Dear Terry and colleagues,
(...) , there cannot be interminable regress of this displacement to
establish these norms. At some point normativity requires ontological
grounding where the grounded normative relation is the preservation of
the systemic physical properties that produce the
To clarify my previous point about paradox:
When G. S. Brown deals with re-entrant forms by introducing time, and
Gregory Bateson reframes logical type violation on the analogy of an
electric buzzer, both do indeed include an additional dimension. This is
not the same as Bateson's concept of
Dear Terrence,
Condsider the Russell paradox.
Russell set is R = { x a set | x is not a member of itself}.
If instead we define
R = { x a set | x is not a member of itself, and x is defined PRIOR TO THE
APPLICATION OF THIS DEFINITION}
then R is not a member of itself since it occurs AFTER
Dear Arturo,
I think this formulation is correct and very useful. It implies, in the formal
sense of real implication, a dynamics of emergence of the more complex states.
Gerhard Luhn has also pointed to this emergence (he calls it of 'new laws') as
a property of the universe, of which are our
