Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism

[pedro marijuan]

Dear Plamen and colleagues, 

What you propose is an excellent initiative, besides the multidisciplinary 
nature of that compilation may inspire a genuine dialog on today's sciences and 
phenomenology.

As for Marcos' response, he is quite right (my hurried message was not very 
accurate with some wordings).

Best vacations to all,
--Pedro
BlackBerry de movistar, allí donde estés está tu oficin@

-Original Message-
From: "Dr. Plamen L. Simeonov" 
Sender: Fis 
Date: Sun, 2 Aug 2015 09:54:44 
To: Loet Leydesdorff
Cc: fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism

Dear colleagues,

I think that this discussion about phenomenology, or better said
"phenomenological philosophy", is essential, but may go in the wrong
direction. As for the common grounds that Loet addressed in his note, I
assume that some of us are continuing the path of Varela’s naturalisation
of phenomenology. If you are a bit patient, you can see the results of our
effort in this direction by the end of the year:

http://www.journals.elsevier.com/progress-in-biophysics-and-molecular-biology/call-for-papers/special-theme-issue-on-integral-biomathics-life-sciences-mat/

This special volume is a collection of 41 papers discussing the aspects of
phenomenological philosophy in mathematics, physics, biology and
biosemiotics, incl. FIS contributors (Marijuan, Matsuno, Marchal, Goranson)
and other prominent scientists representing their fields.

I suggest to continue this discussion next year on the grounds of this
volume.

Best wishes,

Plamen



On Sun, Aug 2, 2015 at 9:09 AM, Loet Leydesdorff 
wrote:

> Dear colleagues,
>
>
>
> Without wishing to defend Husserl, let me try to formulate what is
> according to my knowledge core to his contribution. The message is that the
> transcendental intersubjectivity is phenomenologically present in our
> reality. He therefore returns to Descartes' (much rejected) distinction
> between *res extensa* and *res cogitans*. Intersubjectivity is *res
> cogitans*. It is not "being" like in the Latin *esse*, but it remains
> reflexively available. Thus, we cannot test it. The philosophy of science
> which follows (in "*The Crisis*") is anti-positivistic. The
> intersubjectivity is constructed and we live in these constructions.
>
>
>
> Descartes focused on the subjective *Cogito*. According to him, we meet
> in the doubting, the Other as not limited and biologically constrained,
> that is, God or the Transcendency. Husserl shifts the attention to the
> *cogitatum*: that about what we are in doubt. We no longer find a hold in
> Transcendency, but we find the other as other persons. Persons relate to
> one another not only in "being", but also in terms of expectations. This
> was elaborated as "dual contingency" (among others, by Parsons). The
> dynamics of inter-personal expectations, for example, drive scholarly
> discourses, but also stock exchanges.
>
>
>
> Alfred Schutz was a student and admirer of Husserl, but he did not accept
> the Cartesian duality implied. He writes: "As long as we are born from
> mothers ..." He then developed sociological phenomenology (Luckmann and
> others), which begins with the meta-individual phenomena. This is close to
> Mannheim's position: one cannot analyze the content of the sciences
> sociologically, but only the manifestations. The strong program in the
> sociology of science (SSK: sociology of scientific knowledge) positioned
> that socio-cognitive interests can explain the substantive development of
> the sciences (Bloor, Barnes, and others) in the 1970s. It returns to a kind
> of materialism.
>
>
>
> Luhmann "criticized" Husserl for not taking the next step and to consider
> meaning ("*Sinn*") as constructed in and by communication. In my opinion,
> this is an important step because it opens the realm of a communication
> theory based on interhuman interactions as different from basing theories
> (micro-foundationally) on human agency (e.g., the *homo economicus* or
> agent-based modelling). The communications can be considered as first-order
> attributes to agents; the analysis of communications is in terms of
> second-order attributes; for example, codes of communication. This is very
> much the domain of the information sciences (although Luhmann did not see
> this connection).
>
>
>
> In sum, “phenomenological” is sometimes used as an appeal to return to the
> phenomena without invoking explaining principles *a priori*. The
> question, however, remains whether our intuitions, imaginations, etc. are
> also part of this “reality”. Are they limited (constrained; enabled?) by
> material conditions or epi-phenomenological consequences of them? Husserl’s

Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism

[Francesco Rizzo]

 with the meta-individual phenomena. This is close to
>> Mannheim's position: one cannot analyze the content of the sciences
>> sociologically, but only the manifestations. The strong program in the
>> sociology of science (SSK: sociology of scientific knowledge) positioned
>> that socio-cognitive interests can explain the substantive development of
>> the sciences (Bloor, Barnes, and others) in the 1970s. It returns to a kind
>> of materialism.
>>
>>
>>
>> Luhmann "criticized" Husserl for not taking the next step and to consider
>> meaning ("*Sinn*") as constructed in and by communication. In my
>> opinion, this is an important step because it opens the realm of a
>> communication theory based on interhuman interactions as different from
>> basing theories (micro-foundationally) on human agency (e.g., the *homo
>> economicus* or agent-based modelling). The communications can be
>> considered as first-order attributes to agents; the analysis of
>> communications is in terms of second-order attributes; for example, codes
>> of communication. This is very much the domain of the information sciences
>> (although Luhmann did not see this connection).
>>
>>
>>
>> In sum, “phenomenological” is sometimes used as an appeal to return to
>> the phenomena without invoking explaining principles *a priori*. The
>> question, however, remains whether our intuitions, imaginations, etc. are
>> also part of this “reality”. Are they limited (constrained; enabled?) by
>> material conditions or epi-phenomenological consequences of them? Husserl’s
>> critique of the modern sciences was the reduction of the very concept of
>> “reality” to *res extensa* (that what “is”). Derivatives of *esse* such
>> as ontology dominate the scene. Shannon-type information, however, is the
>> *expected* uncertainty in a distribution. Thus, we stand on common
>> ground that does not exist. J
>>
>>
>>
>> Note that this discussion is different from the one about “being” versus
>> “becoming” (Prigogine), but also shares some aspects with it. Is
>> “life”/biology considered as a monad different from physics that studies
>> “nature” as a given? How can one perhaps distinguish scientific domains in
>> these terms?
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Loet
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -Original Message-
>> From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Robert E.
>> Ulanowicz
>> Sent: Sunday, August 02, 2015 1:04 AM
>> To: Joseph Brenner
>> Cc: fis
>> Subject: Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism
>>
>>
>>
>> Dear Joseph et al.,
>>
>>
>>
>> I'm afraid I can't comment on the adequacy Husserlian phenomenology, as I
>> never could get very far into Hursserl. I would just add that there is also
>> a variety of phenomenology associated with thermodynamics and engineering.
>>
>>
>>
>> The generic meaning of phenomenology is the study of phenomena in
>> abstraction of their eliciting causes. This applies to almost all of
>> classical thermodynamics and much of engineering. The idea is to describe
>> the behavior of systems in quantitative fashion. If the resulting
>> mathematical description proves reliable, it becomes a phenomenological
>> description. PV=nRT is such a description. Too often physicists try to
>> identify thermodynamics with statistical mechanics, an action that is
>> vigorously eschewed by engineers, who claim the field as their own.
>>
>>
>>
>> I have spent most of my career with the phenomenology of quantified
>> networks, where phenomena such as intersubjectivity (if I correctly
>> understand what is meant by the term) thoroughly pervades events.
>>
>>
>>
>> Of course, I'm feathering my own nest when I say that I believe that the
>> only *current* fruitful way to approach systems biology is via such
>> phenomenology! (See Section 3 in
>>
>> <http://people.clas.ufl.edu/ulan/files/Reckon.pdf>.)
>>
>>
>>
>> The best,
>>
>> Bob
>>
>>
>>
>> > Dear Mark,
>>
>> >
>>
>> > Thank you for this note, which points correctly to the fact that there
>>
>> > was something missing in the debate. Intersubjectivity is a good word
>>
>> > for it, but phenomenology in general is probably no longer the answer,
>>
>> > if it ever was. Check out the new book by Tom Sparrow, The End of
>>
>> > Phenomenol

Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark

[Marcos Ortega Luis de]

Dear Pedro and FIS colleagues,

First and foremost we want to thank you for the opportunity to share our work 
and for the stimulating conversation that followed.

As for Pedro’s comments and questions, although we agree that 
bio-neuro-cognitive plausibility may increase the acceptability of our approach 
we want to note that our base is philosophical/humanistic 
(physical/mechanicistic in your words) and it is here were we want to 
differentiate. We do not preclude other stances but holistic plausibility may 
not be possible and it is not our objective (at the present moment).

To be honest we have to say that we have not considered talking. Language is 
quite a complex system of communication. Although its general characteristics 
are well defined, and this is my personal opinion, usually philosophical and 
psychological theories that also account for language have a certain tendency 
to become entangled. We also appreciate your note about the limits of 
creativity. 

Regards have a good vacation,


Luis de Marcos Ortega
Dpto. Ciencias de la ComputaciónComputer Science Department
Universidad de Alcalá   University of Alcalá
http://www.uah.es/pdi/luis_demarcos


De: Fis  en nombre de Pedro C. Marijuan 

Enviado: viernes, 31 de julio de 2015 14:38
Para: 'fis'
Asunto: Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark

Dear Fernando, Luis, and FIS colleagues,

In a few days the list will take vacations (it is our tradition that in
August we do not make discussions). At your convenience, around next
week better, you are invited to make some concluding comments if you
find them opportune. The discussion has had quite interesting points and
you may have obtained elements of reflection --as we all have had.

