Re: Spinoza, Leibniz and Descartes on the mind-body problem
On 18 Nov 2013, at 15:36, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Mon, Nov 18, 2013 at 3:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Nov 2013, at 14:41, Roger Clough wrote: Spinoza, Leibniz and Descartes are completely different on the relationship between mind and matter See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#DesSpiLei Spinoza was a monist, who believed that mind and matter were one. Are you sure? It seems to me that Spinoza defended what is called today "neutral monism": the idea that both matter and mind (which are taken as obviously very different) are coming from one different thing. Computationalism is neutral monist in that sense, where the "different thing" is the arithmetical reality. Descartes believed that mind and matter are totally different OK. But Descartes, imo, became aware of the depth of the rabbit hole this entails. It is hard to say, because Descartes was limited in his prose by the authoritarianism of his epoch. I read him in between the lines. Interesting. I always assumed that Descartes was oblivious to the problems with dualism. But I really like his idea of starting with the cogito. I appreciate very much Descartes, mainly for his meditations (with the dream argument, and the cogito), and his unfinished text "in the search of truth". His dualism is coherent with his mechanism, except that he refers to God (but then it is close to Plotinus' theory of matter), instead of arithmetical truth (but of course he lacks Gödel's discovery). I don't think Descartes ever took the idea of a substance-dualism seriously. He might not be a dulaist in that sense. Of course the Aristotelians jumps on that "cartesian" dualist wagon, but when you read Descartes, you don't see evidence for such a dualism. With Plotinus (that Descartes seems to ignore), Descartes is close to computationalism both on mind and matter. He could have studied more his predecessors, if only to better argue. It is normal. Those who have genuine personal deep question always try to answer them by themselves (and they reinvent the wheel, here and there). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Spinoza, Leibniz and Descartes on the mind-body problem
On Mon, Nov 18, 2013 at 3:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 18 Nov 2013, at 14:41, Roger Clough wrote: > > Spinoza, Leibniz and Descartes are completely different on the relationship > between mind and matter See > > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#DesSpiLei > > Spinoza was a monist, who believed that mind and matter were one. > > > Are you sure? It seems to me that Spinoza defended what is called today > "neutral monism": the idea that both matter and mind (which are taken as > obviously very different) are coming from one different thing. > Computationalism is neutral monist in that sense, where the "different > thing" is the arithmetical reality. > > > > Descartes believed that mind and matter are totally different > > > OK. But Descartes, imo, became aware of the depth of the rabbit hole this > entails. It is hard to say, because Descartes was limited in his prose by > the authoritarianism of his epoch. I read him in between the lines. Interesting. I always assumed that Descartes was oblivious to the problems with dualism. But I really like his idea of starting with the cogito. > > Leibniz beleived that mind was a monad or mental aspect of matter. > > > And this makes him still a materialist, by which I mean a believer in some > ontologically independent substance. > > > > Bertrand Ruseell said that there are two forms of knowing: > > a) Knowing scientifically or objectively (knowing by description) > Example: you know who Obama is from the newspapers. > > b) Knowing by acquaintance or experience (knowing subjectively) > Example: you know who Obama is because you have met him. > > > Yes, and such a difference is made very clear in the 1p/3p distinction that > we have to take into account to understand that materialism is eventually > not compatible with mechanism. > It can be translated in arithmetic, and Bertrand Russell's distinction is > well captured by the difference between Bp & p and Bp. Note that this would > not work without the incompleteness result. > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Spinoza, Leibniz and Descartes on the mind-body problem
On 18 Nov 2013, at 14:41, Roger Clough wrote: Spinoza, Leibniz and Descartes are completely different on the relationship between mind and matter See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#DesSpiLei Spinoza was a monist, who believed that mind and matter were one. Are you sure? It seems to me that Spinoza defended what is called today "neutral monism": the idea that both matter and mind (which are taken as obviously very different) are coming from one different thing. Computationalism is neutral monist in that sense, where the "different thing" is the arithmetical reality. Descartes believed that mind and matter are totally different OK. But Descartes, imo, became aware of the depth of the rabbit hole this entails. It is hard to say, because Descartes was limited in his prose by the authoritarianism of his epoch. I read him in between the lines. Leibniz beleived that mind was a monad or mental aspect of matter. And this makes him still a materialist, by which I mean a believer in some ontologically independent substance. Bertrand Ruseell said that there are two forms of knowing: a) Knowing scientifically or objectively (knowing by description) Example: you know who Obama is from the newspapers. b) Knowing by acquaintance or experience (knowing subjectively) Example: you know who Obama is because you have met him. Yes, and such a difference is made very clear in the 1p/3p distinction that we have to take into account to understand that materialism is eventually not compatible with mechanism. It can be translated in arithmetic, and Bertrand Russell's distinction is well captured by the difference between Bp & p and Bp. Note that this would not work without the incompleteness result. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
