Glen... I quite confused as to what you mean by tight and loose control...
Let us take the case of belief in a tight relationship between my height
off the ground and my likelihood of being injured in a jump. If I firmly
believe that, then whether or not I jump is tightly coupled with the
height.
I've not participated in this discussion of Peirciean Pragmatism for
many reasons including a lack of firsthand knowledge of Peirce's work
(to even vaguely approach that of Nick or Eric for example. The talk
of control loops, habits, belief and coupling with reality vs coupling
with beliefs was
To be a little more concise, Peirce's position on "self-control" is irrelevant
to this point. Where the agency lies is irrelevant. This point is that
Peircian belief and Peircian doubt seem well-elaborated by the concept of the
looseness and tightness of the feedback loop between reality and
Glen,
I am very ambivalent about the notion of "self-control". I think for Peirce
it was limited to where we direct our attention. But that seems to concede too
much of a dualism.
But I am still in transit.
Nick
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark
Yes! I've been talking (mostly) about the selection of habits/beliefs by the
environment, as opposed to the selection of theories about reality. In the
former, the "agent" is reality, whereas in the latter, the agency belongs with
the holder of the theories. If we take what Peirce is saying
