e listed on Wikipedia:-
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_password_managers>.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net
Learning without thought is naught;
thought without learning is dangerous.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQF
0x.
If you ask for a signature from 0x, GnuPG will sign with
subkey 0x instead.
If you specify 0x! (with the "!"), you get sigs from both
0x and 0x.
If you specify any other key, you get 0x as well.
- --
Best regards
MFPA
indows, does Pyrites work on
Windows as well? And/or could it be converted to a standalone Windows
executable using something like Py2exe or cx_Freeze?
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net
It's better to feed one cat than many mice
---
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Tuesday 23 December 2014 at 7:28:32 PM, in
,
Ryan Sawhill wrote:
> I have no idea how much work it would require. No one's
> ever expressed an interest, myself included.
It was more idle curiosity really.
- --
Best re
cted. It is
amazing work to be deeply proud of."
Maybe he read a different audit report than I found at [1].
[0] <https://www.grc.com/misc/truecrypt/truecrypt.htm>
[1]
<https://opencryptoaudit.org/reports/iSec_Final_Open_Crypto_Audit_Project_TrueCrypt_Security_Assessment.pdf&g
ng should indicate which keys are revoked or expired.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net
A closed door is an invitation to knock
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJUoJweXxSAAC4AKGlzc3Vl
presented with this choice.
If several encryption keys match the "To" address of an email, there
is no such choice of keys offered by my MUA and GnuPG picks one to use
for encryption. GnuPG also picks the key itself when I encrypt from
the commandline and use a non-unique patter
s.html#video
> to understand the important role, GPG plays.
I'm not entirely sure how this relates to the thread in which you
posted it.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net
You can't build a reputation on what you are going to do
Just as much use as the photo in a passport, then. (-;
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net
Adults are obsolete children.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJUpGpFXxSAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXR
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net
The man who really wants to do something finds a way,
the other finds an excuse.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJUpeZPXxSAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mc
anna send me a private
> message.
Does encrypt.to cope with 4096-bit keys and SHA256 binding signatures?
What size was your old encryption subkey?
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net
ETHERNET(n): dev
o store, is now K.
[0]
<https://stackoverflow.com/questions/3812416/custom-assymetric-cryptography-algorithm>
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net
Confusion is always the most honest response
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJUprloXxSAA
ed identity,
and people who compartmentalise the facets of their life as separate
"fractions". I guess keybase is not a good "fit" for the latter group.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net
Coffee doe
that
just occurred before we saw the smoking gun.
> I’m just fine with invasive identity establishment for
> murder suspects. :)
I'm not fine with invasive anything whilst they are *only* a suspect.
And once you have proven guilt or innocence it matters not a jot who
they are.
- -
o convey my general opinion that a publicly-known dossier of
unrelated "identity" events sounds far too invasive to be comfortable.
And later in my posting, the corollary that keybase does not sound
like something attractive to people who, like me, prefer to
compartmentalise the facets o
reveal or the associate happens to stumble upon.
(What if each of these labels mapped to a UID on an OpenPGP key, but
anybody who didn't see that particular label on you could not read the
corresponding UID on your key?)
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667r
sted due to an
> incomplete certificate chain.
I get a complete chain, just with a CA that is not "trusted" by my
copy of Firefox. I don't see what they gained by signing the cert with
that CA rather than leaving it as self-signed.
- --
Best regards
MFPA
sting where the code would need changing to allow
this, but cautioning such a key would be unusable by virtually
everybody else.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net
She looked like butter wouldn't melt in her mouth - or anywhere else
y is *your* facebook page (or whatever), so
they will believe it is *your* key.
Here is a review of Keybase I found:-
<http://www.coindesk.com/keybase-project-plans-make-cryptography-easy-twitter/>.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseu
subject has not shared them with you and does not
generally broadcast them. When the penalty has been paid, the debt to
society is discharged and it is no longer anybody else's business.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3d
tand I consider that
> to be Pollyannic fantasy.
Absolutely; it is something to be striven towards but unlikely to be
totally achieved.
[0] <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Right_to_be_Forgotten>.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.
his when it was
> happening,” Management will ask you some really harsh questions
> about why you didn’t pay attention to the warnings.
