Re: RITSIAR (was Numbers, Machine and Father Ted)
Le 03-nov.-06, à 15:06, 1Z a écrit : We don't *have* to assume that there is a gulf between the first personal and third personal. A gulf? Do you agree there is at least a difference? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RITSIAR (was Numbers, Machine and Father Ted)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 03-nov.-06, à 15:06, 1Z a écrit : We don't *have* to assume that there is a gulf between the first personal and third personal. A gulf? Do you agree there is at least a difference? The difference boils down to the incommuncability of certain things, as far as I can see. But (in)communicability isn't an absolute. It depends what you are communicating and how. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RITSIAR (was Numbers, Machine and Father Ted)
Le 09-nov.-06, à 13:57, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 03-nov.-06, à 15:06, 1Z a écrit : We don't *have* to assume that there is a gulf between the first personal and third personal. A gulf? Do you agree there is at least a difference? The difference boils down to the incommuncability of certain things, as far as I can see. But (in)communicability isn't an absolute. It depends what you are communicating and how. I think that the incommunicability of the first person indeterminacy, which occurs in self-duplication experiment/experience, is absolute, unless we belong to duplicated populations in which case we can share the indeterminacy and even win money by betting on it (but then I call it first person PLURAL indeterminacy). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RITSIAR (was Numbers, Machine and Father Ted)
Le 02-nov.-06, à 17:34, David Nyman a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't understand really what you mean by AUDA is not RITSIAR. AUDA is just the lobian interview, or if you prefer the complete mathematical formalization of the UDA reasoning. In some sense you can interpret it as the eventual elimination of the yes doctor hypothesis in the UDA argument (but here I do simplify a little bit). Yes, sorry, perhaps I should have said 'if number is not RITSIAR, is anything?' The intention behind the question is to find out how and where you would apply RITSIAR in your schema - if at all - because Peter has been willing to do this but you haven't. I just want to know why. I recall RITSIAR = Real In The Same Sense That I Am Real (introduced by Peter). Now, the notion of existence is very difficult, and the notion of personal existence is still more difficult, and was the object of the debate. Take the expression I am real. Does it mean I am real and this is something I cannot doubt about, in which case I refer to the first person, or is it my physical body is real, in which case it refers to a third person description of I based on some theory (for example physics, or comp, etc.). So RITSIAR is an highly ambiguous which presuppose many points we were arguing about. Let me try shortly to make it less ambiguous in the frame of the AUDA. Now I cannot be 100% rigorous without being long and boring, so I ask you some indulgence, and I am just trying to convey the idea. As you know I am realist or platonist about numbers and their arithmetical relations. For example I believe in theorem like all numbers can be written as a sum of four square (Lagrange theorem). I take such a truth as being completely independent of me, you, time, place. I take such truth as being primitive and beyond time and space, a-physical if you want. Now I also believe in 1-persons, or souls, etc. I am not a solipsist, and I really believe in my own current experience, but also in yours even if I am currently feeling them differently. I don't believe at all that a first person experience is a number, nor do I believe any first person can believe to be a number. Still, I assume comp, so there must be a relation between 1-person experience and numbers. Indeed persons can manifest themselves relatively to me when they are related to some computations (brain activity with comp and some high substitution level for making things simple). Those computations define or are defined by complex set of counterfactuals, and UDA shows that physics emerge or should emerge (with comp) from their structure. It is plausible because quantum logic can already be seen as a logic of counterfactuals. How to get them, and what the results will say for RITSIAR ? Let me give you all the person point of views (pov), that is the complete science and theology of a simple lobian machine like PA (Peano Arithmetic). It is a fact that if M1 and M2 are lobian machine, and if M2 has stronger provability abilities than M1, then M2 can prove both the science and the theology of M1. But NO lobian machine can prove its own theology without becoming inconsistent, they can only abductively infer their own theology: 0-person pov = arithmetical truth. This can be shown ineffable or non definable by the machine (Tarski theorem). In the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus' TOE, it corresponds to the ONE. It is the big unameable entity at the origin of all forms of existence. 3-person pov = arithmetical provability. It is the self-referential godelian provability predicate. The fundamental thing here is that the incompleteness phenomenon splits it into two parts, each of which are captured by a modal logic: G and G* respectively. G captures what the machine can prove about herself, and G* captures in addition what is true about the machine but unprovable by the machine (like self-consistency for example). G axiomatizes the self-referentially correct science of the machine, and G* minus G axiomatizes the correct theology that the machine can infer without proving (its hope-space if you want). In the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus' TOE, it corresponds to the INTELLECT. Terrestrial or discursive = G, divine = G*. Please note that G and G* capture self-referentially correct *3-person* statements, like someone talking about his own brain with his doctor. It is I with I = my 3-description of my body. It is not the I with I = my soul, or my experiences ... The 1-person point of view. I identify him/it/her with the incorrigible knower. By Godel's second incompleteness theorem, no correct machine can prove its own incorrigibility. But that fact makes it possible to define the knower by making the explicit conjunction of truth and provability, for example by defining a new modal connector like Kp = Bp p. This is what actually Theaetetus has proposed to Socrates when Socrates asked him to define
