Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-29 Thread Achim Patzner
On Wed, Jul 28, 1999 at 04:17:57PM -0400, Brian F. Feldman wrote: > > Brian, FreeBSD isn't your private playground for playing around, this is > > a group project, and you gotta follow the rules, or you don't get to > > play with the rest of the folks > > The rules don't say "leave the code th

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-29 Thread Achim Patzner
On Wed, Jul 28, 1999 at 04:17:57PM -0400, Brian F. Feldman wrote: > > Brian, FreeBSD isn't your private playground for playing around, this is > > a group project, and you gotta follow the rules, or you don't get to > > play with the rest of the folks > > The rules don't say "leave the code t

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Matthew Dillon
:On Wed, 28 Jul 1999, Nate Williams wrote: :> > :> > These were changes that were necessary to make ipfw readable enough that :> > I could work with it in this area. They aren't just to clean it up, or :> > just for change's sake. They need to stay in. :> :> C'mon now, re-ording the lines is *cer

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Matthew Dillon
:On Wed, 28 Jul 1999, Nate Williams wrote: :> > :> > These were changes that were necessary to make ipfw readable enough that :> > I could work with it in this area. They aren't just to clean it up, or :> > just for change's sake. They need to stay in. :> :> C'mon now, re-ording the lines is *ce

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Matthew Dillon
:> The code is *NO* more readable by you re-ordering lines and changes :> whitespace. :... : :. Sounds like one of many arguments I've had with various people who insist on nitpicking and critiqing to death tiny little itsy bitsy inconsistancies that no normal person would car

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Tim Vanderhoek
On Wed, Jul 28, 1999 at 02:40:19PM -0600, Nate Williams wrote: > > Or is this Linux, where we don't give a rip and whatever the current > patch does to the rest of the tree is fine, since the more code we have > the better? Nate, you know damn well that's not true. You're complaining about three

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Tim Vanderhoek
On Wed, Jul 28, 1999 at 02:42:35PM -0600, Nate Williams wrote: > > The code is *NO* more readable by you re-ordering lines and changes > whitespace. It's white! No, dammit, it's beige! Fuck you, I said it's white! Beige! White! I dunno, I guess for some people the distinction's actually mea

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Matthew Dillon
:> The code is *NO* more readable by you re-ordering lines and changes :> whitespace. :... : :. Sounds like one of many arguments I've had with various people who insist on nitpicking and critiqing to death tiny little itsy bitsy inconsistancies that no normal person would ca

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Tim Vanderhoek
On Wed, Jul 28, 1999 at 02:40:19PM -0600, Nate Williams wrote: > > Or is this Linux, where we don't give a rip and whatever the current > patch does to the rest of the tree is fine, since the more code we have > the better? Nate, you know damn well that's not true. You're complaining about thre

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Tim Vanderhoek
On Wed, Jul 28, 1999 at 02:42:35PM -0600, Nate Williams wrote: > > The code is *NO* more readable by you re-ordering lines and changes > whitespace. It's white! No, dammit, it's beige! Fuck you, I said it's white! Beige! White! I dunno, I guess for some people the distinction's actually me

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Nate Williams
> > > > In particular, the changes I pointed out are not 'cleanups', but style > > > > changes. > > > > > > When you make code readable, it's a cleanup. > > > > The code is *NO* more readable by you re-ordering lines and changes > > whitespace. > > This is so very objective. That's why it consi

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Alfred Perlstein
On Wed, 28 Jul 1999, Nate Williams wrote: > > > > > > These were changes that were necessary to make ipfw readable enough > > > > > > that > > > > > > I could work with it in this area. They aren't just to clean it up, > > > > > > or > > > > > > just for change's sake. They need to stay in. > >

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Brian F. Feldman
On Wed, 28 Jul 1999, Nate Williams wrote: > > > > *rant on* > > > > Brian, FreeBSD isn't your private playground for playing around, this is > > > > a group project, and you gotta follow the rules, or you don't get to > > > > play with the rest of the folks > > > > > > The rules don't say "le

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Nate Williams
> > > > > These were changes that were necessary to make ipfw readable enough > > > > > that > > > > > I could work with it in this area. They aren't just to clean it up, or > > > > > just for change's sake. They need to stay in. > > > > > > > > C'mon now, re-ording the lines is *certainly* not n

