On Saturday, November 09, 2013 08:50:32 AM Fabio Pietrosanti wrote:
> Il 11/8/13 3:26 PM, phree...@yandex.ru ha scritto:
> > The tor2webmode is a tiny and straightforward patch. See:
> > https://gitweb.torproject.org/rransom/tor.git/shortlog/refs/heads/feature2
> > 553-v3
> This patch would require
On Friday, November 08, 2013 09:52:53 PM adrelanos wrote:
> > For all I care, the solution has been available for several years.
>
> I strongly agree with you. Tor hidden services are awesome. Their
> concept is great. The implementation need some love [1], but there
> aren't any conceptual issues
Il 11/8/13 3:26 PM, phree...@yandex.ru ha scritto:
>
> The tor2webmode is a tiny and straightforward patch. See:
> https://gitweb.torproject.org/rransom/tor.git/shortlog/refs/heads/feature2553-v3
This patch would require to get some more work, because with the latests
version of Tor, it hangs once
phree...@yandex.ru:
> On Monday, November 04, 2013 01:17:49 PM Jonathan Wilkes wrote:
>> On 11/04/2013 05:28 AM, phree...@yandex.ru wrote:
>>> On Sunday, November 03, 2013 04:06:11 PM Bill Woodcock wrote:
> On Nov 3, 2013, at 3:30, "phree...@yandex.ru"
> wrote:
>
> I don't see how
On Friday, November 08, 2013 12:50:19 PM adrelanos wrote:
> phree...@yandex.ru:
> > [...Tor...]
> > Both client and service can opt to drop their half of the circuit, which
> > turns it into a more or less direct tcp connection, with nat traversal
> > capabilities.
> Is dropping half of the circuit
phree...@yandex.ru:
> [...Tor...]
> Both client and service can opt to drop their half of the circuit, which
> turns
> it into a more or less direct tcp connection, with nat traversal capabilities.
Is dropping half of the circuit really already implemented for client
and for server?
There is To
On Monday, November 04, 2013 01:17:49 PM Jonathan Wilkes wrote:
> On 11/04/2013 05:28 AM, phree...@yandex.ru wrote:
> > On Sunday, November 03, 2013 04:06:11 PM Bill Woodcock wrote:
> >>> On Nov 3, 2013, at 3:30, "phree...@yandex.ru"
> >>> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> I don't see how "pasting over" a QR co
On 11/04/2013 05:28 AM, phree...@yandex.ru wrote:
On Sunday, November 03, 2013 04:06:11 PM Bill Woodcock wrote:
On Nov 3, 2013, at 3:30, "phree...@yandex.ru" wrote:
I don't see how "pasting over" a QR code in a way that's not easily
detectable is somehow harder than pasting over a domain/email
On Sunday, November 03, 2013 04:06:11 PM Bill Woodcock wrote:
> > On Nov 3, 2013, at 3:30, "phree...@yandex.ru" wrote:
> >
> > I don't see how "pasting over" a QR code in a way that's not easily
> > detectable is somehow harder than pasting over a domain/email, or
> > printing a real-looking fake
Il 11/4/13 2:31 AM, adrelanos ha scritto:
> Are they duplicating efforts? See https://leap.se/email.
The main differences from that perspective is:
- Leap is making technology to enable others to run service
- Silent Circle is running their own service
--
Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
HERMES - Center
Are they duplicating efforts? See https://leap.se/email.
--
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> On Nov 3, 2013, at 3:30, "phree...@yandex.ru" wrote:
>
> I don't see how "pasting over" a QR code in a way that's not easily
> detectable is somehow harder than pasting over a domain/email, or printing a
> real-looking fake ad and pasting it over the real one.
A QR code is already isolate
On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 10:25 AM, Ben Laurie wrote:
> But really, what you want for mappings of names to keys is a
> verifiable map, not an append-only log. An append-only log requires
> everyone to download the whole log. A verifiable map does not.
>
> We describe two ways to make verifiable maps
On Saturday, November 02, 2013 12:10:02 PM staticsafe wrote:
> On 11/2/2013 02:31, phree...@yandex.ru wrote:
> > And you still have problems with phishing thanks to being able to
> > "register" a similar domain.
