Hi Jeffrey & Havard
Thank you for the comments.
The goal of 3.1 was to graphically depict the how excess as-path prepending
and how that could yield or exacerbate prefix hijacking impact downstream
consumers of pretending as you stated with ripple effect where a desirable
source origin AS
> On Feb 18, 2022, at 12:30 PM, Randy Bush wrote:
>
>>
>> * 32-bit ASNs don't fit in 16-bit fields. Consider using a set of
>> Extended Communities?
>
> next you're gonna want ipv6; sheesh! :)
>
> i think the draft tried to finesse and not get into wire format. but it
> probably should.
hi job
thanks for reading and commenting!
> * 32-bit ASNs don't fit in 16-bit fields. Consider using a set of
> Extended Communities?
next you're gonna want ipv6; sheesh! :)
i think the draft tried to finesse and not get into wire format. but it
probably should.
extended or wide?
> *
I support Hávard's observations.
I'd also like to comment that the notation of "prepends 5" meaning "5 + 1" is a
bit confusing for all of the examples. Consider instead just saying what the
announced as-path length is. Operators prepend 5 because their intent is
"announce 6". :-)
Rather
[Speaking as an individual contributor.]
Prepending has been around for ages and it's well understood at this point in
how it behaves.
An older version of the grow prepending document was nicely clear as to why
excess prepending was problematic. From that perspective, the document was
Hi,
here are a few comments about section 3.1 in the draft:
Other than the missing comma in the list of routers/ASes, near
the end there is talk about a route leak. However, I don't think
what's stated here as a route leak is what's commonly understood
to be a route leak.
I think a route leak
Hi Randy, Emile,
A few small notes that might be of interest should you wish to progress
this draft:
* 32-bit ASNs don't fit in 16-bit fields. Consider using a set of
Extended Communities?
* The Local Administrator values {64994,64995,64996} might already
be in use and carry local