As an overall opinion, probably distorted and biologically biased, I
find the way of thinking of your essay too much relying on
mechano-physicalist elements. It is part of what I call the XIX and XX
Century "social thermodynamics" complex (social forces, social masses,
irreversible social processes, productive forces, etc.). Maybe because
of the space-mechanistic view, at the microlevel, the bases of the
theory of human act, and the accompanying classifications, have scarce
ecological and neurological sense. For instance, the neural areas
devoted to the hand are at least ten times larger than the areas devoted
to the whole arm (and the tongue has also a disproportionate large
representation) both in the sensory and motor cerebral "homunculi".
Sure, it is accordance with the behavioral complexity and degrees of
freedom of the corresponding actions. The hierarchic approach does not
fit well with the biological organization of behavior either. Besides,
what about the info value of the actions of other Anthropoidea in their
niches--the same as humans? Also, why in the vital acts the info
escalates to infinity?, while at the same time "the information of the
life world is constant." Creativity in itself is not unbounded, as
Kauffman put, the "adjacent possible" holds for the possible
technological, creative, and social changes. Regarding the "dignity" and
"zooming" of the vital acts, these terms and the way they are used are
again alien to elementary cognitive stances...

Finally, the most important "action" of the human being is talking. See
the "Social Brain Theory" of Baron-Cohen and Dunbar. Talking is second
only to sleeping in the daily hours devoted. The relative social,
intercultural, historic constancy of that ecological time devoted to
talking (and the number of bonding relationships associated) has
motivated the concept of "sociotype", within the triad
genotype-phenotype-sociotype. This enlarged sociotype was the crucial
evolutionary factor of humans. Whatever impinges in the communication
practices that subtend the sociotype (writing, books, computers) etc.
has a disproportionate impact in the actions, practices, products and
artifacts related to human sociality. The cortical space devoted to
sociotype dynamics and memory contents is the highest within our brain.
Actually, by decreasing our social capabilities, we may concentrate in
new cultural activities... Thus, the sociotype would delineate our basic
info constraint.

I would like to ad several other comments, but it is not the case. The
point of view adopted by this essay is quite curious and interesting for
both the micro and macro levels, although some more
bio-neuro-compatibility would benefit its acceptability, I think.

All the best & enjoy the vacations

---Pedro


___
Fis mailing list
Fis@listas.unizar.es
http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism

[Dr. Plamen L. Simeonov]

Dear colleagues,

I think that this discussion about phenomenology, or better said
"phenomenological philosophy", is essential, but may go in the wrong
direction. As for the common grounds that Loet addressed in his note, I
assume that some of us are continuing the path of Varela’s naturalisation
of phenomenology. If you are a bit patient, you can see the results of our
effort in this direction by the end of the year:

http://www.journals.elsevier.com/progress-in-biophysics-and-molecular-biology/call-for-papers/special-theme-issue-on-integral-biomathics-life-sciences-mat/

This special volume is a collection of 41 papers discussing the aspects of
phenomenological philosophy in mathematics, physics, biology and
biosemiotics, incl. FIS contributors (Marijuan, Matsuno, Marchal, Goranson)
and other prominent scientists representing their fields.

I suggest to continue this discussion next year on the grounds of this
volume.

Best wishes,

Plamen



On Sun, Aug 2, 2015 at 9:09 AM, Loet Leydesdorff 
wrote:

> Dear colleagues,
>
>
>
> Without wishing to defend Husserl, let me try to formulate what is
> according to my knowledge core to his contribution. The message is that the
> transcendental intersubjectivity is phenomenologically present in our
> reality. He therefore returns to Descartes' (much rejected) distinction
> between *res extensa* and *res cogitans*. Intersubjectivity is *res
> cogitans*. It is not "being" like in the Latin *esse*, but it remains
> reflexively available. Thus, we cannot test it. The philosophy of science
> which follows (in "*The Crisis*") is anti-positivistic. The
> intersubjectivity is constructed and we live in these constructions.
>
>
>
> Descartes focused on the subjective *Cogito*. According to him, we meet
> in the doubting, the Other as not limited and biologically constrained,
> that is, God or the Transcendency. Husserl shifts the attention to the
> *cogitatum*: that about what we are in doubt. We no longer find a hold in
> Transcendency, but we find the other as other persons. Persons relate to
> one another not only in "being", but also in terms of expectations. This
> was elaborated as "dual contingency" (among others, by Parsons). The
> dynamics of inter-personal expectations, for example, drive scholarly
> discourses, but also stock exchanges.
>
>
>
> Alfred Schutz was a student and admirer of Husserl, but he did not accept
> the Cartesian duality implied. He writes: "As long as we are born from
> mothers ..." He then developed sociological phenomenology (Luckmann and
> others), which begins with the meta-individual phenomena. This is close to
> Mannheim's position: one cannot analyze the content of the sciences
> sociologically, but only the manifestations. The strong program in the
> sociology of science (SSK: sociology of scientific knowledge) positioned
> that socio-cognitive interests can explain the substantive development of
> the sciences (Bloor, Barnes, and others) in the 1970s. It returns to a kind
> of materialism.
>
>
>
> Luhmann "criticized" Husserl for not taking the next step and to consider
> meaning ("*Sinn*") as constructed in and by communication. In my opinion,
> this is an important step because it opens the realm of a communication
> theory based on interhuman interactions as different from basing theories
> (micro-foundationally) on human agency (e.g., the *homo economicus* or
> agent-based modelling). The communications can be considered as first-order
> attributes to agents; the analysis of communications is in terms of
> second-order attributes; for example, codes of communication. This is very
> much the domain of the information sciences (although Luhmann did not see
> this connection).
>
>
>
> In sum, “phenomenological” is sometimes used as an appeal to return to the
> phenomena without invoking explaining principles *a priori*. The
> question, however, remains whether our intuitions, imaginations, etc. are
> also part of this “reality”. Are they limited (constrained; enabled?) by
> material conditions or epi-phenomenological consequences of them? Husserl’s
> critique of the modern sciences was the reduction of the very concept of
> “reality” to *res extensa* (that what “is”). Derivatives of *esse* such
> as ontology dominate the scene. Shannon-type information, however, is the
> *expected* uncertainty in a distribution. Thus, we stand on common ground
> that does not exist. J
>
>
>
> Note that this discussion is different from the one about “being” versus
> “becoming” (Prigogine), but also shares some aspects with it. Is
> “life”/biology considered as a monad different from physics that studies
> “nature” as a given? How can one perhaps

Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism

[Loet Leydesdorff]

Dear colleagues,

 

Without wishing to defend Husserl, let me try to formulate what is according
to my knowledge core to his contribution. The message is that the
transcendental intersubjectivity is phenomenologically present in our
reality. He therefore returns to Descartes' (much rejected) distinction
between res extensa and res cogitans. Intersubjectivity is res cogitans. It
is not "being" like in the Latin esse, but it remains reflexively available.
Thus, we cannot test it. The philosophy of science which follows (in "The
Crisis") is anti-positivistic. The intersubjectivity is constructed and we
live in these constructions.

 

Descartes focused on the subjective Cogito. According to him, we meet in the
doubting, the Other as not limited and biologically constrained, that is,
God or the Transcendency. Husserl shifts the attention to the cogitatum:
that about what we are in doubt. We no longer find a hold in Transcendency,
but we find the other as other persons. Persons relate to one another not
only in "being", but also in terms of expectations. This was elaborated as
"dual contingency" (among others, by Parsons). The dynamics of
inter-personal expectations, for example, drive scholarly discourses, but
also stock exchanges.

 

Alfred Schutz was a student and admirer of Husserl, but he did not accept
the Cartesian duality implied. He writes: "As long as we are born from
mothers ..." He then developed sociological phenomenology (Luckmann and
others), which begins with the meta-individual phenomena. This is close to
Mannheim's position: one cannot analyze the content of the sciences
sociologically, but only the manifestations. The strong program in the
sociology of science (SSK: sociology of scientific knowledge) positioned
that socio-cognitive interests can explain the substantive development of
the sciences (Bloor, Barnes, and others) in the 1970s. It returns to a kind
of materialism.

 

Luhmann "criticized" Husserl for not taking the next step and to consider
meaning ("Sinn") as constructed in and by communication. In my opinion, this
is an important step because it opens the realm of a communication theory
based on interhuman interactions as different from basing theories
(micro-foundationally) on human agency (e.g., the homo economicus or
agent-based modelling). The communications can be considered as first-order
attributes to agents; the analysis of communications is in terms of
second-order attributes; for example, codes of communication. This is very
much the domain of the information sciences (although Luhmann did not see
this connection).

 

In sum, "phenomenological" is sometimes used as an appeal to return to the
phenomena without invoking explaining principles a priori. The question,
however, remains whether our intuitions, imaginations, etc. are also part of
this "reality". Are they limited (constrained; enabled?) by material
conditions or epi-phenomenological consequences of them? Husserl's critique
of the modern sciences was the reduction of the very concept of "reality" to
res extensa (that what "is"). Derivatives of esse such as ontology dominate
the scene. Shannon-type information, however, is the expected uncertainty in
a distribution. Thus, we stand on common ground that does not exist. J

 

Note that this discussion is different from the one about "being" versus
"becoming" (Prigogine), but also shares some aspects with it. Is
"life"/biology considered as a monad different from physics that studies
"nature" as a given? How can one perhaps distinguish scientific domains in
these terms?

 

Best,

Loet

 

 

-Original Message-----
From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Robert E.
Ulanowicz
Sent: Sunday, August 02, 2015 1:04 AM
To: Joseph Brenner
Cc: fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism

 

Dear Joseph et al.,

 

I'm afraid I can't comment on the adequacy Husserlian phenomenology, as I
never could get very far into Hursserl. I would just add that there is also
a variety of phenomenology associated with thermodynamics and engineering.