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Nate Williams
> > > *rant on* > > > Brian, FreeBSD isn't your private playground for playing around, this is > > > a group project, and you gotta follow the rules, or you don't get to > > > play with the rest of the folks > > > > The rules don't say "leave the code that you work with in a bigger mess than >

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Brian F. Feldman
On Wed, 28 Jul 1999, Nate Williams wrote: > > > > These were changes that were necessary to make ipfw readable enough that > > > > I could work with it in this area. They aren't just to clean it up, or > > > > just for change's sake. They need to stay in. > > > > > > C'mon now, re-ording the line

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Alfred Perlstein
On Wed, 28 Jul 1999, Brian F. Feldman wrote: > On Wed, 28 Jul 1999, Nate Williams wrote: > > > > > > These were changes that were necessary to make ipfw readable enough that > > > I could work with it in this area. They aren't just to clean it up, or > > > just for change's sake. They need to sta

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Nate Williams
> > > These were changes that were necessary to make ipfw readable enough that > > > I could work with it in this area. They aren't just to clean it up, or > > > just for change's sake. They need to stay in. > > > > C'mon now, re-ording the lines is *certainly* not necessary to work. > > That's t

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Brian F. Feldman
On Wed, 28 Jul 1999, Nate Williams wrote: > > > > These were changes that were necessary to make ipfw readable enough that > > I could work with it in this area. They aren't just to clean it up, or > > just for change's sake. They need to stay in. > > C'mon now, re-ording the lines is *certainly*

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Nate Williams
> > > > In particular, the changes I pointed out are not 'cleanups', but style > > > > changes. > > > > > > When you make code readable, it's a cleanup. > > > > The code is *NO* more readable by you re-ordering lines and changes > > whitespace. > > This is so very objective. That's why it cons

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Nate Williams
> > > @@ -302,14 +303,15 @@ > > > struct ifnet *rif, struct ifnet *oif) > > > { > > > if (ip) { > > > + struct tcphdr *const tcp = (struct tcphdr *)((u_int32_t *)ip+ip->ip_hl); > > > + struct udphdr *const udp = (struct udphdr *)((u_int32_t *)ip+ip->ip_hl); > > > + struct icmp *const icmp =

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Brian F. Feldman
On Wed, 28 Jul 1999, Nate Williams wrote: > > Index: src/sys/netinet/ip_fw.c > > === > > RCS file: /home/ncvs/src/sys/netinet/ip_fw.c,v > > retrieving revision 1.114 > > diff -u -r1.114 ip_fw.c > > --- ip_fw.c 1999/06/19 18:43:28

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Alfred Perlstein
On Wed, 28 Jul 1999, Nate Williams wrote: > > > > > > These were changes that were necessary to make ipfw readable enough that > > > > > > I could work with it in this area. They aren't just to clean it up, or > > > > > > just for change's sake. They need to stay in. > > > > > > > > > > C'mon no

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Nate Williams
> Index: src/sys/netinet/ip_fw.c > === > RCS file: /home/ncvs/src/sys/netinet/ip_fw.c,v > retrieving revision 1.114 > diff -u -r1.114 ip_fw.c > --- ip_fw.c 1999/06/19 18:43:28 1.114 > +++ ip_fw.c 1999/07/28 06:29:07 > @@ -106,6

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Brian F. Feldman
I need help finishing it. The ipfw.8 manpage isn't quite fixed yet. When someone will do that, it will be Ready :) But I've attached it! Brian Fundakowski Feldman _ __ ___ ___ ___ ___ gr...@freebsd.org _ __ ___ | _ ) __| \ FreeBSD: The Power to Serve!

