[Freenet-dev] IMPORTANT: Please read

2001-01-02 Thread Ian Clarke
If you are reading this through the new [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing lists then please disregard it. IMPORTANT Within the next 48 hours I plan to disable email delivery for the old lists.sourceforge.net mailing lists. You should go to http://freenetproject.org/in

Re: [Freenet-dev] An automatic cataloging system.

2001-01-02 Thread Travis Bemann
On Mon, Jan 01, 2001 at 10:47:36PM -0800, Aaron Voisine wrote: > An automatic cataloging system. > > What if we created a catalog key type who's data could be > appended to by anyone as long as the appendix was a single > line that conforms to a specific syntax, is not already > contained in the

Re: [Freenet-dev] Why new list?

2001-01-02 Thread Adam Langley
On Mon, Jan 01, 2001 at 11:02:09PM -0800, joel orton wrote: > Hi List, > > Why are you making a new mailing list? Because Sourceforge sucks under load. AGL -- Join in the new game that's sweeping the country. It's called "Bureaucracy". Everybody stands in a circle. The first person to do a

Re: [Freenet-dev] Node Operator Anonymity - the issues

2001-01-02 Thread Sven Neuhaus
On Thu, Dec 28, 2000 at 09:57:01PM -0600, Brandon wrote: > > Your back on legal loopholes. The fact is that the shielded node relies on > > the existance of public nodes, so you have simply moved the target that > > the enemy needs to have shut down. > > You don't move the target, you reduce its

Re: [Freenet-dev] Map files for FProxy

2001-01-02 Thread Mark J. Roberts
On Tue, 2 Jan 2001, Scott Gregory Miller wrote: > On Mon, 1 Jan 2001, Mark J. Roberts wrote: > > > On Wed, 27 Dec 2000, Scott Gregory Miller wrote: > > > > > Why not have a datstructure that just doesnt grow to big, a lot like the > > > Freenet datastore, rather than worrying about clearing. >

Re: [Freenet-dev] New Mailing Lists

2001-01-02 Thread Mark J. Roberts
On 2 Jan 2001, Steven Hazel wrote: > "Mark J. Roberts" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > > > >From blah blah blah > > > > > > confuses the fucking braindead parser. Arrrgghh. > > > > The list server even munges it with a > prefix it's so evil! > > From-mangling is a more complicated iss

Re: [Freenet-dev] PK key exchange

2001-01-02 Thread Matthew Toseland
On Mon, Jan 01, 2001 at 08:29:01PM -0800, Mr . Bad wrote: > > "OS" == Oskar Sandberg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > >> Shy nodes ("Don't talk to strangers."). I realize it's a > >> social rather than a technical solution, but it might be the > >> only one that would even help. >

Re: [Freenet-dev] PK key exchange

2001-01-02 Thread Oskar Sandberg
On Tue, Jan 02, 2001 at 04:25:29PM +, Matthew Toseland wrote: > A cancer node can do the following Bad Things: > a) return a bad KSK > b) not find a key and take up excess HTL or clock time > c) log connections, node addresses, etc > a) is your own fault for using KSKs; they are necessary to

Re: [Freenet-dev] An automatic cataloging system.

2001-01-02 Thread Oskar Sandberg
On Mon, Jan 01, 2001 at 10:47:36PM -0800, Aaron Voisine wrote: > An automatic cataloging system. > > What if we created a catalog key type who's data could be > appended to by anyone as long as the appendix was a single > line that conforms to a specific syntax, is not already > contained in the

RE: [Freenet-dev] FProxy security detector checked in

2001-01-02 Thread Duncan Irvine
> > > And of course browsers *could* implement this > functionality themselves. > > > > It seems risky to make the assumption that all browser code > should be > > trusted esp. given that we have no ability to audit the > code. A piece of > > firewalling code would seem more appropiate under

Re: [Freenet-dev] PK key exchange

2001-01-02 Thread Mr . Bad
> "MT" == Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: Me> One thing I find a little strange is that we haven't had to Me> deal with cancer nodes yet. MT> Because they require considerable resources to implement and MT> run and rarely give useful results, beyond just finding

Re: [Freenet-dev] PK key exchange

2001-01-02 Thread Mr . Bad
> "OS" == Oskar Sandberg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: OS> We have no solution to the problem of the honest cancer (not OS> even Mr. Bad's "lets break freenet" proposal really OS> helps). En garde! Defend that statement, sir. ~Mr. Bad -- ~~~

Re: [freenet-devl] Re: [Freenet-dev] PK key exchange

2001-01-02 Thread Don Marti
On Tue, Jan 02, 2001 at 11:14:36AM -0800, Mr. Bad wrote: > I don't think someone would make a cancer node to be useful; they > would make one to be destructive. Please forgive me if this is a "person who doesn't understand Freenet's attack on Freenet." I think I understand what's happening well

Re: [freenet-devl] Re: [Freenet-dev] PK key exchange

2001-01-02 Thread Scott Gregory Miller
> > I don't think someone would make a cancer node to be useful; they > would make one to be destructive. > > Also, it'd be fairly easy to adapt Fred to do things like: bury > requests, return garbled results, etc. etc. w/r/t KSKs, I don't think > they're the only problem: As far as I can tell,