A warning system with many false positives is no warning system at
all.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gr
issuer-...@notations.openpgp.fifthhorseman.net=%g [0]
[0] <http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.mail.notmuch.general/3721/focus=7235>
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net
I don't suffer from insanity I enjoy every minute of it.
-BE
he key of
> the attacker.
Surely you only need the revocation certificate.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net
During an eruption - move away from the volcano - not towards it
-BEGIN P
made that claim.
I've seen the question several times before, usually answered in the
negative.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net
Time flies like an arrow. Fruit flies like a banana. -- Groucho M
from the cards, right?
> Yes, I agree.
> Peter.
But the threat is not fully mitigated if, as you said yourself in
another message on this thread, the attacker can potentially
sign/decrypt using the key on the smartcard.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014
ey-theft does radically decrease your attack
> surface in many cases.
As always, it depends on your threat model.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net
A candle loses nothing by lighting another candle
-BEGIN PGP SIGN
2.1. It is not
>used by GnuPG 2.1 and later.
If GnuPG 2.1.x finds an existing secring.gpg, that is used. If not,
the new file format secring.kbx is used.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net
Free advice costs nothing until
Mime attachments too (or not).
In my opinion, one of the strengths of Inline is that you _don't_ need
a mail client to interpret it: the message can be pasted into a text
file or a command window.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net
h
to MIME only after establishing the recipient can cope with it. But I
can't find the reference at the moment, and I think it may be outdated
advice.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net
It is not necessary to have enemies if you go out of yo
enter the passphrase (which is needed for
> re-encryption).
Thanks for the correction. I was confusing secret and public keyring
files.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net
The problem is not that we're paranoid;
it's that we'
unter-intuitive. It seems to be denying yourself
access to some of the incoming traffic for the sake of pedantry, which
sounds like it would harm interoperability. But, of course, the point
of having a spec is interoperability.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Friday 13 February 2015 at 1:14:25 PM, in
, Jerry wrote:
> On Fri, 13 Feb 2015 12:22:23 +0000, MFPA stated:
>> My preference is Inline: I want everything right there
>> in the message body where I can see it.
> Exac
al signature?
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net
I hit the CTRL key but I'm still not in control!
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJU3187XxSAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w
ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXRCM0FFN0VDQTlBOEM
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Friday 13 February 2015 at 5:12:18 PM, in
, Ville Määttä
wrote:
> Fortunately it certainly does not.
I doubt that many spam emails contain an inline OpenPGP signature, or
text that looks like one.
- --
Best regards
M
..
No, I was asking what you meant by "I have assigned your key a
non-trust attribute". From your reply, I see you mean Trust setting
number 2 "I do NOT trust". On my keyring, my own keys have a 5 "I
trust ultimately" and all other keys have the default. (I
that keyserver's web interface still times out for me in
two different browsers, but the "downforeveryoneorjustme.com" response
now says it is up. Strange.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...
es on a mailing list.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net
James, while John had had 'had', had had 'had had'.
'Had had' had had a better effect on the teacher.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
i
. Doesn't
> work with a PGP/MIME mail.
Copy/pasting the message source instead of the message body works for
*some* PGP/MIME messages.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net
Nothing a Pan-Galactic Gargle Blaster won't cure!
--
.
I like that advantage of keeping it all visible in the message body.
But don't recall ever having been asked the question.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net
Man is not a rational animal, he is a rationalising animal.
-
27;s an attachment, and so the recipient thinks there is not text in
> the message.
> These seem to be fairly rare these days though - or maybe I just don't know
> many people who use clients like this.
Outlook Express has that limitation (unless it was fixed in a late
version).
-
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Thursday 25 February 2010 at 3:53:23 AM, in
, John Clizbe wrote:
> MFPA wrote:
>> Hi John
>> On Thursday 25 February 2010 at 12:17:36 AM, you
>> wrote:
>>> It is also a good idea to send your key to the
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymail.com
Ultimate consistency lies in being consistently inconsistent
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQCVAwUBS4aK6aipC46tDG5pAQoWfgP+Kaflz5+32QsDfOJBV+tm33kXb8oDQzMo
tity of the person who controls that key
at the time you are signing it - not an indication that you are in any
way "associated."
