Good morning Antoine,
> Hi Zeeman,
>
> > i.e. I send my high-fee RBF-enabled channel funding to you, at the same
> > time I send a conflicting low-fee RBF-disabled transaction (that pays the
> > entire channel amount to myself) to all the miners I can find.
> Mapping miners mempools will be a
Hi Zeeman,
> i.e. I send my high-fee RBF-enabled channel funding to you, at the same
time I send a conflicting low-fee RBF-disabled transaction (that pays the
entire channel amount to myself) to all the miners I can find.
Mapping miners mempools will be a cost in spying infrastructure and thus
Hi Matt and thanks for your notes.
On Mon, 24 Aug 2020 at 22:22, Matt Corallo wrote:
>
> A few notes.
>
> Given gossip messages will be rejected by many nodes if no such on-chain
> transaction exists, I don't think you can
> "re-broadcast" gossip messages at that time, instead I believe you
Good morning Antoine,
> Hi Roei,
> You might have a mechanism to lower trust in zero-conf channel opener.
> Actually the local party can be in charge of broadcasting the funding
> transaction, thus ensuring it's well-propagated across network mempools and
> then start to accept incoming
Hi Roei,
You might have a mechanism to lower trust in zero-conf channel opener.
Actually the local party can be in charge of broadcasting the funding
transaction, thus ensuring it's well-propagated across network mempools and
then start to accept incoming payment on the zero-conf channel. Per BIP
A few notes.
Given gossip messages will be rejected by many nodes if no such on-chain transaction exists, I don't think you can
"re-broadcast" gossip messages at that time, instead I believe you simply need to not gossip until the funding
transaction has some confirmations. Still, this
Hello everyone,
I would like to discuss the ability to skip a channel funding
transaction confirmation, making the channel fully operational before
its on-chain confirmation (aka a zero-conf channel).
Till confirmation, this channel requires trust between its two parties
and in the case of a