hi Roger: ... and cognitive science , which study the hardware and evolutionary psychology (that study the software or mind) assert that this is true. Partially true, as both the mainstream cognitive science and psychology still does not address the mind-body issue, even less the comp particular mind-body issue. In fact they use comp + weak materialism, which can be shown contradictory(*). The Kant idea that even space and time are creations of the mind is crucial for the understanding and to compatibilize the world of perceptions and phenomena with the timeless, reversible, mathematical nature of the laws of physics that by the way, according with M Theory, have also dualities between the entire universe and the interior of a brane on the planck scale (we can not know if we live in such a small brane). OK. No doubt that Kant was going in the right (with respect to comp at least) direction. But Kant, for me, is just doing 1/100 of what the neoplatonists already did. I don? assume either if this mathematical nature is or not the ultimate nature or reality Any Turing universal part of it is enough for the ontology, in the comp frame. For the epistemology, no mathematical theories can ever be enough. Arithmetic viewed from inside is bigger than what *any* theory can describe completely. This makes comp preventing any text to capture the essence of what being conscious can mean, be it a bible, string theory, or Peano Arithmetic. In a sense such theories are like new person, and it put only more mess in Platonia. Probably the mind (or more specifically each instantiation of the mind along the line of life in space-time) make use a sort of duality in category theory between topological spaces and algebraic structures (as Stephen told me and he can explain you) . Many dualities exist, but as I have try to explain to Stephen, mind and matter are not symmetrical things if we assume comp. The picture is more that matter is an iceberg tip of reality. Even if matter the tip of the iceberg, does the rest of if matter? Without the rest (water), there would be no iceberg and no tip! do we can know about it this submerged computational nature? In science we never know. But we can bet on comp, and then, we can know relatively to that bet-theory. So with comp we know that the rest is the external and internal math structures in arithmetic. which phenomena produce the submerged part of this iceberg in the one that we perceive?. Arithmetic gives the submerged part. The UD complete execution gives it too. The emerged part is given by the first person indeterminacy. Multiverse hypothesis propose a collection of infinite icebergs, but this is a way to avoid God and to continue with the speculative business. What the computational nature of reality tries to explain or to avoid? . May be you answered this questions a number of times, ( even to me and I did not realize it) Careful. Comp makes the observable reality of physics, and the non observable reality of the mind, NON computational. Indeed it needs a God (arithmetical truth). It explains also why God is NOT arithmetical truth as we usually defined it (it is only an approximation). By the way, Bruno, you try
Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather than is
That is true. To pressupose an experience of self in others is a leap on faith based on similarity. It is duck philosophy. What seems a Duck, must be a Duck. Even Hume had to limit its destructive philosophy to avoid self destructiveness. Because there are core beliefs that we don´t doubt, or we can not doubt seriously because we can´t accept that this is just a belief without acting self destructively. That is in the first place the reason why these beliefs exist: they must have been selected and hardcoded by evolution. That must be the ultimate meaning of truth in evolutionary epistemology. In the same way, a self conscious robot must have beliefs about itself and others. he believe that he is conscious. He can not conceive otherwise. And their sensations must be according with this belief. His belief can not be a boolean switch in a program. He must answer sincerely to questions about existence, perception and so on. But still after this reasoning, I doubt that the self conscious philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I have. 2012/10/9 Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net: Hi Alberto G. Corona and Bruno, Perhaps I can express the problem of solipsism as this. To have a mind means that one can experience. Experiences are subjective and thus cannot be actually shared, the best one can do is share a description of the experience. If one cannot actually share another's experience, one cannot know if they actually had an experience-- that is, that they actually have a mind. Comp seems to avoid this insurmountable problem by avoiding the issue of whether the computer actually had an experience, only that it appeared to have an experience. So comp's requirement is as if rather than is. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/9/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-08, 15:12:22 Subject: Re: What Kant did: Consciousness is a top-down structuring ofbottom-up sensory info Bruno: It could be that the indeterminacy in the I means that everything else is not a machine, but supposedly, an hallucination. But this hallucination has a well defined set of mathematical properties that are communicable to other hallucinated expectators. This means that something is keeping the picture coherent. If that something is not computation or computations, what is the nature of this well behaving hallucination according with your point of view? 2012/10/7 Bruno Marchal : On 07 Oct 2012, at 15:11, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/7 Bruno Marchal On 07 Oct 2012, at 12:32, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Hi Roger: ... and cognitive science , which study the hardware and evolutionary psychology (that study the software or mind) assert that this is true. Partially true, as both the mainstream cognitive science and psychology still does not address the mind-body issue, even less the comp particular mind-body issue. In fact they use comp + weak materialism, which can be shown contradictory(*). The Kant idea that even space and time are creations of the mind is crucial for the understanding and to compatibilize the world of perceptions and phenomena with the timeless, reversible, mathematical nature of the laws of physics that by the way, according with M Theory, have also dualities between the entire universe and the interior of a brane on the planck scale (we can not know if we live in such a small brane). OK. No doubt that Kant was going in the right (with respect to comp at least) direction. But Kant, for me, is just doing 1/100 of what the neoplatonists already did. I don? assume either if this mathematical nature is or not the ultimate nature or reality Any Turing universal part of it is enough for the ontology, in the comp frame. For the epistemology, no mathematical theories can ever be enough. Arithmetic viewed from inside is bigger than what *any* theory can describe completely. This makes comp preventing any text to capture the essence of what being conscious can mean, be it a bible, string theory, or Peano Arithmetic. In a sense such theories are like new person, and it put only more mess in Platonia. Probably the mind (or more specifically each instantiation of the mind along the line of life in space-time) make use a sort of duality in category theory between topological spaces and algebraic structures (as Stephen told me and he can explain you) . Many dualities exist, but as I have try to explain to Stephen, mind and matter are not symmetrical things if we assume comp. The picture is more that matter is an iceberg tip of reality. Even if matter the tip of the iceberg, does the rest of if matter? Without the rest (water), there would be no iceberg and no tip! do we can know about it this submerged computational nature? In science we never know. But we can
Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather than is
On 09 Oct 2012, at 11:50, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Alberto G. Corona and Bruno, Perhaps I can express the problem of solipsism as this. To have a mind means that one can experience. Hmm... Not really, with my terminology. A mind is not enough for an experience. You need a soul. It is a fixed point in a transformation of the mind to itself. I can conceive mind without soul. But OK. It is a detail perhaps here. Experiences are subjective and thus cannot be actually shared, the best one can do is share a description of the experience. Not really. You can share the pleasure you have about a movie, by describing the movie and your feeling. But, if you know your partner very well, you can share the experience of the movie, partially, by going together at the movie projection. Sharing does not necessitate communication. If one cannot actually share another's experience, one cannot know if they actually had an experience-- that is, that they actually have a mind. Indeed. But even in dream we have instinctive empathy, and have good reason (even if *sometimes* false) to bet other people have experience. Comp seems to avoid this insurmountable problem by avoiding the issue of whether the computer actually had an experience, only that it appeared to have an experience. So comp's requirement is as if rather than is. Not at all. This is BEH-MEC (behavioral mechanism). Already STRONG-AI (weaker than comp) makes precise that it postulates that machine can be conscious, even independently of behavior. Then COMP is stronger that STRON AI, as it postulates that YOU are a machine, and that your experience (which is of course assumed to exist for the rest making sense) is invariant for some digital transformation. Please try to not deform the hypothesis. Comp is a postulate in a theory of consciousness, experience, subjective life, etc. It is an axiom, or an hypothesis, or a question (quasi synomym for my purpose) of the cognitive science. We have COMP === STRONG AI BEH-MEC, But none of those arrows can be reversed, logically. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/9/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-08, 15:12:22 Subject: Re: What Kant did: Consciousness is a top-down structuring ofbottom-up sensory info Bruno: It could be that the indeterminacy in the I means that everything else is not a machine, but supposedly, an hallucination. But this hallucination has a well defined set of mathematical properties that are communicable to other hallucinated expectators. This means that something is keeping the picture coherent. If that something is not computation or computations, what is the nature of this well behaving hallucination according with your point of view? 2012/10/7 Bruno Marchal : On 07 Oct 2012, at 15:11, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/7 Bruno Marchal On 07 Oct 2012, at 12:32, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Hi Roger: ... and cognitive science , which study the hardware and evolutionary psychology (that study the software or mind) assert that this is true. Partially true, as both the mainstream cognitive science and psychology still does not address the mind-body issue, even less the comp particular mind-body issue. In fact they use comp + weak materialism, which can be shown contradictory(*). The Kant idea that even space and time are creations of the mind is crucial for the understanding and to compatibilize the world of perceptions and phenomena with the timeless, reversible, mathematical nature of the laws of physics that by the way, according with M Theory, have also dualities between the entire universe and the interior of a brane on the planck scale (we can not know if we live in such a small brane). OK. No doubt that Kant was going in the right (with respect to comp at least) direction. But Kant, for me, is just doing 1/100 of what the neoplatonists already did. I don? assume either if this mathematical nature is or not the ultimate nature or reality Any Turing universal part of it is enough for the ontology, in the comp frame. For the epistemology, no mathematical theories can ever be enough. Arithmetic viewed from inside is bigger than what *any* theory can describe completely. This makes comp preventing any text to capture the essence of what being conscious can mean, be it a bible, string theory, or Peano Arithmetic. In a sense such theories are like new person, and it put only more mess in Platonia. Probably the mind (or more specifically each instantiation of the mind along the line of life in space-time) make use a sort of duality in category theory between topological spaces and algebraic structures (as Stephen told me and he can explain you) . Many dualities exist, but as I have try to explain to Stephen,
Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather than is
On 09 Oct 2012, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But still after this reasoning, I doubt that the self conscious philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I have. ? You mean it is a zombie? I can't conceive consciousness without a soul. Even if only the universal one. So I am not sure what you mean by soul. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather than is
It may be a zombie or not. I can´t know. The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made of zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in the conventional thing. Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, after that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be good for my success in society. Then, I doubt that I will have any surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist epistemology. However there are people that believe these strange things. Some autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of evolutionary epistemology. 2012/10/9 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 09 Oct 2012, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But still after this reasoning, I doubt that the self conscious philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I have. ? You mean it is a zombie? I can't conceive consciousness without a soul. Even if only the universal one. So I am not sure what you mean by soul. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