--
Best regards
MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymail.com
War is a matter of vital importance to the State.
pgpAp7LFTpgPR.pgp
Descr
Some PGPNET members prefer to use Biglumber, or to post their key on
their own website. Quite a few members use the keyservers, and some
are active in networks such as GSWoT. Some members don't choose to
have their key on the servers, and there was heated discussion some
time back when
an individual under suspicion of illegal or
subversive activity, or in some places may be illegal itself. Isn't
that a good enough reason to not want a key on a public server showing
your name and/or an email address that can be traced to you?
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi Robert
On Thursday 25 February 2010 at 8:23:30 PM, you wrote:
> On 2/25/10 9:24 AM, MFPA wrote:
>> Some people hate the idea and get *very* upset if their key does end
>> up on the servers.
> What you're advocating he
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi Robert
On Friday 26 February 2010 at 6:05:56 PM, you wrote:
> On 2/26/10 12:38 PM, MFPA wrote:
>> I am *not* advocating the implementation of any form of
>> Digital Restrictions Malware (DRM).
> You can say you're no
the UID offers
protection against the accidental upload scenario. But somebody could
still generate a key with a UID suggesting nefarious activities, sign
your key with it, and upload it. Or their UID could simply identify
whose was the key with the obfuscated UID.
-
east)
giving an extra warning to answer if you execute --send-keys to upload
a key with that bit set?
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymail.com
Don't anthropomorphize computers - they hate it
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQCVAwUBS4g42aipC46tDG5pAQpbhgP/UR/YSCW6ns
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi David
On Friday 26 February 2010 at 4:33:03 PM, you wrote:
> On Feb 26, 2010, at 11:24 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> On 2/26/10 9:49 AM, MFPA wrote:
>>> I thought signing somebody's key was just stating to the world t
y
people who don't actually understand the information they find.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymail.com
Look, it's a hat! It's not going to hurt you.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQCVAwUBS4hnqqipC46tDG5pAQrosQQAgJcCy9zvllPkG7edCUIm+T26xJ1
o UK law, although equivalent
safeguards are in place in every country in the EU and the EEA.
Similar principles are applied in the laws of many other countries.
References include:-
http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/PaperOECD.html
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/instruments/oecdguidel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Friday 26 February 2010 at 5:04:36 PM, in
, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 2/26/10 10:53 AM, MFPA wrote:
>> There are privacy issues, especially if user-ids on the key contain
>> email addresses.
> This isn't persuasi
the privacy problem of
exposing other people's contact details.
> If you want to change that, the burden is on you to present
> persuasive evidence supporting a change. So far I've not
> seen it, which means the status quo stands.
I think that rather than ju
e email address and containing the key ID for
that email address.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymail.com
Change is inevitable except from a vending machine
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQCVAwUBS4mF6KipC46tDG5pAQrg3wQAq7tFOvu5NpAhVtrVIyfUjmwN1Sa6Cz8l
IM
the key owner's explicit
> permission."
> This is a pretty big change in the conventional wisdom.
> Before I'll sign on to that I'll have to see some
> strong reasoning, and I haven't.
>> It seems (and I could be utterly wrong), that MFPA is
>> say
's a great example of a clear exception to a general rule.
And whist you have stated that you check first, you have advocated
that it's OK not to. Somebody following your advice could land this
hypothetical Cuban in a whole lot of trouble.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmai
nds.
--
Best regards
MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymail.com
Reality is nothing but a collective hunch.
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-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi Robert
On Saturday 27 February 2010 at 8:03:15 PM, you wrote:
> On Feb 27, 2010, at 2:21 PM, MFPA wrote:
>> I have always been taught to challenge the status quo. "Because that's
>> the way we do it" is *never* a
municating with you and closes the email account. A
very common name; which John Smith was it? Is it much easier to track
a random John Smith than a random MFPA?
> How
> do I authenticate that an anonymous entity is really an anonymous
> entity?
I'm not anonymous: I'm MFPA.
ter and ignore the request.
In my opinion that's a step forward.
I'm convinced 1.4.9 would only do that in "expert" mode.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymail.com
Two wrongs don't make a right. But t
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi John
On Saturday 27 February 2010 at 10:21:20 PM, you wrote:
> MFPA wrote:
>> My contention is that the de
>> facto standard of revealing email addresses in key UIDs could actually be
>> mitigating *against* the use
can be found easily by
> a free, ordinary user search--and find out a beginning of how
> to track down MFPA so they can verify his key in person. :-)
Why not start your detective work from something like email kludges?