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Brian F. Feldman
On Wed, 28 Jul 1999, Nate Williams wrote: > > > > *rant on* > > > > Brian, FreeBSD isn't your private playground for playing around, this is > > > > a group project, and you gotta follow the rules, or you don't get to > > > > play with the rest of the folks > > > > > > The rules don't say "l

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Nate Williams
> > > > > These were changes that were necessary to make ipfw readable enough that > > > > > I could work with it in this area. They aren't just to clean it up, or > > > > > just for change's sake. They need to stay in. > > > > > > > > C'mon now, re-ording the lines is *certainly* not necessary t

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Nate Williams
> > > *rant on* > > > Brian, FreeBSD isn't your private playground for playing around, this is > > > a group project, and you gotta follow the rules, or you don't get to > > > play with the rest of the folks > > > > The rules don't say "leave the code that you work with in a bigger mess than

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Brian F. Feldman
On Wed, 28 Jul 1999, Nate Williams wrote: > > > > These were changes that were necessary to make ipfw readable enough that > > > > I could work with it in this area. They aren't just to clean it up, or > > > > just for change's sake. They need to stay in. > > > > > > C'mon now, re-ording the lin

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Alfred Perlstein
On Wed, 28 Jul 1999, Brian F. Feldman wrote: > On Wed, 28 Jul 1999, Nate Williams wrote: > > > > > > These were changes that were necessary to make ipfw readable enough that > > > I could work with it in this area. They aren't just to clean it up, or > > > just for change's sake. They need to st

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Nate Williams
> > > > Implementing it is the easy part, making sure it's the right thing to do > > > > is the hard part. > > > > > > Well, the easy part is done, except for raising limits. Look: > > > ipfw: 1 Deny ICMP:8.0 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 out via lo0 > > > ipfw: 1 Deny ICMP:8.0 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 out via l

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Brian F. Feldman
On Wed, 28 Jul 1999, Nate Williams wrote: > > > Implementing it is the easy part, making sure it's the right thing to do > > > is the hard part. > > > > Well, the easy part is done, except for raising limits. Look: > > ipfw: 1 Deny ICMP:8.0 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 out via lo0 > > ipfw: 1 Deny ICMP:8.

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Nate Williams
> > > These were changes that were necessary to make ipfw readable enough that > > > I could work with it in this area. They aren't just to clean it up, or > > > just for change's sake. They need to stay in. > > > > C'mon now, re-ording the lines is *certainly* not necessary to work. > > That's

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Brian F. Feldman
On Wed, 28 Jul 1999, Nate Williams wrote: > > > > These were changes that were necessary to make ipfw readable enough that > > I could work with it in this area. They aren't just to clean it up, or > > just for change's sake. They need to stay in. > > C'mon now, re-ording the lines is *certainly

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Nate Williams
> > > @@ -302,14 +303,15 @@ > > > struct ifnet *rif, struct ifnet *oif) > > > { > > > if (ip) { > > > + struct tcphdr *const tcp = (struct tcphdr *)((u_int32_t *)ip+ip->ip_hl); > > > + struct udphdr *const udp = (struct udphdr *)((u_int32_t *)ip+ip->ip_hl); > > > + struct icmp *const icmp

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Doug
On Tue, 27 Jul 1999, Brian F. Feldman wrote: > If it will get ALL of you to give it a rest, how about: > per-rule logging limits This has been needed for some time now. Also, please don't forget the oft-repeated request to have seperate accounting and logging counters so that you ca

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Brian F. Feldman
On Wed, 28 Jul 1999, Nate Williams wrote: > > Index: src/sys/netinet/ip_fw.c > > === > > RCS file: /home/ncvs/src/sys/netinet/ip_fw.c,v > > retrieving revision 1.114 > > diff -u -r1.114 ip_fw.c > > --- ip_fw.c 1999/06/19 18:43:28

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Nate Williams
> Index: src/sys/netinet/ip_fw.c > === > RCS file: /home/ncvs/src/sys/netinet/ip_fw.c,v > retrieving revision 1.114 > diff -u -r1.114 ip_fw.c > --- ip_fw.c 1999/06/19 18:43:28 1.114 > +++ ip_fw.c 1999/07/28 06:29:07 > @@ -106,

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Brian F. Feldman
I need help finishing it. The ipfw.8 manpage isn't quite fixed yet. When someone will do that, it will be Ready :) But I've attached it! Brian Fundakowski Feldman _ __ ___ ___ ___ ___ [EMAIL PROTECTED] _ __ ___ | _ ) __| \ FreeBSD: The Power to Serve!

