RE: Parfit's token and type
Bruno Marchal writes: > >> Parfit is good. I stop to follow him when he insists that we are > >> token. > >> I paraphrase myself sometimes by the slogan MANY TYPES NO TOKEN. > > > > Can you explain the disagreement with Parfit? My reading of chapter 99 > > of > > R & P is that a "token" is a particular instantiation of a person > > while a "type" > > is the ensemble of related instantiations. "Mary Smith" is a type, > > "Mary Smith > > coming out of replicator no. 978 at 11:05 AM" is a token. > > > When I say "MANY TYPES NO TOKEN", I assume comp *and* the conclusion I > derive from it, that is the reversal between physics and "number > theoretical machine theory" (say). In particular I take from granted > that my next "observer moment" is somehow determined by two things: a > "proportion" of computational histories going through my actual > computational state, and the proportion of consistent extensions, which > are related to a "proportion" of similar computational histories. > So with comp "Mary Smith coming out of a replicator no. 978 at 11:05 > AM" is a type. It is the type of all (2^aleph_0) histories going > through that event (supposedly well 3-described). > From a third person point of view, if you are willing to say that the > natural numbers are token (I am neutral on that), then it would make > sense to see the nth step of an immaterial execution of a DU, (or an > enumeration of the true sigma_1 arithmetical sentences) as (immaterial) > tokens. But even in that case, there would be no sense to attribute > tokenness to "Mary Smith coming out of a replicator no. 978 at 11:05 > AM", because there is no way to privilege one instantiation from > another. We must take them all, and they constitute highly undecidable > sets. I think this might be a terminology issue. There may be many computations or processes in the multiverse implementing the OM "Mary Smith no. 978 at 11:05 AM". From a third person POV it may be possible to point to a computer and say "that's MS 978 #1" and another computer and say "that's MS 978 #2", these being two instantiations of the one OM, but from a first person POV it is not possible to make such a distinction, otherwise they would be different OM's. I would further add that if the third person distinction leads to any interaction with the two instantiations as separate entities then that also forces them to become distinct OM's since it changes their first person experience. It is really only an observer who will not interact with the separate instantiations, like a deistic god overseeing the universe, who can tell them apart. So someone who has a relationship with Mary Smith will at any one time have a relationship with a particular Mary Smith token, which might actually have multiple instantiations not distinguishable by either Mary Smith or the observer as separate. I think it is the term "token" that is confusing. "OM" is less problematic. > > It appears that in this terminology (actually due to Bernard Williams, > > not Parfit) > > once generated a token remains the same token until there is another > > branching, > > but my preference is to generalise the term and say that a token has > > only transient > > existence, which then makes "token" equivalent to "observer moment". > > > OK. I prefer. > With comp it has to correspond to the third person Observer Moment (OM > hereafter). > They are the true Sigma_1 sentences, or the accessible states by the UD. > > > > This is > > literally true, given that from moment to moment, even in the absence > > of teleportation > > etc., the atoms in your body turn over such that after a certain time > > none of the > > matter in your body is the "same", and before this time the fact that > > some of the > > matter in your body is the "same" is accidental and makes no > > difference to your > > conscious experience. > > > Assuming bodies. I see the point. > > > > > > As to whether I am token or type: obviously, literally, > > I-who-write-this-now am a > > token. > > This looks like the first person OM. It is different from the preceding > one. > The 3-OM are enumerable, even recursively enumerable. > The 1-OM are enumerable but not recursively enumerable (for those who > have the Cutland, it is a simple consequence of Rice theorem). > And the similarity classes of the 1-OM (= states plus its relative > proportion) has the power of the continuum. > > > > > > My present token is included in the set of related tokens in the > > past, future, > > other branches of the multiverse, surreptitious emulations of my mind > > made by aliens, > > and so on: the type. Note that the definition of a particular token > > (especially in my > > generalised sense, fixed to a specific and unique position in the > > multiverse) can be > > made completely unambiguous, > > > How? With comp (with the multiverse = UD*) you have to bet on a level > of description of you, and then,
Re: Parfit's token and type
Le 07-oct.-06, à 16:35, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > Bruno marchal writes: > >> Le 05-oct.-06, à 20:49, markpeaty a écrit : >> >>> >>> Bruno, >>> I started to read [the English version of] your discourse on Origin >>> of >>> Physical Laws and Sensations. I will read more later. It is certainly >>> very interesting and thought provoking. It makes me think of 'Reasons >>> and Persons' by Derek Parfitt. His book is very dry in places but >>> mostly very well worth the effort of ploughing through it. >> >> Parfit is good. I stop to follow him when he insists that we are >> token. >> I paraphrase myself sometimes by the slogan MANY TYPES NO TOKEN. > > Can you explain the disagreement with Parfit? My reading of chapter 99 > of > R & P is that a "token" is a particular instantiation of a person > while a "type" > is the ensemble of related instantiations. "Mary Smith" is a type, > "Mary Smith > coming out of replicator no. 978 at 11:05 AM" is a token. When I say "MANY TYPES NO TOKEN", I assume comp *and* the conclusion I derive from it, that is the reversal between physics and "number theoretical machine theory" (say). In particular I take from granted