Re: ODP: Free will/consciousness/ineffability
Russell Standish wrote: As I am bound to paraphrase, Free Will is the ability to do somehthing completely stupid! Would you accept: Freedom is the right to deny 2 + 2 = 5. (cf. George Orwell torture scene in 1984) Free Will is the right to say 2 + 2 = 5 (cf. Russell Standish) ? Interpreting freely to deny 2 + 2 = 5 by -[]f ( f = FALSE or 0 = 1) and to say 2 + 2 = 5 by []f, you get through Orwell + Standish, this interpretation of Godel: Freedom makes Free Will consistent. (-[]f - []f) (Or the inconsistency of free will entails no freedom). I am guessing you give a good definition of free-will, at least for the non stupid (sound) machines. For the stupid one (those inconsistent really believing that 2 + 2 = 5 or some equivalent proposition) it is not clear if their stupid acts will bear any witness to free-will. Perhaps free will is the ability to do something we *bet* as being completely stupid, and freedom is the ability of *not* doing that completely stupid thing? when George Levy said Now let's look at observing free will in the self. Do we perceive ourselves to be indeterminate in our behavior? Absolutely sometimes. When the decision is clear then free will is really not an issue. Free will becomes important when the decision factors are close to being evenly split. In those cases, before a decision is made, there is no way to know what this decision will be unless one makes the decision. If someone asked you why did you choose this, you wouldn't be able to say. This is free will. I tend to disagree. When the decision factors are close to being evenly split, then I cannot choose and let the first circumstance choose for me. No need of free will. Following Russell I would say that free will could perhaps be the ability of choosing what seems to be the stupider choice, ... and freedom could perhaps be the ability to reject that stupider solution. I should think a little more about that. Bruno
RE: ODP: Free will/consciousness/ineffability
It seems unlikely that it could be otherwise. Presumably the impulse to make a decision has to originate from a lower level, assuming that consciousness is supported by layers of unconscious processing? However the decisions in question were to do with when to perform a simple action - pressing a key, or something similar. What about conscious decisions that are arrived at by evaluating evidence, weighing possibilities, etc? Presumably they are also supported by unconscious layers which know how to evaluate evidence etc... Surely the feeling of free will comes from us not being aware of these underlying processes. Charles -Original Message- From: Brent Meeker [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Wednesday, 24 October 2001 9:34 a.m. To: rwas Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: ODP: Free will/consciousness/ineffability Whatever free will is, it is very doubtful that it depends on consciousness. See Daniel Dennett's dicussion of the Grey Walter carousel experiment. This experiment shows (although there is a little ambiguity left) that free will decisions occure *before* on is conscious of them. Brent Meeker The freedom of the will consists in the fact that future actions cannot be known now. --- Ludwig Wittgenstein
Re: ODP: Free will/consciousness/ineffability
Pete Carlton wrote: Hi all, I've been lurking for months and am continually amazed by the discussions going on - I got into this list after branching out from philosophy of mind, after something like the GP/UDA (though completely lacking in rigor) had surfaced in a discussion I was in about artificial intelligence.. My interest in this channel has more to do with ai and synthetic consciousness as well. If you like, we could start our own thread. Robert W. _ Do You Yahoo!? Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com
Re: ODP: Free will/consciousness/ineffability
Interesting, although I suspect the interpretation of the ability to do somehthing completely stupid is more like asserting the truth of an unprovable statement than asserting the truth of a false statement. In modal logic, this would be (x -[]x ) n'est-ce pas? Note an automaton cannot assert the truth of anything not provable from its axioms... Cheers Marchal wrote: Russell Standish wrote: As I am bound to paraphrase, Free Will is the ability to do somehthing completely stupid! Would you accept: Freedom is the right to deny 2 + 2 = 5. (cf. George Orwell torture scene in 1984) Free Will is the right to say 2 + 2 = 5 (cf. Russell Standish) ? Interpreting freely to deny 2 + 2 = 5 by -[]f ( f = FALSE or 0 = 1) and to say 2 + 2 = 5 by []f, you get through Orwell + Standish, this interpretation of Godel: Freedom makes Free Will consistent. (-[]f - []f) (Or the inconsistency of free will entails no freedom). I am guessing you give a good definition of free-will, at least for the non stupid (sound) machines. For the stupid one (those inconsistent really believing that 2 + 2 = 5 or some equivalent proposition) it is not clear if their stupid