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Nate Williams
> > > > Implementing it is the easy part, making sure it's the right thing to do > > > > is the hard part. > > > > > > Well, the easy part is done, except for raising limits. Look: > > > ipfw: 1 Deny ICMP:8.0 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 out via lo0 > > > ipfw: 1 Deny ICMP:8.0 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 out via

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Brian F. Feldman
On Wed, 28 Jul 1999, Nate Williams wrote: > > > Implementing it is the easy part, making sure it's the right thing to do > > > is the hard part. > > > > Well, the easy part is done, except for raising limits. Look: > > ipfw: 1 Deny ICMP:8.0 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 out via lo0 > > ipfw: 1 Deny ICMP:8

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Doug
On Tue, 27 Jul 1999, Brian F. Feldman wrote: > If it will get ALL of you to give it a rest, how about: > per-rule logging limits This has been needed for some time now. Also, please don't forget the oft-repeated request to have seperate accounting and logging counters so that you c

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Nate Williams
> > Implementing it is the easy part, making sure it's the right thing to do > > is the hard part. > > Well, the easy part is done, except for raising limits. Look: > ipfw: 1 Deny ICMP:8.0 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 out via lo0 > ipfw: 1 Deny ICMP:8.0 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 out via lo0 > ipfw: limit 2 reach

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Nate Williams
> And then ... securelevel == 3 I think it is better NOT to permit > 'sysctl -w', 'ipfw *' AND a logging limmit, just process the logfile > faster to avoid DoS The real issue we are dealing with is what happens at securelevel == 3. What you are saying is that people shouldn't be allowed to modify

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Henk van Oers
On Tue, 27 Jul 1999, Julian Elischer wrote: > a system wide limit and each rule's logging counter individually resetable > back to 0. > > So, what's your vote? > > ... Joe I vote for this too. Henk. To Unsubscribe: send mail to majord...@freebsd.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-hackers" in the

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Henk van Oers
On Wed, 28 Jul 1999, Brian F. Feldman wrote: > > > If it will get ALL of you to give it a rest, how about: > > > per-rule logging limits > > > logging limit raising > > > logging limit resetting > > > Which would all NOT affect the statistics? Separate statistics/logging counters is fine, b

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Nate Williams
> > Implementing it is the easy part, making sure it's the right thing to do > > is the hard part. > > Well, the easy part is done, except for raising limits. Look: > ipfw: 1 Deny ICMP:8.0 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 out via lo0 > ipfw: 1 Deny ICMP:8.0 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 out via lo0 > ipfw: limit 2 reac

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Nate Williams
> And then ... securelevel == 3 I think it is better NOT to permit > 'sysctl -w', 'ipfw *' AND a logging limmit, just process the logfile > faster to avoid DoS The real issue we are dealing with is what happens at securelevel == 3. What you are saying is that people shouldn't be allowed to modify

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Henk van Oers
On Tue, 27 Jul 1999, Julian Elischer wrote: > a system wide limit and each rule's logging counter individually resetable > back to 0. > > So, what's your vote? > > ... Joe I vote for this too. Henk. To Unsubscribe: send mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with "unsubscribe freebsd-hackers" in the bod

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-28 Thread Henk van Oers
On Wed, 28 Jul 1999, Brian F. Feldman wrote: > > > If it will get ALL of you to give it a rest, how about: > > > per-rule logging limits > > > logging limit raising > > > logging limit resetting > > > Which would all NOT affect the statistics? Separate statistics/logging counters is fine,

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Brian F. Feldman
On Tue, 27 Jul 1999, Nate Williams wrote: > > If it will get ALL of you to give it a rest, how about: > > per-rule logging limits > > logging limit raising > > logging limit resetting > > Which would all NOT affect the statistics? > > We need more input from people who use the code, t

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Brian F. Feldman
On Tue, 27 Jul 1999, Nate Williams wrote: > > If it will get ALL of you to give it a rest, how about: > > per-rule logging limits > > logging limit raising > > logging limit resetting > > Which would all NOT affect the statistics? > > We need more input from people who use the code,

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Nate Williams
> If it will get ALL of you to give it a rest, how about: > per-rule logging limits > logging limit raising > logging limit resetting > Which would all NOT affect the statistics? We need more input from people who use the code, to make sure they don't depend on the current 'featu

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Nate Williams
> If it will get ALL of you to give it a rest, how about: > per-rule logging limits > logging limit raising > logging limit resetting > Which would all NOT affect the statistics? We need more input from people who use the code, to make sure they don't depend on the current 'feat