that my next "observer moment" is somehow determined by two things: a "proportion" of computational histories going through my actual computational state, and the proportion of consistent extensions, which are related to a "proportion" of similar computational histories. So with comp "Mary Smith coming out of a replicator no. 978 at 11:05 AM" is a type. It is the type of all (2^aleph_0) histories going through that event (supposedly well 3-described). From a third person point of view, if you are willing to say that the natural numbers are token (I am neutral on that), then it would make sense to see the nth step of an immaterial execution of a DU, (or an enumeration of the true sigma_1 arithmetical sentences) as (immaterial) tokens. But even in that case, there would be no sense to attribute tokenness to "Mary Smith coming out of a replicator no. 978 at 11:05 AM", because there is no way to privilege one instantiation from another. We must take them all, and they constitute highly undecidable sets. > > It appears that in this terminology (actually due to Bernard Williams, > not Parfit) > once generated a token remains the same token until there is another > branching, > but my preference is to generalise the term and say that a token has > only transient > existence, which then makes "token" equivalent to "observer moment". OK. I prefer. With comp it has to correspond to the third person Observer Moment (OM hereafter). They are the true Sigma_1 sentences, or the accessible states by the UD. > This is > literally true, given that from moment to moment, even in the absence > of teleportation > etc., the atoms in your body turn over such that after a certain time > none of the > matter in your body is the "same", and before this time the fact that > some of the > matter in your body is the "same" is accidental and makes no > difference to your > conscious experience. Assuming bodies. I see the point. > > As to whether I am token or type: obviously, literally, > I-who-write-this-now am a > token. This looks like the first person OM. It is different from the preceding one. The 3-OM are enumerable, even recursively enumerable. The 1-OM are enumerable but not recursively enumerable (for those who have the Cutland, it is a simple consequence of Rice theorem). And the similarity classes of the 1-OM (= states plus its relative proportion) has the power of the continuum. > My present token is included in the set of related tokens in the > past, future, > other branches of the multiverse, surreptitious emulations of my mind > made by aliens, > and so on: the type. Note that the definition of a particular token > (especially in my > generalised sense, fixed to a specific and unique position in the > multiverse) can be > made completely unambiguous, How? With comp (with the multiverse = UD*) you have to bet on a level of description of you, and then, even in the lucky case of a correct bet, I still don't see how you will discover you present token, if only because of the many undistinguishable computational histories going through that state (which I recall you can only bet on). This was about your 3-OM token. The situation is even more difficult for the 1-OM token, which is determined in the neighborhood of the infinite. And frankly if you believe a recording can be conscious, don't forget to look for the infinitely any emulation any recording before telling me where is your 1-OM in UD*. > while the definition of a type is necessarily vague and > fuzzy arround the edges. For example, if a being exists somewhere with > 70% of > my memories and 30% of your memories, should he be included in my > type, your type, > a new type, or some combination of these? It is only because we > experience a
RE: Parfit's token and type
Brent Meeker writes: > Russell Standish wrote: > > The NS article is > > > > issue 2556 of New Scientist magazine, 19 June 2006, page 50 > > > > the actual published work is > > > > Cell, vol 122, p 133 > > > > What he measured was the age of carbon in DNA, which is only a tiny > > fraction of the total number of atoms making up a cell. So I guess you > > are right in your more restricted meaning of "same". > > > > Cheers > > I wonder what part of neuron remains over a long period time. I can well > understand > the electrolytes and other components that are part of the metabolic cycle > turning > over fairly quickly. But what about the structural protiens that give shape > to the > axons? What about the myline sheath? Do they really turn over quickly too? All cellular components are continuously being repaired and replaced, including structural ones. I am not sure of the actual figures for individual components in human brains but probably protein turnover has a haf-life of days. For example, experiments with radiolabeled tyrosine suggest that half the protein in a mouse brain turns over every ten days: http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1164796 Jesse Mazer quoted a study a while ago suggesting that turnover of synaptic structures was even more rapid, a matter of minutes, but I cannot find the reference. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Parfit's token and type
Russell Standish wrote: > The NS article is > > issue 2556 of New Scientist magazine, 19 June 2006, page 50 > > the actual published work is > > Cell, vol 122, p 133 > > What he measured was the age of carbon in DNA, which is only a tiny > fraction of the total number of atoms making up a cell. So I guess you > are right in your more restricted meaning of "same". > > Cheers I wonder what part of neuron remains over a long period time. I can well understand the electrolytes and other components that are part of the metabolic cycle turning over fairly quickly. But what about the structural protiens that give shape to the axons? What about the myline sheath? Do they really turn over quickly too? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Parfit's token and type