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymail.co
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi Mark
On Wednesday 3 March 2010 at 4:16:21 PM, you wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 26, 2010 at 03:53:27PM +0000, MFPA wrote:
>> There are privacy issues, especially if user-ids on the key contain
>> email addresses. In some cases, the auth
t privacy
> *according to your definition*.
A good point, well made.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymail.com
What's another word for synonym?
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQCVAwUBS462J6ipC46tDG5pAQr/RgP/UNZPYOePwKIZ1/wlu6HXKHwMfrN86i7G
hOq8M
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi Paul
On Saturday 6 March 2010 at 8:55:48 AM, you wrote:
> On Sat, 27 Feb 2010 03:52:02 +0000 MFPA wrote:
>> > (b) the person owns the information has the right to
>> > control how it is disseminated, and
This was someon
Hi Paul
On Saturday 6 March 2010 at 8:54:41 AM, you wrote:
> Hello MFPA,
> During this whole debate, you have assumed one thing in your argument
> that I don't believe anyone has pointed out as being flawed. You have
> assumed that the person (I will call him John Doe) w
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi David
On Sunday 7 March 2010 at 5:53:51 PM, you wrote:
> On Mar 7, 2010, at 11:46 AM, MFPA wrote:
>> (And yes, I know gpg now
>> allows you to omit the email address without having to use --expert,
>> but you a
h
tools.
--
Best regards
MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymail.com
Two wrongs don't make a right. But three lefts do.
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ot; rather than "impatient?"
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymail.com
We are all in the gutter, but some of us are looking at the stars
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQCVAwUBS5RXeKipC46tDG5pAQoYDgQAj3BvmgZythkHXMXotKBT/rAHpLtVCb
could not see how
including them could aid privacy).
> Maybe it is that I am an above average user. Maybe. Maybe it is just
> that I exercised judgment. Maybe I expect others to do the same.
Maybe.
--
Best regards
MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymail.com
Life is a holiday. In the same way that glass is a liquid.
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-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi Paul
On Monday 8 March 2010 at 5:35:08 AM, you wrote:
> MFPA wrote:
>> On Saturday 6 March 2010 at 8:55:48 AM, you wrote:
>>
>>
>>> On Sat, 27 Feb 2010 03:52:02 + MFPA wrote:
>>>>> (b) the
the default?
Enable is default, same as in PGP. Both offer the ability to disable a
key, so that you cannot encrypt to it or sign with it but you can
still decrypt and can still verify signatures.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymail.com
Life is far too important a t
l known CAs, while others belong to less reputable
> ones.
A lot there that I've not heard of. Could be perfectly reputable, but
I am unaware of their reputation...
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymail.com
Think for yourself.
Otherwise you have to b
such things.
I would question whether the defence solicitor was fit to practice if
he didn't produce expert witnesses who could explain this sufficiently
clearly for the jury to understand.
--
Best regards
MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymail.com
Dogs look up to u
is no way other than that.
Wouldn't "--disable-cipher-algo 3DES" achieve this?
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymail.com
If you can't convince them, confuse them.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQCVAwUBS5tlkaipC46tDG5
r things. I'd avoid it ;)
Fair enough. I just wondered.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymail.com
Another person's secret is like another person's money:
you are not as careful with it as you are with your own
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQCVAwUBS5
that amount could effectively be "none" judging by
their profile and postings on the likes of Facebook.
> I believe that many
> of us on this mailing list want to use cryptography in
> association with our real identities. Others don't.
You find both camps on this list a
to bring it to the attention of everyone. If I
> reject an ID incorrectly and refuse to sign, then I am damaging my own
> standing in the Web of Trust.
Presumably less damage than if you failed to spot a fake ID and went
ahead with the signing?
- --
Best regards
MFPA
y, if you have
> personal-cipher-preferences and you leave off AES, you won't use it
> when encrypting to someone else.
Would "--disable-cipher-algo AES" add anything to that? Or cause
potential problems?
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymai
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Sunday 14 March 2010 at 1:19:46 PM, in
, David Shaw
wrote:
> On Mar 14, 2010, at 8:26 AM, MFPA wrote:
>> Would "--disable-cipher-algo AES" add anything to
>> that? Or cause potential problems?