 

The generic meaning of phenomenology is the study of phenomena in
abstraction of their eliciting causes. This applies to almost all of
classical thermodynamics and much of engineering. The idea is to describe
the behavior of systems in quantitative fashion. If the resulting
mathematical description proves reliable, it becomes a phenomenological
description. PV=nRT is such a description. Too often physicists try to
identify thermodynamics with statistical mechanics, an action that is
vigorously eschewed by engineers, who claim the field as their own.

 

I have spent most of my career with the phenomenology of quantified
networks, where phenomena such as intersubjectivity (if I correctly
understand what is mean

Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism

[Robert E. Ulanowicz]

Dear Joseph et al.,

I'm afraid I can't comment on the adequacy Husserlian phenomenology, as I
never could get very far into Hursserl. I would just add that there is
also a variety of phenomenology associated with thermodynamics and
engineering.

The generic meaning of phenomenology is the study of phenomena in
abstraction of their eliciting causes. This applies to almost all of
classical thermodynamics and much of engineering. The idea is to describe
the behavior of systems in quantitative fashion. If the resulting
mathematical description proves reliable, it becomes a phenomenological
description. PV=nRT is such a description. Too often physicists try to
identify thermodynamics with statistical mechanics, an action that is
vigorously eschewed by engineers, who claim the field as their own.

I have spent most of my career with the phenomenology of quantified
networks, where phenomena such as intersubjectivity (if I correctly
understand what is meant by the term) thoroughly pervades events.

Of course, I'm feathering my own nest when I say that I believe that the
only *current* fruitful way to approach systems biology is via such
phenomenology! (See Section 3 in
.)

The best,
Bob

> Dear Mark,
>
> Thank you for this note, which points correctly to the fact that there was
> something missing in the debate. Intersubjectivity is a good word for it,
> but phenomenology in general is probably no longer the answer, if it ever
> was. Check out the new book by Tom Sparrow, The End of Phenomenology,
> Edinburgh, 2014; Sparrow is a key player in a new 'movement' called
> Speculative Realism which is proposed as a replacement.
>
> What does this have to do with information? I think a great deal and worth
> a new debate, even in extremis. The problem with Husserlian phenomenology
> is that it fails to deliver an adequate picture of reality, but
> speculative realism is too anti-scientific to do any better. What I think
> is possible, however, is to reconcile the key insights of Heidegger with
> science, especially, with information science. This places information
> science in a proper intersubjective context where its utility can be seen.
> For discussion, I hope.
>
> Best,
>
> Joseph


___
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Fis@listas.unizar.es
http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism

[Joseph Brenner]

Dear Mark,

Thank you for this note, which points correctly to the fact that there was 
something missing in the debate. Intersubjectivity is a good word for it, but 
phenomenology in general is probably no longer the answer, if it ever was. 
Check out the new book by Tom Sparrow, The End of Phenomenology, Edinburgh, 
2014; Sparrow is a key player in a new 'movement' called Speculative Realism 
which is proposed as a replacement. 

What does this have to do with information? I think a great deal and worth a 
new debate, even in extremis. The problem with Husserlian phenomenology is that 
it fails to deliver an adequate picture of reality, but speculative realism is 
too anti-scientific to do any better. What I think is possible, however, is to 
reconcile the key insights of Heidegger with science, especially, with 
information science. This places information science in a proper 
intersubjective context where its utility can be seen. For discussion, I hope.

Best,

Joseph
  - Original Message - 
  From: Mark Johnson 
  To: fis 
  Sent: Saturday, August 01, 2015 1:18 PM
  Subject: Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark


  Dear Fernando,


  Without wanting to spawn a new debate, I think it might be useful to flag 
something up about the 'phenomenology' that you mention. I understand Joseph's 
reaction to what to you say and I agree. However, phenomenology is a rich a 
complex topic, and few scholars have the tenacity to delve deeply into the 
difficult and detailed thinking of Husserl, Heidegger, Schutz, tracing it's 
evolution in French existentialism, hermeneutics, or from Schutz to Berger, 
Luckmann, Parsons and then Luhmann. At the very least there is the division 
between Husserlian transcendental phenomenology with its "transcendental ego" 
to which Heidegger and many others objected, and the existential phenomenology 
of everyday experience which Heidegger developed instead. Husserl, for his part 
thought Heidegger had completely misunderstood him. To say he might have been 
right is not to take away the genius of Heidegger's own insights.


  The point is, when we say "phenomenology", what do we mean?


  Joseph's concern relates (I think) to what appears to be a missing account of 
"intersubjectivity" in your paper. But of course, intersubjectivity was a 
central concern for Husserl, and his ideas on it were much refined by Schutz, 
who seems to me to be a critically important figure (I'm grateful to Loet for 
pointing me in Schutz's direction!). To be 'phenomenological' does not preclude 
intersubjectivity. However, if you are Heideggerian, then I think it is true 
that Heidegger's understanding of human relations is rather weak (interesting 
to reflect on this in relation to Heidegger's politics!)