acts will bear any witness to free-will. Perhaps free will is the ability to do something we *bet* as being completely stupid, and freedom is the ability of *not* doing that completely stupid thing? when George Levy said Now let's look at observing free will in the self. Do we perceive ourselves to be indeterminate in our behavior? Absolutely sometimes. When the decision is clear then free will is really not an issue. Free will becomes important when the decision factors are close to being evenly split. In those cases, before a decision is made, there is no way to know what this decision will be unless one makes the decision. If someone asked you why did you choose this, you wouldn't be able to say. This is free will. I tend to disagree. When the decision factors are close to being evenly split, then I cannot choose and let the first circumstance choose for me. No need of free will. Following Russell I would say that free will could perhaps be the ability of choosing what seems to be the stupider choice, ... and freedom could perhaps be the ability to reject that stupider solution. I should think a little more about that. Bruno Dr. Russell Standish Director High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile) UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 () Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centrehttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
Re: ODP: Free will/consciousness/ineffability
Pete Carlton wrote: George Levy wrote: snip Free will is also relativistic. A consciousness gives the impression of having free will if its behavior is unpredicatble (ineffable - unprovable) BY THE OBSERVER. The self gives the impression to the OBSERVING SELF of having free will because the self cannot predict what its own behavior will be. There are two ways of observing free will: free will in others and free will in self. Let's first discuss free will in others. It is obvious that if someone else's behavior is so clear and so totally predictable that it appears to the observer to be following a program then the person has no free will. In the limit, consider the case of a programmer (the observer) observing the behavior of a program he has just written. Assuming that the observer is an intelligent programmer and knows what is is doing, then the program is an open book to him. The program obiously has no free will. It may be the case however, that the programmer is programming a very complex program or even a neural net and that there is no simple logical links between the program steps (a neural nets has no program steps). The program may then do things which are unexpected to the programmer. At that point the programmer may think that the program has free will. Free will stems from perceived indeterminacy in the behavior of a person or a program. This indeterminacy could either be physical in nature (quantics) or mathematical (Godelian). I believe that both physical indeterminacy and mathematical indeterminacy will eventually be proven to be identical. Bruno Marchal may be on his way to doing this. I think that Godel ndeterminacy could be made relativistic: it could depend on the axiomatic system used, with an arbitrary number of systems rather than the only two systems suggested by Bruno: G and G*. Unfortunately I am not a good enough mathematician to carry out this task. Now let's look at observing free will in the self. Do we perceive ourselves to be indeterminate in our behavior? Absolutely sometimes. When the decision is clear then free will is really not an issue. Free will becomes important when the decision factors are close to being evenly split. In those cases, before a decision is made, there is no way to know what this decision will be unless one makes the decision. If someone asked you why did you choose this, you wouldn't be able to say. This is free will. George
Re: ODP: Free will/consciousness/ineffability
rwas wrote: --- Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: On 10-Oct-01, Marchal wrote: You talk like if you have a proof of the existence of matter. Like if it was obvious subtancia are consistent. But you know substancia only appears in Aristote mind when he misunderstood Plato doctrine on intelligible . . . You mean as is everything is material. ? Be careful. I certainly does not believe everything is computational. Quite the contrary, IF I am the result of a computation then I can expect to be confronted with many non computational things. Perhaps you were meaning everything is immaterial? That's is indeed a consequence of the computational hypothesis. Rwas wrote I am confused with this. Not to be combative but how can one know they are not in a simulator, ie., arcade game or virtual reality? Good question! In fact you are superposed in multiple environments some of them could be simulators, others very large and complex Hollywood type sets and so on. Your environment is subject to the indeterminacy principle just like anything else you may want to know. One way to find out in which environment you actually