Fifth Third Bank is already being used.
On Fri, Aug 2, 2019, 16:14 Chris Hoelscher wrote:
> So does SECONDTENNESSEE move up to FIRSTTENNESSEE ??
>
> Thank You,
> Chris Hoelscher| ITI . DB Services . Mainframe Database | Humana Inc.| T
> 502.476.2538 or 502.407.7266
>
> -Original
The dataset-inventory information is available using IDCAMS/DCOLLECT utility
and DFSORT/ICETOOL provides decoder-ring logic to analyze the DCOLLECT output
and report on DATACLAS usage (as well as other SMS-construct usage) within your
z/OS system, including DFHSM-migrated datasets as well as
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/08/what-we-can-learn-from-the-capital-one-hack/
The details are OT to mainframes, of course.
Charles
-Original Message-
From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List [mailto:IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU] On Behalf
Of Bill Johnson
Sent: Wednesday, July 31, 2019
Hello Matt,
I am not sure about backups.
This is Pervasive Encryption.
So, again my understanding is that IF your RACFID can access the file, you
will read the data and it will be presented to you as unencrypted.
Now, if you write it to DASD and encryption is on for that device it will
be
The protective side of data security is only half technical. The other half is
GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation), a set of controls that spell out
Draconian penalties for any entity that allows--or presides over--a data breach
affecting EU citizens. The hair-raising penalties are more
On 2019-08-04 4:06 AM, Kirk Wolf wrote:
I'm curious.
Say that I have something like:
ATTACH EP=MYPROG,ECB=MYECB
LTR R15,R15
BZ ATTERR
ST R1,MYTCB
WAIT 1,ECB=MYECB
DETACH MYTCB
I know that I can get either the subtask return code or ABEND completion
code(s) from the ECB. But in the case of an
Thanks everyone.
That certainly helps.
On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 4:31 PM Charles Mills wrote:
> Others have mentioned backups. The real value is in the right to *do*
> backups. Your storage administrator may have access to the dataset, but not
> the decryption key. So he can do backups, but he
At ABEND, R15 contains the REASON. For a normal return, R15 contains the
return code, and R0 often contains a reason, but that is a weaker
convention. On a normal return, registers come back however the called
program sets them. However, a subtask returns to the system. Maybe you
could find
I think the main take-away is that in almost all cases its either software
bugs, poor security defaults that don’t force changes in credentials /
passwords, bad default configurations for ease of use which results in poor
configurations or perhaps malice in the form of allowing a breach.
We
Hello everyone,
I have a curiousity question about Pervasive Encryption.
If we are already protecting resources with RACF, what additional benefit
do we get from Pervasive Encryption? I think it is a good idea, since
encrypted data lets me sleep better. Pervasive Encryption appears to be
very
There are some good presentations on SHARE about this. The point about
backups is that the backups are made of the encrypted file, by personnel
and software that do *not* have the access to the decryption key. That
allows admins & sysprogs to manage storage & such without having the
ability to
@Kirk, is the ABEND reason code somewhere in the TCB? I would do the search but
you can do it as well as I.
Is R0 = normal completion reason code "architected"? I don't recall that it is.
It is something of a convention, but is it an "MVS linkage"? If not, I
*suspect* the contents of R0 have
ITYM R15.
description of ABEND includes " ,REASON=reason code".
--
Shmuel (Seymour J.) Metz
http://mason.gmu.edu/~smetz3
From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List on behalf of
Charles Mills
Sent: Saturday, August 3, 2019 4:28 PM
To:
On Sat, 3 Aug 2019 13:24:46 -0400, Matt Hogstrom wrote:
>One use case is backups. If someone can access a backup outside of the
>controls the system it resides on employs they could not compromise the data.
>Consider potential data services that host backups offsite for instance. Your
Is the RB chain intact after an ABEND? If so, you can look at R15.
--
Shmuel (Seymour J.) Metz
http://mason.gmu.edu/~smetz3
From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List on behalf of
Kirk Wolf
Sent: Saturday, August 3, 2019 2:05 PM
To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU
Others have mentioned backups. The real value is in the right to *do* backups.
Your storage administrator may have access to the dataset, but not the
decryption key. So he can do backups, but he can't steal credit card numbers or
health information.
Charles
-Original Message-
From:
If it is truly the case that the new version of the module is not being
used, then clearly the old version is being found somewhere.
If you have replaced the copy in the only data set where it lives and
refreshed LLA, then these are the possibilities that come to mind
-- you are not re-fetching
I'm curious.
Say that I have something like:
ATTACH EP=MYPROG,ECB=MYECB
LTR R15,R15
BZ ATTERR
ST R1,MYTCB
WAIT 1,ECB=MYECB
DETACH MYTCB
I know that I can get either the subtask return code or ABEND completion
code(s) from the ECB. But in the case of an ABEND, is there an easy way to
get the
Amen to that, Brother.
And complexity, which makes it hard to get everything right (and you only need
to get one or two things wrong to have a problem). That is what struck me
reading the Krebs piece.
Charles
-Original Message-
From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List
One use case is backups. If someone can access a backup outside of the
controls the system it resides on employs they could not compromise the data.
Consider potential data services that host backups offsite for instance. Your
protecting your data while entrusting someone with ensuring its
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