> Potential p
es. I've heard it stated often enough (usually by the same
people who advocate "ready, fire, aim").
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymail.com
Vegetarian: Indian word for lousy hunter!!!
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
27;m sure if you did it would make interesting reading, but it's not
necessary.
> As for the rest of the issues, everyone has different
> goals and needs. It would be foolish for us to assume
> what is best for all users.
I believe "it is 'best for all users' t
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Tuesday 16 March 2010 at 6:02:15 AM, in
, Paul Richard Ramer wrote:
> On Mon, 15 Mar 2010 14:49:32 +0000 MFPA wrote:
>> I don't understand the comment that they were never
>> private information. They will have been pr
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Wednesday 17 March 2010 at 12:58:37 AM, in
, reynt0
wrote:
> On Mon, 15 Mar 2010 14:49:32 +0000 MFPA wrote: . . .
>> When the reader is Big Brother, or a potential
>> employer or blackmailer etc., that might matter. When
&
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Friday 19 March 2010 at 6:54:06 AM, in
, Paul Richard Ramer wrote:
> On Sat, 13 Mar 2010 20:05:21 +0000 MFPA wrote:
>> It looks to me as if the answer is "yes." Unless each
>> person who had one of your email addr
ce that's an --expert option.
I always interpreted the capabilities menu as a sub-menu of the key
generation process, so it seemed logical that quitting the sub-menu
would revert to the parent menu.
Are you advocating (when in the capabilities menu) an "okay" or &
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Monday 22 March 2010 at 2:30:36 PM, in
, David Shaw
wrote:
> On Mar 22, 2010, at 8:48 AM, MFPA wrote:
>> The thing that stands out to me is the lack of an
>> option to toggle the certify capability.
> That is by design,
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Tuesday 23 March 2010 at 2:27:10 PM, in
, David Shaw
wrote:
>>> On Mar 22, 2010, at 8:48 AM, MFPA wrote:
>> I was thinking about the "special case"
>> of users who maintain a "personal master key&q
ell
them to delete it before uploading another with the same email address
in the UID to them.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymail.com
Keep them dry and don't feed them after midnight
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQCVAwUBS+bP6aipC46tDG5pAQqzuwP+P
main response should be to
> get the certifications revoked.
Maybe this indicates a good reason to use expiry dates on keys. And
maybe a trusted revocation key that you don't actually use and that
lives offline somewhere secure, maybe even split, in case of such
eventualities.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Wednesday 12 May 2010 at 9:48:34 PM, in
, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On 05/12/2010 02:06 PM, MFPA wrote:
>> Although the comment could just state it was his new key from
>> dd/mm/ without mentioning any other key(s
ret key could do the same and suggest people used a key of
their own creation instead... Hopefully your contacts would check the
validity of the suggested replacement before encrypting to it.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymail.com
Vegetarian: Indian word
put.
> What do you think? When are comments in the User ID
> field actually useful?
I think they are only useful for telling keys apart at-a-glance in a
list or GUI. And then, only when the comment is on the primary UID.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmail
ste your command here?
This worked for me:-
gpg -e -r mfpa -o test.txt.pgp test.txt
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymail.com
Did you hear? They took the word gullible out of the dictionary
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQCVAwUBS/whTKipC46tDG5pAQqN9
-only" public key algorithms (algos 2 and 3) instead of
using RSA (algo 1) with the "key flags" subpacket.
If any of your contacts have similar keys you may experience this.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailto:expires2...@ymail.com
Consistency is the last
t place to harvest email addresses than
trawling through mailing list archives.
> If you want to get rid of most spam, just filter
> everything sent from dynamic ip addresses and you're
> fine.
Only if you consider sacrificing some legitimate incoming mail to be
"fine."
e
internet via a plethora of different ISPs and WiFi locations. That
doesn't make it "correct". But being sent from an RFC-ignorant server
does not make a message spam or illegitimate or invalid. It just makes
it slightly more suspect.
- --
Best regards
MFPAmailt
s.
I guess somebody with a list of the addresses subscribed to this list
could find out by sending a test message to each member in turn until
the auto-reply is tripped, then ask that person to stop forwarding and
delete them if they don't. Or one message to everyb
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