are is to make a measurement. Depending on which interpretation you prefer, your measurement collapses the wave function of your environment (Copenhagen school) or selects you and your environment from the multiverse (MWI). An interesting question that we have been discussing in many forms is what is the meaning of consciousness when you are in a superposition. Is a superposition of conscious states one single consciousness or many? Does it make sense to claim that there could be many consciousnesses when these consciousnesses themselves cannot distinguish themselves from each other? I believe not. This brings us to the perception of consciousness which I believe to be a relativistic issue. Perception of conscious self and perception of conscious others can vary in kind depending on who does the observing. Free will is also relativistic. A consciousness gives the impression of having free will if its behavior is unpredicatble (ineffable - unprovable) BY THE OBSERVER. The self gives the impression to the OBSERVING SELF of having free will because the self cannot predict what its own behavior will be. And when a measurement is performed and a branching occurs, does it make sense to say that there occur an sudden increase in the measure of the consciousness involved in this process. I do not believe so. There is a diversification of consciousness but no increase in measure. George
Re: ODP: Free will/consciousness/ineffability
Zbigniew Motyka wrote: [...] http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal It would be not polite from my side to express any opinion about UDA before I really make acquaintance with it. Thanks. I whish everyone were like you :-) For now I may only repeat: When you start from some suitable axiomatic positions, you may prove almost everything using all rules of logic. I am afraid that UDA may start from such positions from very beginning. I could aknowledge it. Most who understand the UDA just throw out comp. I just show COMP entails sort of weirdness (experimentaly verifiable) A case is made that quantum weirdness is part of comp weirdness. By comp I mean really three things: 1) There is a level of description of myself such that I can survive through a digital emulation of myself at that level. 2) Church (Kleene, Post, Turing, Markov) Thesis. 3) Arithmetical Platonism (proposition like 17 is prime of FERMAT are true independently of my or ours knowledge of them). I don't postulate there is a universe, still less a computable universe. I just don't know, but I don't need it. It could happen that a maximal universal covering for dense subset of computational histories can be eventually be isolated, it would then define a natural unique multiverse, but at first sight the arithmetical translation is not going in that direction. But then it is not yet clear (imo) that the MWI makes possible classical realism too ... But... I promised, I see. Though, my opinion should not be anything binding for you, of course. Obviously, I would be more interested if you found a serious failure :) I am just rank physicist and maybe too aventurous for this rank. The UDA needs only some imagination and passive knowledge of computer science. The translation of the UDA in arithmetic, and its use for extracting the logic of the measure 1 out of the (arithmetical) geometry of the consistent computational extensions, need familiarity with both logic and physics. (It's technical). Bruno
Re: ODP: Free will/consciousness/ineffability
Brent Meeker wrote: On 10-Oct-01, Marchal wrote: You talk like if you have a proof of the existence of matter. Like if it was obvious subtancia are consistent. But you know substancia only appears in Aristote mind when he misunderstood Plato doctrine on intelligible ideas. (My opinion!). Despite the formidable success of physics, the main problems are not solved: neither qualitative appearance, nor (the new problem which appears through the comp hypothesis), the problem of the qualitative *appearance* of matter and quantities. I don't see this as an either-or question. But it was a neither-nor affirmation. I'm just saying that with comp you need to explain *both* mind and matter. With (naive) materialism you need to explain only mind, for matter is taken as granted (more or less at some level). That everything is computational is an hypothesis and is everything is material. You mean as is everything is material. ? Be careful. I certainly does not believe everything is computational. Quite the contrary, IF I am the result of a computation then I can expect to be confronted with many non computational things. Perhaps you were meaning everything is immaterial? That's is indeed a consequence of the computational hypothesis. We should pursue every hypothesis as far as we can and see what we get. Right. David Deutsch insists on that idea too. Note that we choose the hypotheses which seduces us in a way or another ... Some will be proven wrong - Newtonian mechanics. Some will be found vacuous - God did it. But the rest we should pursue. Some may work out and they may even prove to be all different versions of the same thing. OK. Bruno