> >
> > Of course, despite its shortcomings, namecoin is better than the existing
> >
On Sunday, November 03, 2013 02:17:59 AM Jonathan Wilkes wrote:
> On 11/02/2013 02:31 AM, phree...@yandex.ru wrote:
> > On Saturday, November 02, 2013 01:22:02 AM Maxim Kammerer wrote:
> >> On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 12:47 AM, Tony Arcieri wrote:
> >>> tl;dr: a Bitcoin-like global append-only log can
On 11/02/2013 02:31 AM, phree...@yandex.ru wrote:
On Saturday, November 02, 2013 01:22:02 AM Maxim Kammerer wrote:
On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 12:47 AM, Tony Arcieri wrote:
tl;dr: a Bitcoin-like global append-only log can enable the secure mapping
of human-meaningful names to cryptographic keys
Yo
On 1 November 2013 22:47, Tony Arcieri wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:00 PM, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
>>
>> But since you are asking, safe human-readable addresses are not possible
>> as a concept, unless
>> you are willing to trust a third party.
>
>
> Aaron Swartz wrote a great blog post about
On 11/2/2013 02:31, phree...@yandex.ru wrote:
> And you still have problems with phishing thanks to being able to "register"
> a
> similar domain.
>
> Of course, despite its shortcomings, namecoin is better than the existing
> "global namespaces" which are outright run by hostile entities.
Hos
I think that's highly relevant to follow a standardization approach
going trough the IETF.
Like applying for an internet-draft first with the draft, subject it to
security/scientific community peer-review, improve during time until it
became an RFC with at least 2 interoperable implementation, re-
On Saturday, November 02, 2013 01:22:02 AM Maxim Kammerer wrote:
> On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 12:47 AM, Tony Arcieri wrote:
> > tl;dr: a Bitcoin-like global append-only log can enable the secure mapping
> > of human-meaningful names to cryptographic keys
>
> You are still trusting a third party — a P
On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 12:47 AM, Tony Arcieri wrote:
> tl;dr: a Bitcoin-like global append-only log can enable the secure mapping
> of human-meaningful names to cryptographic keys
You are still trusting a third party — a P2P network and the
computational effort it represents, in this case — and i
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:00 PM, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
> But since you are asking, safe human-readable addresses are not possible
> as a concept, unless
> you are willing to trust a third party.
Aaron Swartz wrote a great blog post about "Squaring Zooko's Triangle", an
idea which has more or les
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 10:14 PM, Jonathan Wilkes wrote:
> What's the Cables solution for human readable addresses?
I really didn't intend to turn this thread into discussion of cables —
just pointed out that these companies may try to fill a niche where
they aren't needed as commercial entities.
On 11/01/2013 12:58 PM, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:44 PM, Sacha van Geffen wrote:
“Together our mission is simple: To bring the world a unique end-to-end
encrypted protocol and architecture that is the ‘next-generation’ of
private and secure email. What we call ‘Email 3.0.’
On 01 November, 2013 - Maxim Kammerer wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:44 PM, Sacha van Geffen wrote:
> > “Together our mission is simple: To bring the world a unique end-to-end
> > encrypted protocol and architecture that is the ‘next-generation’ of
> > private and secure email. What we call ‘E
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:58 PM, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
> Does their mission also include making their service offerings
> redundant? E.g., anyone who does not need SMTP interoperability (let's
> call this innovative concept “Email 3.0”) can use cables communication
> [1], which is serverless.
Hell
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:44 PM, Sacha van Geffen wrote:
> “Together our mission is simple: To bring the world a unique end-to-end
> encrypted protocol and architecture that is the ‘next-generation’ of
> private and secure email. What we call ‘Email 3.0.’ is an urgent
> replacement for today’s deca
http://threatpost.com/lavabit-silent-circle-form-new-anti-surveillance-dark-mail-alliance/102757
++
Lavabit, Silent Circle Form New Anti-Surveillance Dark Mail Alliance
by Dennis FisherOctober 30, 2013 , 3:18 pm
As the stunning revelations about the NSA’s coll
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