Re: [freenet-devl] Re: [Freenet-dev] PK key exchange

2001-01-02 Thread Scott Gregory Miller
On 2 Jan 2001, Mr.Bad wrote: > > "OS" == Oskar Sandberg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > OS> We have no solution to the problem of the honest cancer (not > OS> even Mr. Bad's "lets break freenet" proposal really > OS> helps). > > En garde! Defend that statement, sir. On the co

Re: [freenet-devl] Re: [Freenet-dev] PK key exchange

2001-01-02 Thread Mr . Bad
> "SGM" == Scott Gregory Miller <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: Me> As far as I can tell, Fred does -not- check CHKs or do other Me> verification on data it gets. SGM> Having spent nearly 12 hours a day for a month to implement SGM> this, I can say fairly certainly that Fred does

Re: [freenet-devl] Re: [Freenet-dev] PK key exchange

2001-01-02 Thread Mr . Bad
> "SGM" == Scott Gregory Miller <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: OS> We have no solution to the problem of the honest cancer (not OS> even Mr. Bad's "lets break freenet" proposal really OS> helps). Me> En garde! Defend that statement, sir. SGM> On the contrary, the burden o

Re: [Freenet-dev] Node Operator Anonymity - the issues

2001-01-02 Thread Brandon
Brandon: > > If you're running a shielded node, your address is relative to the address > > of the proxy node. I suppose you could say that you can "switch" proxy > > node by starting to send your messages through a new proxy, in which case > > you'll still be receiving messages from the old prox

Re: [Freenet-dev] Node Operator Anonymity - the issues

2001-01-02 Thread Brandon
Ian: > > No - my intention is that every time you set a datasource in a message, > > you can select a different shield node, so that even if one of those Adam: > It's like switching IP all the time - and I don't think it's going > to work. Yes, it's exactly like switching IP all the time. So i

Re: [Freenet-dev] Node Operator Anonymity - the issues

2001-01-02 Thread Brandon
Brandon: > > There also needs to be some way in the protocol that the shielded nodes > > specifies that it wants to be shielded so that the proxy node can > > differentiate between nodes that do and do not want to be shielded. Scott: > No, you still dont seem to get it. Shielded nodes have encr

Re: [Freenet-dev] Shadow Nodes (Was: Node Operator Anonymity - theissues)

2001-01-02 Thread Brandon
> No it doesn't. The shield node has a public/private keypair. Nodes using > the shield encrypt their address using the shield's public key, and attach > the ciphertext to their reference. The shield only needs to decrypt that > field with its private key and send the message to the address it

RE: [Freenet-dev] FProxy security detector checked in

2001-01-02 Thread Brandon
BC: > "Forbid" was a poor choice of word. We need a method of using client-side > code that does not compromise the anonymity or security of the user. What do you suggest? ___ Freenet-dev mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://lists.sourceforge.net

Re: [Freenet-dev] Node Operator Anonymity - the issues

2001-01-02 Thread Zem
Brandon wrote: > Yeah, but the shield node still needs to know to forward messages to > shielded nodes. > > So if the if the node on tcp/141.215.69.7:19114 gets a message for > tcp/141.215.69.7:19114/12345 it needs to recall that this is referring to > tcp/192.168.0.2:1876. So it has to keep a t

Re: [freenet-devl] Re: [Freenet-dev] PK key exchange

2001-01-02 Thread Oskar Sandberg
On Tue, Jan 02, 2001 at 01:21:51PM -0800, Mr.Bad wrote: <> > I agree with Oskar that what I described wouldn't solve this > problem. The only thing I can think of that would is having the > routing algorithms try to preserve diversity in the routing table -- > which would probably be hard to do r

Re: [Freenet-dev] Newsgroup gateway

2001-01-02 Thread johncole
Howdy all! On another mailing list I'm on, they run a Usenet news server just for themselves and with a mail-news gateway to-from their server (with some restrictions so that mail-bombs and fake-headers don't cause problems) could this be a solution? or do you really want it all on the global Us

Re: [Freenet-dev] Node Operator Anonymity - the issues

2001-01-02 Thread Zem
Oskar Sandberg wrote: > Just like you noted with the clusters, the question is whether operator of > the "shadowed" node is providing anything to the network that makes it > worthwhile (from the perspective of the network) for him to run a node at > all. Since his node is serving data he is obvio

Re: [Freenet-dev] freenet://

2001-01-02 Thread Philipp Hug
hi I found some useful stuff about those protocol-handlers (http, https, freenet) on the MSDN cds. I'll try to implement a test dll tomorrow. btw: the protocol-handler could forward the request to fproxy using sockets (no java to binary compiler needed) philipp - Original Message - From

RE: [Freenet-dev] Why don't we get real updating done?

2001-01-02 Thread Brandon
> Brandon, why is SimplifiedClient printing the size of each message it > inserts? I don't see anything obvious. It fucks with my logging. The size of each message? I'm not getting that but I'll look into it. > Also I found out a few days ago that getData doesn't work, but getMetaData > does. T

[Freenet-dev] RE: [freenet-devl] Eeeekkkk. Date-updating SSK redirects are borked, I think.

2001-01-02 Thread Benjamin Coates
>From "Mark J. Roberts" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >So I insert a redirect like > >insert -createUpdate yes -increment 60 -htl 2 SSK@H-lqMDiPY2yDwOtFBrN~ShrDyjsdFtZItBbOTzk19w/wubba > >and what gets inserted is > >Metadata: >Redirect >increment=60 >baseline=210100 >End >freenet:SSK@H-lqMDiPY2yDw