  I suspect that the phenomenological literature and its history is of 
considerable relevance to current debates about information. 


  Best wishes,


  Mark


  On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 9:17 AM, Fernando Flores 
 wrote:

Dear Mark



Thanks for your commentaries. Our use of the term “foundational” is more 
philosophical than practical. You are right; the term contradicts in some sense 
our intentions which are “very” practical. (This is a term which we could leave 
behind without hesitation.) In fact, we have no intentions in “instituting” a 
new concept of “information”. Our work is “foundational” only in one aspect, 
and that is in searching for methods to measure the informational value of 
collective acts in everyday life. We found that it was necessary to classify 
human acts in such a way that their informational value could be “operative” 
(useful in practical tasks); we did that, grouping the acts in types depending 
on their complexity. We found that these acts could also be distinguished in 
relation to their consequences on the everyday world. We noticed that the 
movement from the very complex acts to the simplest acts follows a reduction of 
the surrounding world and that the human body is the natural reference in the 
understanding of this reduction. We knew that we could express informational 
value in relation to probabilities and found in the von Mises/Popper frequency 
series a possible and easy solution (an accessible mathematics). We insist; we 
have been working only with practical problems and we have not been thinking so 
much of which concept of information we are using; we believe that cybernetics 
does not address the practical problems we confront. However, we are sure that 
if we succeed, some cybernetic theorem will explain our success. The question 
is that the state of knowledge we have today is insufficient to understand the 
simplest informational problems in our surrounding world. Informational theory 
and cybernetics have been developed in the world of Physics; instead, we try to 
develop solutions that work in everyday life. If you understand as “variety” 
t

Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark

[Mark Johnson]

Dear Fernando,

Without wanting to spawn a new debate, I think it might be useful to flag
something up about the 'phenomenology' that you mention. I understand
Joseph's reaction to what to you say and I agree. However, phenomenology is
a rich a complex topic, and few scholars have the tenacity to delve deeply
into the difficult and detailed thinking of Husserl, Heidegger, Schutz,
tracing it's evolution in French existentialism, hermeneutics, or from
Schutz to Berger, Luckmann, Parsons and then Luhmann. At the very least
there is the division between Husserlian transcendental phenomenology with
its "transcendental ego" to which Heidegger and many others objected, and
the existential phenomenology of everyday experience which Heidegger
developed instead. Husserl, for his part thought Heidegger had completely
misunderstood him. To say he might have been right is not to take away the
genius of Heidegger's own insights.

The point is, when we say "phenomenology", what do we mean?

Joseph's concern relates (I think) to what appears to be a missing account
of "intersubjectivity" in your paper. But of course, intersubjectivity was
a central concern for Husserl, and his ideas on it were much refined by
Schutz, who seems to me to be a critically important figure (I'm grateful
to Loet for pointing me in Schutz's direction!). To be 'phenomenological'
does not preclude intersubjectivity. However, if you are Heideggerian, then
I think it is true that Heidegger's understanding of human relations is
rather weak (interesting to reflect on this in relation to Heidegger's
politics!)

I suspect that the phenomenological literature and its history is of
considerable relevance to current debates about information.

Best wishes,

Mark

On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 9:17 AM, Fernando Flores <
fernando.flo...@kultur.lu.se> wrote:

> Dear Mark
>
>
>
> Thanks for your commentaries. Our use of the term “foundational” is more
> philosophical than practical. You are right; the term contradicts in some
> sense our intentions which are “very” practical. (This is a term which we
> could leave behind without hesitation.) In fact, we have no intentions in
> “instituting” a new concept of “information”. Our work is “foundational”
> only in one aspect, and that is in searching for methods to measure the
> informational value of collective acts in everyday life. We found that it
> was necessary to classify human acts in such a way that their informational
> value could be “operative” (useful in practical tasks); we did that,
> grouping the acts in types depending on their complexity. We found that
> these acts could also be distinguished in relation to their consequences on
> the everyday world. We noticed that the movement from the very complex acts
> to the simplest acts follows a reduction of the surrounding world and that
> the human body is the natural reference in the understanding of this
> reduction. We knew that we could express informational value in relation to
> probabilities and found in the von Mises/Popper frequency series a possible
> and easy solution (an accessible mathematics). We insist; we have been
> working only with practical problems and we have not been thinking so much
> of which concept of information we are using; we believe that cybernetics
> does not address the practical problems we confront. However, we are sure
> that if we succeed, some cybernetic theorem will explain our success. The
> question is that the state of knowledge we have today is insufficient to
> understand the simplest informational problems in our surrounding world.
> Informational theory and cybernetics have been developed in the world of
> Physics; instead, we try to develop solutions that work in everyday life.
> If you understand as “variety” the measure of the “states of a system”, the
> series of von Mises/Popper could be our kind of variety, but we are not
> sure. You are certain, our “acts” are neither “actions” nor “events”, but
> they are not the hybrids of Latour either. Our acts are phenomenological;
> they are intended to be congruent with concepts as “work”, “money”,
> “culture”, “thing”, “market”, and the like. The concept “informational
> value” for example, is very close to the concept of “information” without
> meaning exact the same.
>
>
>
>
>
> Fernando Flores PhD
>
> Associate Professor
>
> History of Ideas and Sciences
>
> Lund University
>
>
>
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>
>


