Re: Platonia and causality
Hi Günther, On 30 Nov 2008, at 18:53, Günther Greindl wrote: > > Hi all, > > Bruno, do you still keep a notion of causality and the likes in > platonia? I have collected these snips from some recent posts: OK, I will comment, and perhaps say more for the benefit of the others. But in a nutshell, the simplest notion of "causality" in Platonia is the implication. A "causes" B, if and only A is false or B is true. I recall that "the Platonia" of Peano Arithmetic is just arithmetical truth or the "standard model of Elementary Arithmetic, like the Platonia of Zermelo Fraenkel set theory is (the more dubious) Set Theoretical truth. In some context I can use deduction as a form of Platonist causality, which, for first order Lobian Machine. As expected it is a mathematical causality, and has a priori no relation with physical causality ... Then, you can consider key subset of the implication/deduction causalities: the computational causality, for example A "causes" B if all computations (executed by the UD) going through A are going through B. Or things like that (they will be many variants). All notions should be translatable in formal arithmetic (or combinators, fortran programs, etc.) when we interview the machines in Platonia, notably to retrieve the physical laws (or the believe in the physical laws). When this is done we should have the comp physical notions capable of explaining or intuitive notion of physical causality. > > > Brent Meeker wrote: > >> But is causality an implementation detail? There seems to be an >> implicit >> assumption that digitally represented states form a sequence just >> because there >> is a rule that defines that sequence, but in fact all digital (and >> other) >> sequences depend on causal chains. > > Kory wrote: > >> I have an intuition that causality >> (or its logical equivalent in Platonia) is somehow important for >> consciousness. You argue that the the slide from Fully-Functional >> Alice to Lucky Alice (or Fully-Functional Firefox to Lucky Firefox) >> indicates that there's something wrong with this idea. However, you >> have an intuition that order is somehow important for consciousness. > > But we must realise that causality is a concept that is deeply related > (cognitively, in humans) to time and physical change. I agree. Especially physical causality. But even the notion of "responsibility" is deeply related to time (and causality). > > > But both time and space _emerge_ only from the inside view (1st person > or 1st person shareable) in the sum over all computations. Assuming comp, and that we are correct, ok. > > > In Platonia (viewed, for the time being, ludicrously and impossibly, > from the outside) A powerfull lobian machine like ZF can do this, looking at some Platonia, in a precise way when reasoning on the "Platonia" of a simpler sound Lobian Machine. (Even for the 1-Platonias, the first person pov in Platonia (this gives the hypostases)). > - there is no notion of time, space, sequentiality, > before and after. Right. But don't overlook that the number zero is before the number one, which is itself before the number two, which is before the number three, etc. (With "before" interpreted by minus one). The UD itself has a first computation step, then a second, then a third, etc. But like "a movie", you can look at all of them, well if you are infinitely patient of course, and immortal. It is in that sense (before making things more technical) that the UD computes in Platonia. > > > The very notion of causation must be one that arises only in the > inside > view, as a "succession" of consistent patterns. OK. > > > In a sense, order (shareable histories) must arise from the Platonic > Eternal Mess (chaos) -> somehow along the lines of self-organization > maybe: > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-organization#Self-organization_in_mathematics_and_computer_science > > In this sense, the computations would "assemble themselves" to > "consistent histories". > > Bruno said: >> Even >> in Platonia consciousness does not supervene on description of the >> computation, even if those description are 100% precise and correct > > Hmm, I understand the difference between description and computation > in > maths and logic, and also in real world, but I do not know if this > still > makes sense in Platonia -> viewed from the acausal perspective > outlined > above. Well maybe in the sense that in some histories there will be > platonic descriptions that are not conscious. > > But in other histories those descriptions will be computations and > conscious. A "movie" *in* Platonia, would be a description of a computation encoded in some static way by some occasional program or entity. Even in Platonia, such a description is not a computation, but only a description (without any causality, even in the simple imlication/ deduction sense). It is the difference between the fact
Re: Platonia and causality
On Nov 30, 2008, at 9:53 AM, Günther Greindl wrote: > Kory wrote: > >> I have an intuition that causality >> (or its logical equivalent in Platonia) is somehow important for >> consciousness. You argue that the the slide from Fully-Functional >> Alice to Lucky Alice (or Fully-Functional Firefox to Lucky Firefox) >> indicates that there's something wrong with this idea. However, you >> have an intuition that order is somehow important for consciousness. > > But we must realise that causality is a concept that is deeply related > (cognitively, in humans) to time and physical change. > > But both time and space _emerge_ only from the inside view (1st person > or 1st person shareable) in the sum over all computations. > > In Platonia (viewed, for the time being, ludicrously and impossibly, > from the outside) - there is no notion of time, space, sequentiality, > before and after. > > The very notion of causation must be one that arises only in the > inside > view, as a "succession" of consistent patterns. For what it's worth, I do think that that there's a *kind* of causality in Platonia. Let me once again trot out the picture of a platonic block universe in which the initial state is the binary digits of PI, and the succeeding states are determined by the rules of Conway's Life. This block universe exists unchangingly and eternally in Platonia, but the states of the bits within it are related in a kind of causal fashion. The state of each bit in the block is determined (in a sense, "caused") by the pyramid of cells beneath it, stretching back to the initial state, which is determined by the algorithm for computing the binary digits of PI. In this sense, causality is an essential aspect of the platonic notion of computation. One might argue that this is really a misuse of the concept of "causality" - that I should just talk about the necessary logical relationships that are there "by definition" in my platonic object. But my point is that these logical relationships fill the exact role that "causality" is supposed to fill for the physicalist. When patterns of bits within this platonic block universe "discuss" their own physics, they might