This analysis is also needed for the counterfactual objection to MGA
to be fully fleshed-out... the counterfactuals on the physical level
need to correspond to counterfactuals on the platonic level,
presumably arising from a notion of causality on the platonic level.
Perhaps we could see causation in Platonia as some form of direct
logical implication. This works despite the timeless nature of
platonia... but it also introduces a dependance on the particular
axiomization used to represent a logical structure. One axiomization
of numbers might give rise to a somewhat different causal structure
than another.


On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 12:53 PM, Günther Greindl
> Hi all,
> Bruno, do you still keep a notion of causality and the likes in
> platonia? I have collected these snips from some recent posts:
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>  >But is causality an implementation detail?  There seems to be an
>  >implicit
>  >assumption that digitally represented states form a sequence just
>  >because there
>  >is a rule that defines that sequence, but in fact all digital (and
>  >other)
>  >sequences depend on causal chains.
> Kory wrote:
>  > I have an intuition that causality
>  >(or its logical equivalent in Platonia) is somehow important for
>  >consciousness. You argue that the the slide from Fully-Functional
>  >Alice to Lucky Alice (or Fully-Functional Firefox to Lucky Firefox)
>  >indicates that there's something wrong with this idea. However, you
>  >have an intuition that order is somehow important for consciousness.
> But we must realise that causality is a concept that is deeply related
> (cognitively, in humans) to time and physical change.
> But both time and space _emerge_ only from the inside view (1st person
> or 1st person shareable) in the sum over all computations.
> In Platonia (viewed, for the time being, ludicrously and impossibly,
> from the outside) - there is no notion of time, space, sequentiality,
> before and after.
> The very notion of causation must be one that arises only in the inside
> view, as a "succession" of consistent patterns.
> In a sense, order (shareable histories) must arise from the Platonic
> Eternal Mess (chaos) -> somehow along the lines of self-organization maybe:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-organization#Self-organization_in_mathematics_and_computer_science
> In this sense, the computations would "assemble themselves" to
> "consistent histories".
> Bruno said:
>  >Even
>  >in Platonia consciousness does not supervene on description of the
>  >computation, even if those description are 100% precise and correct
> Hmm, I understand the difference between description and computation in
> maths and logic, and also in real world, but I do not know if this still
> makes sense in Platonia -> viewed from the acausal perspective outlined
> above. Well maybe in the sense that in some histories there will be
> platonic descriptions that are not conscious.
> But in other histories those descriptions will be computations and
> conscious.
> Cheers,
> Günther
> >

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