-- 
Dr. Mark William Johnson
Phone: 07786 064505
Email: johnsonm...@gmail.com
Blog: http://dailyimprovisation.blogspot.com
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Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark

[Pedro C. Marijuan]

Dear Fernando, Luis, and FIS colleagues,

In a few days the list will take vacations (it is our tradition that in 
August we do not make discussions). At your convenience, around next 
week better, you are invited to make some concluding comments if you 
find them opportune. The discussion has had quite interesting points and 
you may have obtained elements of reflection --as we all have had.


As an overall opinion, probably distorted and biologically biased, I 
find the way of thinking of your essay too much relying on 
mechano-physicalist elements. It is part of what I call the XIX and XX 
Century "social thermodynamics" complex (social forces, social masses, 
irreversible social processes, productive forces, etc.). Maybe because 
of the space-mechanistic view, at the microlevel, the bases of the 
theory of human act, and the accompanying classifications, have scarce 
ecological and neurological sense. For instance, the neural areas 
devoted to the hand are at least ten times larger than the areas devoted 
to the whole arm (and the tongue has also a disproportionate large 
representation) both in the sensory and motor cerebral "homunculi". 
Sure, it is accordance with the behavioral complexity and degrees of 
freedom of the corresponding actions. The hierarchic approach does not 
fit well with the biological organization of behavior either. Besides, 
what about the info value of the actions of other Anthropoidea in their 
niches--the same as humans? Also, why in the vital acts the info 
escalates to infinity?, while at the same time "the information of the 
life world is constant." Creativity in itself is not unbounded, as 
Kauffman put, the "adjacent possible" holds for the possible 
technological, creative, and social changes. Regarding the "dignity" and 
"zooming" of the vital acts, these terms and the way they are used are 
again alien to elementary cognitive stances...


Finally, the most important "action" of the human being is talking. See 
the "Social Brain Theory" of Baron-Cohen and Dunbar. Talking is second 
only to sleeping in the daily hours devoted. The relative social, 
intercultural, historic constancy of that ecological time devoted to 
talking (and the number of bonding relationships associated) has 
motivated the concept of "sociotype", within the triad 
genotype-phenotype-sociotype. This enlarged sociotype was the crucial 
evolutionary factor of humans. Whatever impinges in the communication 
practices that subtend the sociotype (writing, books, computers) etc. 
has a disproportionate impact in the actions, practices, products and 
artifacts related to human sociality. The cortical space devoted to 
sociotype dynamics and memory contents is the highest within our brain. 
Actually, by decreasing our social capabilities, we may concentrate in 
new cultural activities... Thus, the sociotype would delineate our basic 
info constraint.


I would like to ad several other comments, but it is not the case. The 
point of view adopted by this essay is quite curious and interesting for 
both the micro and macro levels, although some more 
bio-neuro-compatibility would benefit its acceptability, I think.


All the best & enjoy the vacations

---Pedro

Fernando Flores wrote:


Dear Mark

Thanks for your commentaries. Our use of the term “foundational” is 
more philosophical than practical. You are right; the term contradicts 
in some sense our intentions which are “very” practical. (This is a 
term which we could leave behind without hesitation.) In fact, we have 
no intentions in “instituting” a new concept of “information”. Our 
work is “foundational” only in one aspect, and that is in searching 
for methods to measure the informational value of collective acts in 
everyday life. We found that it was necessary to classify human acts 
in such a way that their informational value could be “operative” 
(useful in practical tasks); we did that, grouping the acts in types 
depending on their complexity. We found that these acts could also be 
distinguished in relation to their consequences on the everyday world. 
We noticed that the movement from the very complex acts to the 
simplest acts follows a reduction of the surrounding world and that 
the human body is the natural reference in the understanding of this 
reduction. We knew that we could express informational value in 
relation to probabilities and found in the von Mises/Popper frequency 
series a possible and easy solution (an accessible mathematics). We 
insist; we have been working only with practical problems and we have 
not been thinking so much of which concept of information we are 
using; we believe that cybernetics does not address the practical 
problems we confront. However, we are sure that if we succeed, some 
cybernetic theorem will explain our success. The question is that the 
state of knowledge we have today is insufficient to understand the 
simplest informational problems in our surrounding world. 
Informational theory and

Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark

[Joseph Brenner]

Dear All,

This note from Fernando clearly spells out his universe of discourse (practical 
problems; everyday life). However, in stating that 

> our "acts" are neither "actions" nor "events"... Our acts are 
> phenomenological;

but that current information theory is only mathematical, dealing with 
'probabilities', he seems to me to be ignoring
applications of information theory made by several members of this group to 
real problems, that is, to the subjects
of science.