talk about how current configurations of physical matter were "caused" by previous states. The logical connections in Platonia are a good candidate for what they can actually be talking about. This platonic form of "causality" may not always be directly related to the concept of time that patterns of bits in a block universe might have. For instance, there's a cellular automaton rule (which deserves to be much more widely known than it is) called Critters which is as simple as Conway's Life, uses only bits (on or off), is known to be computation universal, and is also fully reversible. This gets weird, because the computational structures within a Critters block universe will still seem to favor one direction in time - they'll store memories about the "past" and try to anticipate the "future", etc. But in fact, our own physics seems to be reversible, so we have these same issues to work out regarding our own consciousness. The point is that, within a Critters block universe in Platonia, the states will still be logically related to each other in a way that precisely matches what physicists in the block universe (the "critters within Critters"!) would think of as causality. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonia and causality
Günther, This analysis is also needed for the counterfactual objection to MGA to be fully fleshed-out... the counterfactuals on the physical level need to correspond to counterfactuals on the platonic level, presumably arising from a notion of causality on the platonic level. Perhaps we could see causation in Platonia as some form of direct logical implication. This works despite the timeless nature of platonia... but it also introduces a dependance on the particular axiomization used to represent a logical structure. One axiomization of numbers might give rise to a somewhat different causal structure than another. --Abram On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 12:53 PM, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Hi all, > > Bruno, do you still keep a notion of causality and the likes in > platonia? I have collected these snips from some recent posts: > > Brent Meeker wrote: > > >But is causality an implementation detail? There seems to be an > >implicit > >assumption that digitally represented states form a sequence just > >because there > >is a rule that defines that sequence, but in fact all digital (and > >other) > >sequences depend on causal chains. > > Kory wrote: > > > I have an intuition that causality > >(or its logical equivalent in Platonia) is somehow important for > >consciousness. You argue that the the slide from Fully-Functional > >Alice to Lucky Alice (or Fully-Functional Firefox to Lucky Firefox) > >indicates that there's something wrong with this idea. However, you > >have an intuition that order is somehow important for consciousness. > > But we must realise that causality is a concept that is deeply related > (cognitively, in humans) to time and physical change. > > But both time and space _emerge_ only from the inside view (1st person > or 1st person shareable) in the sum over all computations. > > In Platonia (viewed, for the time being, ludicrously and impossibly, > from the outside) - there is no notion of time, space, sequentiality, > before and after. > > The very notion of causation must be one that arises only in the inside > view, as a "succession" of consistent patterns. > > In a sense, order (shareable histories) must arise from the Platonic > Eternal Mess (chaos) -> somehow along the lines of self-organization maybe: > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-organization#Self-organization_in_mathematics_and_computer_science > > In this sense, the computations would "assemble themselves" to > "consistent histories". > > Bruno said: > >Even > >in Platonia consciousness does not supervene on description of the > >computation, even if those description are 100% precise and correct > > Hmm, I understand the difference between description and computation in > maths and logic, and also in real world, but I do not know if this still > makes sense in Platonia -> viewed from the acausal perspective outlined > above. Well maybe in the sense that in some histories there will be > platonic descriptions that are not conscious. > > But in other histories those descriptions will be computations and > conscious. > > Cheers, > Günther > > > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonia and causality
Günther Greindl wrote: > Hi all, > > Bruno, do you still keep a notion of causality and the likes in > platonia? I have collected these snips from some recent posts: > > Brent Meeker wrote: > > >But is causality an implementation detail? There seems to be an > >implicit > >assumption that digitally represented states form a sequence just > >because there > >is a rule that defines that sequence, but in fact all digital (and > >other) > >sequences depend on causal chains. > > Kory wrote: > > > I have an intuition that causality > >(or its logical equivalent in Platonia) is somehow important for > >consciousness. You argue that the the slide from Fully-Functional > >Alice to Lucky Alice (or Fully-Functional Firefox to Lucky Firefox) > >indicates that there's something wrong with this idea. However, you > >have an intuition that order is somehow important for consciousness. > > But we must realise that causality is a concept that is deeply related > (cognitively, in humans) to time and physical change. > > But both time and space _emerge_ only from the inside view (1st person > or 1st person shareable) in the sum over all computations. > > In Platonia (viewed, for the time being, ludicrously and impossibly, > from the outside) - there is no notion of time, space, sequentiality, > before and after. > > The very notion of causation must be one that arises only in the inside > view, as a "succession" of consistent patterns. I agree. But what is it about the patterns that creates a succession as viewed from "the inside"? And how do we know that this does not obtain in the projection of the MGA? Brent > > In a sense, order (shareable histories) must arise from the Platonic > Eternal Mess (chaos) -> somehow along the lines of self-organization maybe: > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-organization#Self-organization_in_mathematics_and_computer_science > > In this sense, the computations would "assemble themselves" to > "consistent histories". > > Bruno said: > >Even > >in Platonia consciousness does not supervene on description of the > >computation, even if those description are 100% precise and correct > > Hmm, I understand the difference between description and computation in > maths and logic, and also in real world, but I do not know if this still > makes sense in Platonia -> viewed from the acausal perspective outlined > above. Well maybe in the sense that in some histories there will be > platonic descriptions that are not conscious. > > But in other histories those descriptions will be computations and > conscious. > > Cheers, > Günther > > > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