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Brian F. Feldman
If it will get ALL of you to give it a rest, how about: per-rule logging limits logging limit raising logging limit resetting Which would all NOT affect the statistics? I am, yes, suggesting I will implement it. Brian Fundakowski Feldman _ __ ___ ___ ___ ___

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Brian F. Feldman
If it will get ALL of you to give it a rest, how about: per-rule logging limits logging limit raising logging limit resetting Which would all NOT affect the statistics? I am, yes, suggesting I will implement it. Brian Fundakowski Feldman _ __ ___ ___ ___ ___

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Achim Patzner
> I'd like to see people other than you, I, and Matt discussing this. > Other people who use this feature of IPFW that have an opinion one way > or the other should speak up. I must admit being a bad boy - I'm using ipfw for firewalling and accounting: "log" rules for catching bad guys (and I'm no

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Julian Elischer
a system wide limit and each rule's logging counter individually resetable back to 0. On Tue, 27 Jul 1999, Joe Greco wrote: > > 1) Set a global VERBOSE_LIMIT mechanism and: > a) allow your logging counter to be reset, or > b) allow your limit to be raised to re-enable logging > 2

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Joe Greco
> > > > > Again, it's not a fix, it's a feature. Not being able to mess with > > > > > counters (logging or otherwise) is a feature. It may be a feature > > > > > that > > > > > > > > you can do without, but that decision is not to be made lightly. > > > > > >

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Nate Williams
> > > > Again, it's not a fix, it's a feature. Not being able to mess with > > > > counters (logging or otherwise) is a feature. It may be a feature that > > > > > > you can do without, but that decision is not to be made lightly. > > > > > > I'm _saying_ to cr

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Joe Greco
> > > Again, it's not a fix, it's a feature. Not being able to mess with > > > counters (logging or otherwise) is a feature. It may be a feature that > > > > you can do without, but that decision is not to be made lightly. > > > > I'm _saying_ to create a compl

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Joe Greco
> > > > I like the ability at secure level 3 to only reset the counters > > > > forward.. > > > > It fits in with such things as the "append only" flag. > > > > > > Then we'd have to implement per-rule counters that default to > > > IPFW_VERBOSE_LIMIT but that could be changed to anything. That'

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Nate Williams
> > Again, it's not a fix, it's a feature. Not being able to mess with > > counters (logging or otherwise) is a feature. It may be a feature that > > you can do without, but that decision is not to be made lightly. > > I'm _saying_ to create a completely separa

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Joe Greco
> > > > > One could argue that accounting numbers in a firewall shouldn't be > > > > > trusted, but I won't argue that point since the firewall is often the > > > > > most 'natural' place to stick network accounting software. > > > > > > > > If you can't trust something in the kernel, then you jus

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Achim Patzner
> I'd like to see people other than you, I, and Matt discussing this. > Other people who use this feature of IPFW that have an opinion one way > or the other should speak up. I must admit being a bad boy - I'm using ipfw for firewalling and accounting: "log" rules for catching bad guys (and I'm n

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Julian Elischer
a system wide limit and each rule's logging counter individually resetable back to 0. On Tue, 27 Jul 1999, Joe Greco wrote: > > 1) Set a global VERBOSE_LIMIT mechanism and: > a) allow your logging counter to be reset, or > b) allow your limit to be raised to re-enable logging >

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Nate Williams
> > > I like the ability at secure level 3 to only reset the counters forward.. > > > It fits in with such things as the "append only" flag. > > > > Then we'd have to implement per-rule counters that default to > > IPFW_VERBOSE_LIMIT but that could be changed to anything. That's a very > > differ

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Nate Williams
> > > > One could argue that accounting numbers in a firewall shouldn't be > > > > trusted, but I won't argue that point since the firewall is often the > > > > most 'natural' place to stick network accounting software. > > > > > > If you can't trust something in the kernel, then you just can't tr

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Joe Greco
> > > > > Again, it's not a fix, it's a feature. Not being able to mess with > > > > > counters (logging or otherwise) is a feature. It may be a feature that > > > > > > > > you can do without, but that decision is not to be made lightly. > > > > > > > > I'm _

