On 1/7/2013 22:48 PM, Yashaswini Sathyanarayana wrote:
Hi ,
By default all standard attribute like user-name, user-password are of
type 1 and length 1.
But kineto attributes are of type 2 and length 2.
So is there a way to make RFC-2865 dictionary that is added in free
The MSCHAPs include the given name when calculating the hashes.
Stripping the domain will therefore not work. The client is using the
domain\name in the hash and you're asking the server to use just the name.
On 3/23/2011 15:08 PM, Thomas Wunder wrote:
Hi,
I'm currently trying to configure my
Perhaps the character value of the string for zero ('0') is 30 in hex
(0x30).
On 1/12/2011 23:33 PM, Xiaochen wrote:
Dear all,
I am using Fedora 12 + Freeradius to do some CoA tests.
One is : AAA sends Disconnect request to Client.
My packet.txt content is as:
WiMAX-DM-Action-Code=0
But
There's many a slip 'twixt the cup and the lip
I promise you'll want to kick yourself when you find the simple
difference after so many messages. Many of us have the grace to go
through this necessarily humbling exercise in private.
On 2010-11-05 2:47 PM, Eduardo Moreira wrote:
sorry, but
By the looks of it you have two problems. The User-Password name 'bob'
isn't matched by the response Juniper-Local-User-Name 'labrat'. Perhaps
ssh cares.
Your broken client sends the identical packet for the new authentication
attempt when it must send a brand new packet (different id, socket
I'm merely speculating that your SSH client is rejecting the response
where the User-Name Juniper-Local-User-Name for 'bob' but accepts the
name 'labrat' and response name 'labrat'.
well, i don't have user labrat configured in file users on the
radius server.
KISS:
Set up the server to
No one here is going to do your homework for you.
RFC 2865 is pretty clear on how this is calculated.
A Message-Authenticator attribute in the response attributes will
require more work. Perhaps you can get extra credit for figuring it out.
On 2010-09-12 1:25 PM, Theresa Otte wrote:
Hello,
TACACS+ uses an MD5 pad based on the session ID, shared secret, TACACS+
version, and packet sequence number. This is XOR'd over the packet. The
pad is in multiples of the MD5 hash length.
The header is sent plain text and includes the sequence number, the
session ID and version number.
:01 PM, Michael Lecuyer m...@iterpacis.org
mailto:m...@iterpacis.org wrote:
TACACS+ uses an MD5 pad based on the session ID, shared secret,
TACACS+ version, and packet sequence number. This is XOR'd over the
packet. The pad is in multiples of the MD5 hash length.
The header
I'm not sure it would help you to know how the Master Keys are generated
or encoded - it's not simple.
It's a process involving the accumulated TLS handshake messages, random
number generation, various sorts of key exchanges, cryptographic hashes,
and the PRF function described in the TLS
The password is encoded for PAP (when a User-Password is present). Its
the only authentication method that uses decodable passwords. FR is
displaying it in plain text for your convenience.
Inýcio Alves wrote:
Good Morning to all.
I would like if is possible use FR+LDAP with Use-Password
Plenty of reasons - but one you won't have control over even in CoA is
that it could be proxied.
The NAS-IPAddress is used in the CoA request packet to tell the NAS
which client should receive the packet.
Marlon Duksa wrote:
Hi everyone -
Can anyone think of a reason why the NAS-IP and the
It's a one-way hash of the password. What you're seeing is the CHAP
password value. Only PAP uses a reversible password.
Sallai Janos wrote:
Hi,
Does anyone knows how I could save the CHAP password into radpostauth
pass in a VISIBLE format, in mysql ?
Actually I can correctly log both the
Evolynx is not very good (quite poor). It uses long fixed time outs for
packets which really only tells how fast the client is, not the server.
Almost all simple load tests have this problem.
All RADIUS systems will bog down with back end issues like LDAP and
accounting databases. Test those
The User-Password value is a MD5 chained pad based on the shared secret
and packet authenticator. The password is XOR'd over the pad and this is
chained to the next pad. The process is reversible.
Essentially this is as close to a perfect encryption scheme as you can
get - entirely depending
NTRadPing is a very bad client to test real authentication.
While it says it has an Access-Accept packet it isn't doing any proper
checking of the packet. All Access-Accept packets are signed by the
server using the shared secret. A good client will check that signature.
A packet with a bad
Like most other RADIUS server load testers it merely tests how fast the
client load test can run and doesn't really test the server load.
The Evolynx tester is especially prone to this problem because you can't
set the client time out. And 20 concurrent threads won't result in
much of a
It's impossible to put an Message-Authenticator in an accounting packet.
It has to do with the way the Accounting-Request packet is signed.
