Re: all of me or one of me
ERRATA I am sorry. I guess I was a bit flighty with my post yesterday. DON'T READ: >In experiment A, one box is put in *paradise* and 999 999 are put in >*hell*. >In experiment B, one box is put in *hell* and 999 999 are put in >*paradise*. > >(I suppose also that the different places in *hell* (resp. *paradise*) >are distinctibles. Let us call that the DISTINCT hypothesis) > >What will you choose ? > >I would answer: if for some reason I know I will never open the door, I > don't care and I can choose between A and B randomly. If I know I WILL >open the door then I choose A. BUT READ (the only change is the last letter): >In experiment A, one box is put in *paradise* and 999 999 are put in >*hell*. >In experiment B, one box is put in *hell* and 999 999 are put in >*paradise*. > >(I suppose also that the different places in *hell* (resp. *paradise*) >are distinctibles. Let us call that the DISTINCT hypothesis) > >What will you choose ? > >I would answer: if for some reason I know I will never open the door, I > don't care and I can choose between A and B randomly. If I know I WILL >open the door then I choose B. Obviously. (Obviously ?)
Re: all of me or one of me
Wei Dai wrote: >Given the MWI or one of the "everything" theories we've discussed, the >universe must contain multiple observers who have exactly the same >memories and experiences as you do. Should you identify with all of them, >or should you think, "I am one of these people, but I don't know which"? > >I think the following thought experiment shows the latter is more >appropriate ... I have the same understanding. Nevertheless I would like to try to make something a little more precise. Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that there are two and only two identical non-interacting and non-interfering newtonian-like universes. So there are two copies of you, one in each universe. In this situation you can say: "I am one of these people, but I don't know which" You can even say "I am one of these people, I don't know which, AND I don't care" But suppose that in the course of your "life time", the two universes "diverge" for some reason, so that a detectable (in principle) difference appears. In that case, even if the difference is not detected, you MUST say "I am one of these people, but I don't know which", and you must take that into account if you hope to describe a coherent way to quantify the indeterminism coming from the "everything" axiom. The "probabilities" depends on the relative proportion of relatively undistinguishable environments. Do you see what I am trying to say ? Do you agree ? Bruno
Re: all of me or one of me
On Thu, Apr 01, 1999 at 06:36:31PM -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Wouldn't the situation most relevant to the question of identity be one > where the two people in the room are both copies of you? Where you can > know that each would do exactly the same thing? The reason I didn't use a scenario with copies is because the copies might care about each other as much as they care about themselves, which would complicate the situation. In my scenario it's clearer that the two players are not altrustic toward each other. I think we can abstract away the problem that they won't have exactly identical memories and experiences and assume that the temporary amnesia treatment actually makes them completely identical. > If you knew that each would do the same thing, I think you would push A. > As I recall, if Hofstadter set up different scenarios to try to get > people to push A. The other fellow is your identical twin, etc. When he > finally got to where the "other player" was just the player in a mirror, > then finally people would push A. With two instances of the same person, > I think it would be as certain as myself in the mirror. It is not necessary to invoke "superrationality" in order to get the result that both players should press A. If each player cannot tell which player he is in the game, conventional rationality in the form of decision theory actually tells him to press A. Unlike Hofstadter, who thinks the players SHOULD press A, I think they SHOULDN'T, and therefore decision theory must be incomplete. So basicly I'm making a similar point as Hofstadter, but in the opposite direction.
Re: all of me or one of me
Wei Dai, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, writes, regarding whether we should identify with exact copies of ourselves: > I think the following thought experiment shows the latter is more > appropriate. Suppose you are one of two people in a prisoner's dilemma > type game, where if you push button A both players will get 4 dollars, but > if you push button B you will get 5 dollars and the other player will get > nothing. The twist is that both players are given temporary amnesia and > are put into identical rooms so you don't know what your identity is. > > If you identify with both players, then you should press A. However I > think most people under the circumstances will press B. This is similar to the question of "super-rationality" discussed by Douglas Hofstadter in his Scientific American column in the 1980s. He set up a similar thought experiment and he found that most people he asked would in fact push B. However in his case he simply had everyone be in roughly the same situation, that is, they had their individual personalities intact but they were presented identical scenarios, and they knew that each person was presented an identical scenario. Wei sharpens the situation so that the players have temporary amnesia and don't remember who they are. This would make it more plausible that each would do the same thing. But still they might have different personalities, tendencies, reasoning abilities, etc. Wouldn't the situation most relevant to the question of identity be one where the two people in the room are both copies of you? Where you can know that each would do exactly the same thing? If you knew that each would do the same thing, I think you would push A. As I recall, if Hofstadter set up different scenarios to try to get people to push A. The other fellow is your identical twin, etc. When he finally got to where the "other player" was just the player in a mirror, then finally people would push A. With two instances of the same person, I think it would be as certain as myself in the mirror. Hal
