To be a little more concise, Peirce's position on "self-control" is irrelevant to this point. Where the agency lies is irrelevant. This point is that Peircian belief and Peircian doubt seem well-elaborated by the concept of the looseness and tightness of the feedback loop between reality and the behavior under consideration.
Any behavior (be it belief in the æther or eyeball saccade) can be considered Peircian-doubtful if it's tightly coupled to the environment and Peircian-believed if it is loosely coupled to the environment. And to go back to "What Pragmatism Is", when Peirce says: "if a given prescription for an experiment ever can be and ever is carried out in act, an experience of a given description will result", I think you'll notice that the tightness or looseness of the coupling is a tacit experimental target for pretty much any habit/belief. E.g. my atheist friends delight in pointing out how our theist friends always fail to check their idea of God against reality (strong evidence of Peircian-belief). Or e.g. arguing for/against gun control, one can't help but notice how often an arguer (fails to) cite(s) data. Or e.g. when I run, the first mile or so is painful and horrible (strong evidence of Peircian-doubt), yet the final mile or 2 are wonderfully liberating (strong evidence of Peircian-belief). Or to go back to the dead horse, it should be clear whether a person believes the floor is there when they get up out of bed or not. Did they look first (tight coupling) or not (loose coupling). OK. I feel like I've done as much as I can to make the point clear. I'll stop. Thanks for everyone's patience. ### -- ☣ uǝlƃ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