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Nate Williams
> > > > Again, it's not a fix, it's a feature. Not being able to mess with > > > > counters (logging or otherwise) is a feature. It may be a feature that > > > > > > you can do without, but that decision is not to be made lightly. > > > > > > I'm _saying_ to c

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Joe Greco
> > > Again, it's not a fix, it's a feature. Not being able to mess with > > > counters (logging or otherwise) is a feature. It may be a feature that > > > > you can do without, but that decision is not to be made lightly. > > > > I'm _saying_ to create a comp

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Joe Greco
> > > How do you figure? Currently, the kernel will quit 'logging' denied > > > packets when the counter reaches a specific (compiled-in) number. > > ^ > > Then what is > > > > net.inet.ip.fw.verbose_limit: 0 > > Well I'll be. You learn

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Joe Greco
> > I like the ability at secure level 3 to only reset the counters forward.. > > It fits in with such things as the "append only" flag. > > Then we'd have to implement per-rule counters that default to > IPFW_VERBOSE_LIMIT but that could be changed to anything. That's a very > different setup th

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Joe Greco
> > > > I like the ability at secure level 3 to only reset the counters forward.. > > > > It fits in with such things as the "append only" flag. > > > > > > Then we'd have to implement per-rule counters that default to > > > IPFW_VERBOSE_LIMIT but that could be changed to anything. That's a very

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Joe Greco
> > > You get *better* information on per-rule limits than on a global limit. > > > > No, you simply get a finer-grained ability to select. > > Which is almost always better. > > > > > If I'm an admin, I'm going to think "Well lets see, I want to store a > > > > month of bad packets in it. > > >

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Nate Williams
> > Again, it's not a fix, it's a feature. Not being able to mess with > > counters (logging or otherwise) is a feature. It may be a feature that > > you can do without, but that decision is not to be made lightly. > > I'm _saying_ to create a completely separ

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Joe Greco
> > > > > One could argue that accounting numbers in a firewall shouldn't be > > > > > trusted, but I won't argue that point since the firewall is often the > > > > > most 'natural' place to stick network accounting software. > > > > > > > > If you can't trust something in the kernel, then you ju

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Nate Williams
> > > I like the ability at secure level 3 to only reset the counters forward.. > > > It fits in with such things as the "append only" flag. > > > > Then we'd have to implement per-rule counters that default to > > IPFW_VERBOSE_LIMIT but that could be changed to anything. That's a very > > diffe

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Nate Williams
> > > > One could argue that accounting numbers in a firewall shouldn't be > > > > trusted, but I won't argue that point since the firewall is often the > > > > most 'natural' place to stick network accounting software. > > > > > > If you can't trust something in the kernel, then you just can't t

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Joe Greco
> > > How do you figure? Currently, the kernel will quit 'logging' denied > > > packets when the counter reaches a specific (compiled-in) number. > > ^ > > Then what is > > > > net.inet.ip.fw.verbose_limit: 0 > > Well I'll be. You learn

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Joe Greco
> > I like the ability at secure level 3 to only reset the counters forward.. > > It fits in with such things as the "append only" flag. > > Then we'd have to implement per-rule counters that default to > IPFW_VERBOSE_LIMIT but that could be changed to anything. That's a very > different setup t

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Joe Greco
> > > You get *better* information on per-rule limits than on a global limit. > > > > No, you simply get a finer-grained ability to select. > > Which is almost always better. > > > > > If I'm an admin, I'm going to think "Well lets see, I want to store a > > > > month of bad packets in it. > >

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Nate Williams
> > (Another thing I just thought of is that this could cause DoS attacks on > > the system if a user compromised root and then set the limit to a very > > high number.) > > If you have someone going berzerk as "root" on a firewall you're definitely > going to have a completely different set of he

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Achim Patzner
On Tue, Jul 27, 1999 at 11:15:11AM -0600, Nate Williams wrote: > Then we'd have to implement per-rule counters that default to > IPFW_VERBOSE_LIMIT but that could be changed to anything. *falling on my knees* If you're going to do that what would it cost me (in chocolate bars or sushi) to get you

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Nate Williams
> > How do you figure? Currently, the kernel will quit 'logging' denied > > packets when the counter reaches a specific (compiled-in) number. > ^ > Then what is > > net.inet.ip.fw.verbose_limit: 0 Well I'll be. You learn something new ev