Re: RITSIAR (was Numbers, Machine and Father Ted)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 02-nov.-06, à 17:34, David Nyman a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't understand really what you mean by AUDA is not RITSIAR. AUDA is just the lobian interview, or if you prefer the complete mathematical formalization of the UDA reasoning. In some sense you can interpret it as the eventual elimination of the yes doctor hypothesis in the UDA argument (but here I do simplify a little bit). Yes, sorry, perhaps I should have said 'if number is not RITSIAR, is anything?' The intention behind the question is to find out how and where you would apply RITSIAR in your schema - if at all - because Peter has been willing to do this but you haven't. I just want to know why. I recall RITSIAR = Real In The Same Sense That I Am Real (introduced by Peter). Now, the notion of existence is very difficult, and the notion of personal existence is still more difficult, and was the object of the debate. Take the expression I am real. Does it mean I am real and this is something I cannot doubt about, in which case I refer to the first person, or is it my physical body is real, in which case it refers to a third person description of I based on some theory (for example physics, or comp, etc.). We don't *have* to assume that there is a gulf between the first personal and third personal. So RITSIAR is an highly ambiguous which presuppose many points we were arguing about. Let me try shortly to make it less ambiguous in the frame of the AUDA. Now I cannot be 100% rigorous without being long and boring, so I ask you some indulgence, and I am just trying to convey the idea. As you know I am realist or platonist about numbers and their arithmetical relations. For example I believe in theorem like all numbers can be written as a sum of four square (Lagrange theorem). I take such a truth as being completely independent of me, you, time, place. I take such truth as being primitive and beyond time and space, a-physical if you want. Now I also believe in 1-persons, or souls, etc. I am not a solipsist, and I really believe in my own current experience, but also in yours even if I am currently feeling them differently. I don't believe at all that a first person experience is a number, nor do I believe any first person can believe to be a number. Still, I assume comp, so there must be a relation between 1-person experience and numbers. Indeed persons can manifest themselves relatively to me when they are related to some computations (brain activity with comp and some high substitution level for making things simple). Those computations define or are defined by complex set of counterfactuals, and UDA shows that physics emerge or should emerge (with comp) from their structure. It is plausible because quantum logic can already be seen as a logic of counterfactuals. How to get them, and what the results will say for RITSIAR ? Let me give you all the person point of views (pov), that is the complete science and theology of a simple lobian machine like PA (Peano Arithmetic). It is a fact that if M1 and M2 are lobian machine, and if M2 has stronger provability abilities than M1, then M2 can prove both the science and the theology of M1. But NO lobian machine can prove its own theology without becoming inconsistent, they can only abductively infer their own theology: 0-person pov = arithmetical truth. This can be shown ineffable or non definable by the machine (Tarski theorem). In the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus' TOE, it corresponds to the ONE. It is the big unameable entity at the origin of all forms of existence. Don't entities have to exist? 3-person pov = arithmetical provability. It is the self-referential godelian provability predicate. The fundamental thing here is that the incompleteness phenomenon splits it into two parts, each of which are captured by a modal logic: G and G* respectively. G captures what the machine can prove about herself, and G* captures in addition what is true about the machine but unprovable by the machine (like self-consistency for example). G axiomatizes the self-referentially correct science of the machine, and G* minus G axiomatizes the correct theology that the machine can infer without proving (its hope-space if you want). In the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus' TOE, it corresponds to the INTELLECT. Terrestrial or discursive = G, divine = G*. Please note that G and G* capture self-referentially correct *3-person* statements, like someone talking about his own brain with his doctor. It is I with I = my 3-description of my body. It is not the I with I = my soul, or my experiences ... The 1-person point of view. I identify him/it/her with the incorrigible knower. By Godel's second incompleteness theorem, no correct machine can prove its own incorrigibility. But that fact makes it possible to define the knower by making the explicit conjunction of
