-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 11/06/13 17:52, Sean Cassidy wrote:
I have created a simple anonymity network that broadcasts all
messages to participants so that you cannot associate chatters.
Hi Sean,
A few quick questions:
* Do routers subscribe to prefixes, or is it only
On Wed, Jun 12, 2013 at 6:34 AM, Michael Rogers
mich...@briarproject.org wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 11/06/13 17:52, Sean Cassidy wrote:
I have created a simple anonymity network that broadcasts all
messages to participants so that you cannot associate chatters.
the ideal would be to hit a high enough rate that it makes real-time
analysis of content (by a human) impossible. By the time the service hit
that rate of chats, it will be nigh-unusable by people.
Every client could broadcast a message on a timer. Sometimes the message
would be wheat and
Hello all,
I have created a simple anonymity network that broadcasts all messages
to participants so that you cannot associate chatters.
https://bitbucket.org/scassidy/dinet
There is a simple sample client available, but you could write your
own client to build your own features atop the
It would be a fairly simple task to review all of the chat information and
correlate call and response for all of the conversations.
~Griffin
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at
Hi. I took a quick look while procrastinating at work and found a few
potential issues:
- What's up with this hard-coded
salthttps://bitbucket.org/scassidy/dinet/src/9f3afe465afb124367e03b63c6b63cba261e4edf/client/broadcast_client.c?at=master#cl-16
?
- Any specific reason you picked
On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 10:10 AM, Griffin Boyce griffinbo...@gmail.com wrote:
It would be a fairly simple task to review all of the chat information and
correlate call and response for all of the conversations.
I disagree for several reasons.
First is that if the load on the network is high
On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 10:29 AM, Steve Weis stevew...@gmail.com wrote:
Hi. I took a quick look while procrastinating at work and found a few
potential issues:
Thanks for taking a look. I'll be sure to incorporate your feedback.
- What's up with this hard-coded salt?
Lack of love for the
On 11 June 2013 13:42, Sean Cassidy sean.a.cass...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 10:10 AM, Griffin Boyce griffinbo...@gmail.com
wrote:
It would be a fairly simple task to review all of the chat information and
correlate call and response for all of the conversations.
I disagree
Comments inline...
On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 10:47 AM, Sean Cassidy sean.a.cass...@gmail.comwrote:
- Any specific reason you picked CTR?
CTR is widely recommended. Cryptography Engineering specifically
recommends it.
The reason I ask is that this makes your IV-generation more critical than,
On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 9:52 AM, Sean Cassidy sean.a.cass...@gmail.com wrote:
I have created a simple anonymity network that broadcasts all messages
to participants so that you cannot associate chatters.
https://bitbucket.org/scassidy/dinet
See also: https://bitmessage.org/wiki/Main_Page
(I
Sean Cassidy sean.a.cass...@gmail.com wrote:
First is that if the load on the network is high enough, conversations
can hide in the noise. This is helped by dummy message generation
either by clients or servers (preferably clients to protect against
attackers that can monitor every node).
On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 11:42 AM, Griffin Boyce griffinbo...@gmail.com wrote:
Sean Cassidy sean.a.cass...@gmail.com wrote:
First is that if the load on the network is high enough, conversations
can hide in the noise. This is helped by dummy message generation
either by clients or servers
On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 11:13 AM, Gregory Maxwell gmaxw...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 9:52 AM, Sean Cassidy sean.a.cass...@gmail.com
wrote:
I have created a simple anonymity network that broadcasts all messages
to participants so that you cannot associate chatters.
Steve Weis:
Comments inline...
On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 10:47 AM, Sean Cassidy
sean.a.cass...@gmail.comwrote:
- Any specific reason you picked CTR?
CTR is widely recommended. Cryptography Engineering specifically
recommends it.
I was puzzled by this recommendation. CTR has several
15 matches
Mail list logo