ERRATA
I am sorry. I guess I was a bit flighty with my post yesterday.
DON'T READ:
>In experiment A, one box is put in *paradise* and 999 999 are put in
>*hell*.
>In experiment B, one box is put in *hell* and 999 999 are put in
>*paradise*.
>
>(I suppose also that the different places in *he
Wei Dai wrote:
>Given the MWI or one of the "everything" theories we've discussed, the
>universe must contain multiple observers who have exactly the same
>memories and experiences as you do. Should you identify with all of them,
>or should you think, "I am one of these people, but I don't know wh
On Thu, Apr 01, 1999 at 06:36:31PM -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Wouldn't the situation most relevant to the question of identity be one
> where the two people in the room are both copies of you? Where you can
> know that each would do exactly the same thing?
The reason I didn't use a scenar
Wei Dai, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, writes, regarding whether we should
identify with exact copies of ourselves:
> I think the following thought experiment shows the latter is more
> appropriate. Suppose you are one of two people in a prisoner's dilemma
> type game, where if you push button A both playe
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