Re: ODP: Free will/consciousness/ineffability
Zbigniew Motyka wrote: Marchal wrote:[[[EMAIL PROTECTED]] -Re: Free will/consciousness/ineffability, 01-10-01(see below)]: I don't believe in matter (personal opinion) Comp is incompatible (in some sense) with existing matter (my thesis). (...) I agree and that is why I believe that IF we are machine THEN we are immaterial machine. We have never leave Plato heaven if you want. Now I don't believe copy of material universe exists in Platonia. Appearance of physical universes emerges on the computational histories. To explain appearnance of lawfulness we need to take into account *ALL* computational histories. (...) If there is a physical universe then comp is false. Equivalently if comp is true there is no physical universe. Many people seem to believe in Popper?s Third World - Platonia more then in their own personal experience. People believe in many other things as well. It doesn?t mean that every ?designum? (designated object) of their belief (signum) does really exist somewhere else then in Platonia, where any every possible idea would exist. I used conditional to underline that in my opinion there is no idea in Third World which was not created first in the brain of some conscious being. In such an understanding, Platonia would be nothing more than the global memory existing in whole the world. In my opinion it is sublimated form of global (social) consciousness (culture) and as such is the property of more complicated level of matter than single (human) being. But what is matter? Even in the physicist books I see only relation between numbers. My Platonia is numberland, including the many dreams, obeying to the laws of dreams (computer/information science), I have no serious evidence that substancial (aristotelian) matter exists in any obvious sense. I don't postulate it. And as consciousness for humans is the property of material brain, In which sense? I mean with or without comp? Few people doubt the brain obeys computational laws at some level (like Schroedinger equation). Even Hameroff accept it implicitely by postulating the brain is a (universal) quantum machine. Only Penrose seems aware (for incorrect reason unfortunately) that the existence of substancial matter (not intelligence) is incompatible with comp, so that a materialist toe need a non computaionalist theory of mind. (Of course I got the equivalent contraposition: a computationalist toe need an immaterialist theory of matter). ... the culture is the property of society. OK. I mean that comparison has some smell of truth ... Such a point of view is commonly identified with Marxism and too often declined only due to that negative connotation - what a pity. In my opinion - as a physicist - materialism is much closer to physical description of the world then any form of idealism. That is a quite respectable opinion. All what I say is that such opinion is incompatible with comp (and weak form of Ockham). I proved that comp gives us no other choice, for solving the mind body problem, than deriving the physical laws from a set of self-referential truth. More generally from logic + arithmetic (I indeed translate a simple argument (the dovetailer universal argument UDA) in arithmetic by using the Godel trick (perfectionned by Lob, Solovay, Boolos, Visser, Goldblatt). BTW I use also the formidable work of Grzegorczyk, a great Polish logician. The arithmetical version of the first person is given by his modal logical system S4Grz (Grz for Grzegorczyk). You know Poland has been one of the most productive country in logic! And physical description is the best description humans worked out as the scientific method of cognition, so far. I am quite amazed by physics and physicians. Still I am used to believe that the mind/body problems is physics' Achile's Heel. It is the place where aventurous physicist will meet aventurous psychologist or theologians. There is no reason (even from the Okham?s point of view) to believe in Platonia solely and neglect material world. Material world appear more solid when we will understand that its stable laws emerge from machines forever dreaming in Numberland. Everything you can state from such point of view, may be easily translated in terms of properties of matter. You talk like if you have a proof of the existence of matter. Like if it was obvious subtancia are consistent. But you know substancia only appears in Aristote mind when he misunderstood Plato doctrine on intelligible ideas. (My opinion!). Despite the formidable success of physics, the main problems are not solved: neither qualitative appearance, nor (the new problem which appears through the comp hypothesis), the problem of the qualitative *appearance* of matter and quantities. You talk like if matter has been defined, or if we know what it is. I don't think we know that. From material point to probability waves and superstring in complex space, it seems matter is elusive, even