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Achim Patzner
On Tue, Jul 27, 1999 at 11:12:25AM -0600, Nate Williams wrote: > How do you figure? Currently, the kernel will quit 'logging' denied > packets when the counter reaches a specific (compiled-in) number. ^ Then what is net.inet.ip.fw.verbose_

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Matthew Dillon
:I just thought of a bad thing. If you allowed the counters to be zero'd :(or advanced) at securelevel == 3, then a 'malicious user' could write a :cronjob to continually reset them and cause a DoS attack on the system :(or in the case of advance, reset them to ridiculously high values), :thus fil

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Nate Williams
> ipfw allows you to clear counters. It is a feature that already exists. > > However, it does not allow you to do it if you are sitting at secure > level 3. > > Why not? I can't think of any good reason why clearing the counters > should be disallowed when sitting at a hig

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Nate Williams
> I like the ability at secure level 3 to only reset the counters forward.. > It fits in with such things as the "append only" flag. Then we'd have to implement per-rule counters that default to IPFW_VERBOSE_LIMIT but that could be changed to anything. That's a very different setup than what we c

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Nate Williams
> :That doesn't mean we shouldn't allow people to have an unsophisticated setup, > :just because a sophisticated one is available. It would be useful to have > :a per-firewall-rule counter, decrement it on each match if logging and > :set, and be able to reset to something higher. > : > : Brian Fun

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Nate Williams
> :Instead of zeroing it, how about raising the logging limit to (current + > :whatever the limit was) > : > : Brian Fundakowski Feldman _ __ ___ ___ ___ ___ > : gr...@freebsd.org _ __ ___ | _ ) __| \ > > The way I see it either some piece of software is monit

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Nate Williams
> > (Another thing I just thought of is that this could cause DoS attacks on > > the system if a user compromised root and then set the limit to a very > > high number.) > > If you have someone going berzerk as "root" on a firewall you're definitely > going to have a completely different set of h

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Nate Williams
> > You get *better* information on per-rule limits than on a global limit. > > No, you simply get a finer-grained ability to select. Which is almost always better. > > > If I'm an admin, I'm going to think "Well lets see, I want to store a > > > month of bad packets in it. > > > > If you're an

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Achim Patzner
On Tue, Jul 27, 1999 at 11:15:11AM -0600, Nate Williams wrote: > Then we'd have to implement per-rule counters that default to > IPFW_VERBOSE_LIMIT but that could be changed to anything. *falling on my knees* If you're going to do that what would it cost me (in chocolate bars or sushi) to get you

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Nate Williams
> > How do you figure? Currently, the kernel will quit 'logging' denied > > packets when the counter reaches a specific (compiled-in) number. > ^ > Then what is > > net.inet.ip.fw.verbose_limit: 0 Well I'll be. You learn something new e

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Achim Patzner
On Tue, Jul 27, 1999 at 11:12:25AM -0600, Nate Williams wrote: > How do you figure? Currently, the kernel will quit 'logging' denied > packets when the counter reaches a specific (compiled-in) number. ^ Then what is net.inet.ip.fw.verbose

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Matthew Dillon
:But it might be hiding a real security threat/attack or a real breakin. :Say I've spent all night trying to hack into your machine and finally get in. :If I can reset all of ipfw's counters back to zero, and this is :something your security checking scripts are checking, you might not :think

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Matthew Dillon
:I just thought of a bad thing. If you allowed the counters to be zero'd :(or advanced) at securelevel == 3, then a 'malicious user' could write a :cronjob to continually reset them and cause a DoS attack on the system :(or in the case of advance, reset them to ridiculously high values), :thus fi

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Nate Williams
> ipfw allows you to clear counters. It is a feature that already exists. > > However, it does not allow you to do it if you are sitting at secure > level 3. > > Why not? I can't think of any good reason why clearing the counters > should be disallowed when sitting at a hi

Re: securelevel and ipfw zero

1999-07-27 Thread Nate Williams
> I like the ability at secure level 3 to only reset the counters forward.. > It fits in with such things as the "append only" flag. Then we'd have to implement per-rule counters that default to IPFW_VERBOSE_LIMIT but that could be changed to anything. That's a very different setup than what we

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