Oskar Sandberg wrote:
> Just like you noted with the clusters, the question is whether operator of
> the "shadowed" node is providing anything to the network that makes it
> worthwhile (from the perspective of the network) for him to run a node at
> all. Since his node is serving data he is obviously providing disk space,
> but all the bandwidth his node is providing to the network costs the
> gateway node equally much. So whether the existence of such a node is
> worthwhile depends on which resource is more scarce.
Mojo Nation solves this problem with micropayments for relaying.
> Well, it protects an individual node, but the practically viable "Media
> Enforcer" attack (after we implement PKI) is simply to randomly attack all
> public nodes in an attempt to stifle the entire network, so it seems to me
> that any solution that depends on the existence of any public nodes is
> only a slight improvement.
I assume "stifle the entire network" refers to cease-and-desist letters
and not a DoS attack.
Efficiency aside for the moment, what if public nodes only provided a
forwarding service? No caching, no requests, just relaying messages to
shadow nodes. Allow nested shadow chains, make shadow addresses
indistinguishable from 'true' addresses, and use padding to hide the
length of chains.
This might allow a public node to use a 'common carrier' defense, since
it provides no service other than forwarding messages.
There would be little value in siezing the node for its datastore
addresses, since all addresses would appear to be arbitrarily long
shadow chains.
One might also argue that shadow nodes would then provide a worthwhile
service over public nodes :)
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