The MA is placed in the Access-Request packet as 16 zeroed bytes. The
HMAC-MD5 value is calculated over the entire packet and patched into the
MA's zeroed
:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
ius.org] On Behalf Of Michael Lecuyer
Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2007 6:47 PM
To: FreeRadius users mailing list
Subject: Re: Accounting Request Message Authenticator setting to 0x00
It's impossible to put an Message-Authenticator in an accounting packet.
It has to do with the way
You can send a Disconnect-Message from the RADIUS server to the client
to disconnect them if the NAS supports DM/COA. The DM will cause the NAS
to drop the connection effectively disconnecting them from any services
they were using.
Dennis Skinner wrote:
satish patel wrote:
You're requiring MS-CHAP authentiation but the client is sending a CHAP
authentication. They're not the same type of authentication.
John Longland wrote:
Hi all
My freeradius server has been running for some time now and due to
the users file getting a bit long, I decide to go with the
This pretty much sums up the problem:
rlm_mschap: No MS-CHAP-Challenge in the request
This is not a valid MS-CHAP request. You might want to look at the
actual attributes passed to see if this is really an MS-CHAP request. It
will contain Microsoft VSAs containing a MS-CHAP-Challenge and a
Debugging output is always a security exposure. Secure debugging
wouldn't be all that helpful to the debugging process especially as
seeing the plain text password may be the difference between solving a
problem or not.
Perhaps 'redacted' debugging output is what you're after (for posting to
I'm directed to www.domaindirect.com. However a 'whois' shows:
Expiration Date:19-Nov-2007 05:00:00 UTC
Registrant Name:Alan DeKok
Status:CLIENT TRANSFER PROHIBITED
so it's unlikely that that the domain has expired or has been hijacked.
However the name servers are on domaindirect.com so
Rob Shepherd wrote:
The setup uses PEAP, however am I correct in thinking that the RADIUS
server never touches any TLS components. The TLS tunnel is between the
WLAN controller and the client right?
PEAP - Protected EAP - the protection is the TLS tunnel which is between
the RADIUS client
This has been explained before in this list and it's how RADIUS works.
The Even though the secret is incorrect the authentication can be
correct. The server returns an Access-Accept. Why? The server trusts the
client (it's in the accepted NAS list) and performs the authentication.
The server
Most authentication methods don't use the secret as part of the password
encoding and use independent information for encoding.
PAP is the only authentication method that depends on the secret.
For example CHAP uses the password, two random numbers and MD5 to encode
the password.
Thibault
I think that authenticating everyone if the database went down would be
called 'foolsafe' :) If your database is down you're out of business.
There are much better 'failsafe' methods - search for fail-over in the
FreeRadius documentation.
Matt wrote:
Ok,
Well with no answer to this question
It would be difficult to say how RADIUS would interact with the actual
ACE server since it's a proprietary system. In 2002 I thought about
going down this route and I'm summarizing from the 5 page SecurId
integration document.
You must write code that uses RSA's 'RSA Agent' software to
There's more going on the exchange than a simple authentication.
The data in the Access-Request packet may have correct data for
authentication. The server will correctly authenticate the entity.
However server signs the response packet with a different secret than
the client making the
There is no way to generate a message authenticator in an
Accounting-Request packet the usual way it's generated for an
Access-Request.
The accounting packet is signed by the client therefore there cannot be
two signatures created for the entire the packet. By the very nature of
creating
This is dictated by TLS (actually OpenSSL's TLS). For the RSA key
exchange TLS uses RSA_PKCS1_PADDING.
Juan Daniel Moreno wrote:
Hi, I am using a freeRadius 1.0.4 and I would like to know something
about client_key_exchange(). Into this function it is necessary to
specify a padding system
You must have missed the information in RFC 2865 (RADIUS), which is also
a Fine Manual. The PAP password is XOR'd with the MD5 hash of the
shared secret and the authenticator.
You've been reading about the protocol prior to the RADIUS client's
involvment. The same thing applies to CHAP, just
Sayantan Bhowmick wrote:
Hi,
I am using FreeRADIUS version 1.0.2 and I am trying to authenticate
users using CHAP authentication. Everything works and authentication
goes through except that users are authenticated successfully( provided
userid and password id correct) irrespective of what
Ascend (as Lucent) has been introducing tags with values higher than 256
in the VSA's for a while (first message I saw where the problem of long
tags was mentioned was from January 2004). An example from their
dictionary shows:
ATTRIBUTE Ascend-MOH-Timeout 261 integer
The reason is that the shared secret is wrong.
RADIUS accounting packets are signed by the client and the signature is
checked by the server. The authenticator is generated by the client from
the packet contents and forms this signature. The server checks this
signature.
Authentication
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