The above description is, in my opinion, also somewhat abstract and static in 
not viewing 'everyday life' as constituted not only by 'acts' but by complex 
processes of constant change. This criticism is similar to that made by Loet 
July 29 from his different perspective:

But human agency is not an isolated system, in my opinion. We are coupled 
through our communications which generate non-linear loops. ... In sum, the 
argument that action is only bodily and in relation to artifacts (as isolated 
systems) seems questionable to me. ... Why would not the potentiality of matter 
contain a plurality (multiplicity) of options?
 

There is here room for further reflection, I think.

Best,

Joseph
  

  - Original Message - 
  From: Fernando Flores 
  To: fis@listas.unizar.es 
  Sent: Thursday, July 30, 2015 10:17 AM
  Subject: [Fis] Answer to Mark


  Dear Mark

   

  Thanks for your commentaries. Our use of the term "foundational" is more 
philosophical than practical. You are right; the term contradicts in some sense 
our intentions which are "very" practical. (This is a term which we could leave 
behind without hesitation.) In fact, we have no intentions in "instituting" a 
new concept of "information". Our work is "foundational" only in one aspect, 
and that is in searching for methods to measure the informational value of 
collective acts in everyday life. We found that it was necessary to classify 
human acts in such a way that their informational value could be "operative" 
(useful in practical tasks); we did that, grouping the acts in types depending 
on their complexity. We found that these acts could also be distinguished in 
relation to their consequences on the everyday world. We noticed that the 
movement from the very complex acts to the simplest acts follows a reduction of 
the surrounding world and that the human body is the natural reference in the 
understanding of this reduction. We knew that we could express informational 
value in relation to probabilities and found in the von Mises/Popper frequency 
series a possible and easy solution (an accessible mathematics). We insist; we 
have been working only with practical problems and we have not been thinking so 
much of which concept of information we are using; we believe that cybernetics 
does not address the practical problems we confront. However, we are sure that 
if we succeed, some cybernetic theorem will explain our success. The question 
is that the state of knowledge we have today is insufficient to understand the 
simplest informational problems in our surrounding world. Informational theory 
and cybernetics have been developed in the world of Physics; instead, we try to 
develop solutions that work in everyday life. If you understand as "variety" 
the measure of the "states of a system", the series of von Mises/Popper could 
be our kind of variety, but we are not sure. You are certain, our "acts" are 
neither "actions" nor "events", but they are not the hybrids of Latour either. 
Our acts are phenomenological; they are intended to be congruent with concepts 
as "work", "money", "culture", "thing", "market", and the like. The concept 
"informational value" for example, is very close to the concept of 
"information" without meaning exact the same. 

   

   

  Fernando Flores PhD

  Associate Professor

  History of Ideas and Sciences

  Lund University

   



--


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[Fis] Answer to Mark

[Fernando Flores]

Dear Mark

Thanks for your commentaries. Our use of the term "foundational" is more 
philosophical than practical. You are right; the term contradicts in some sense 
our intentions which are "very" practical. (This is a term which we could leave 
behind without hesitation.) In fact, we have no intentions in "instituting" a 
new concept of "information". Our work is "foundational" only in one aspect, 
and that is in searching for methods to measure the informational value of 
collective acts in everyday life. We found that it was necessary to classify 
human acts in such a way that their informational value could be "operative" 
(useful in practical tasks); we did that, grouping the acts in types depending 
on their complexity. We found that these acts could also be distinguished in 
relation to their consequences on the everyday world. We noticed that the 
movement from the very complex acts to the simplest acts follows a reduction of 
the surrounding world and that the human body is the natural reference in the 
understanding of this reduction. We knew that we could express informational 
value in relation to probabilities and found in the von Mises/Popper frequency 
series a possible and easy solution (an accessible mathematics). We insist; we 
have been working only with practical problems and we have not been thinking so 
much of which concept of information we are using; we believe that cybernetics 
does not address the practical problems we confront. However, we are sure that 
if we succeed, some cybernetic theorem will explain our success. The question 
is that the state of knowledge we have today is insufficient to understand the 
simplest informational problems in our surrounding world. Informational theory 
and cybernetics have been developed in the world of Physics; instead, we try to 
develop solutions that work in everyday life. If you understand as "variety" 
the measure of the "states of a system", the series of von Mises/Popper could 
be our kind of variety, but we are not sure. You are certain, our "acts" are 
neither "actions" nor "events", but they are not the hybrids of Latour either. 
Our acts are phenomenological; they are intended to be congruent with concepts 
as "work", "money", "culture", "thing", "market", and the like. The concept 
"informational value" for example, is very close to the concept of 
"information" without meaning exact the same.


Fernando Flores PhD
Associate Professor
History of Ideas and Sciences
Lund University

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