The NS article is issue 2556 of New Scientist magazine, 19 June 2006, page 50 the actual published work is Cell, vol 122, p 133 What he measured was the age of carbon in DNA, which is only a tiny fraction of the total number of atoms making up a cell. So I guess you are right in your more restricted meaning of "same". Cheers On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 11:52:49AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Russell Standish writes: > > > On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 12:35:44AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > This is > > > literally true, given that from moment to moment, even in the absence of > > > teleportation > > > etc., the atoms in your body turn over such that after a certain time > > > none of the > > > matter in your body is the "same", and before this time the fact that > > > some of the > > > matter in your body is the "same" is accidental and makes no difference > > > to your > > > conscious experience. > > > > > > > We _really_ need to dispell this myth. It turns out that A bomb tests > > prior to the partial test ban treaty provides a unique clock that > > allows one to measure when a particular cell was born. It turns out > > that whilst this statement is true of various organs (eg the gut in > > particular), neurons turn out to have an average age just two years > > less than the age of the person (as measured in cadavers), ie most are > > born during the rapid brain expansion that occurs during the first two > > years of life. > > > > This is crucial, because I would suspect that neurons have far more > > relevance to one's person, than do gut cells. > > > > I posted on this before - it was reported in a recent New Scientist. I > > can dig out the reference if people are interested. > > I'd be interested in the reference. However, I wasn't referring to turnover > of cells, but > to turnover of components of cells. Water and electrolytes are freely and > continuously > turned over while proteins and other structural components are continuously > breaking > down and being replaced. I'm not sure of the numbers but I would guess that > only a tiny > percentage of the matter in a neuron would be the same years later. If there > are trillions > of radioactive atoms to begin with then by chance some of them will persist > in a particular > cell provided it does not die. What is actually preserved in a neuron which > survives over > the course of a person's life is a rough template and physical continuity, > not the matter it > is comprised of. But for a few lucky atoms, ordinary living is equivalent to > destructive > teleportation. > > Stathis Papaiaonnou > _ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d > -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Parfit's token and type
Russell Standish writes: > On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 12:35:44AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > This is > > literally true, given that from moment to moment, even in the absence of > > teleportation > > etc., the atoms in your body turn over such that after a certain time none > > of the > > matter in your body is the "same", and before this time the fact that some > > of the > > matter in your body is the "same" is accidental and makes no difference to > > your > > conscious experience. > > > > We _really_ need to dispell this myth. It turns out that A bomb tests > prior to the partial test ban treaty provides a unique clock that > allows one to measure when a particular cell was born. It turns out > that whilst this statement is true of various organs (eg the gut in > particular), neurons turn out to have an average age just two years > less than the age of the person (as measured in cadavers), ie most are > born during the rapid brain expansion that occurs during the first two > years of life. > > This is crucial, because I would suspect that neurons have far more > relevance to one's person, than do gut cells. > > I posted on this before - it was reported in a recent New Scientist. I > can dig out the reference if people are interested. I'd be interested in the reference. However, I wasn't referring to turnover of cells, but to turnover of components of cells. Water and electrolytes are freely and continuously turned over while proteins and other structural components are continuously breaking down and being replaced. I'm not sure of the numbers but I would guess that only a tiny percentage of the matter in a neuron would be the same years later. If there are trillions of radioactive atoms to begin with then by chance some of them will persist in a particular cell provided it does not die. What is actually preserved in a neuron which survives over the course of a person's life is a rough template and physical continuity, not the matter it is comprised of. But for a few lucky atoms, ordinary living is equivalent to destructive teleportation. Stathis Papaiaonnou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Parfit's token and type
On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 12:35:44AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > This is > literally true, given that from moment to moment, even in the absence of > teleportation > etc., the atoms in your body turn over such that after a certain time none of > the > matter in your body is the "same", and before this time the fact that some of > the > matter in your body is the "same" is accidental and makes no difference to > your > conscious experience. > We _really_ need to dispell this myth. It turns out that A bomb tests prior to the partial test ban treaty provides a unique clock that allows one to measure when a particular cell was born. It turns out that whilst this statement is true of various organs (eg the gut in particular), neurons turn out to have an average age just two years less than the age of the person (as measured in cadavers), ie most are born during the rapid brain expansion that occurs during the first two years of life. This is crucial, because I would suspect that neurons have far more relevance to one's person, than do gut cells. I posted on this before - it was reported in a recent New Scientist. I can dig out the reference if people are interested. -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
