--On 12 April 2008 12:02:45 -0400 Barry Warsaw [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
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On Mar 31, 2008, at 6:15 AM, Ian Eiloart wrote:
As far as DKIM is concerned, I think Mailman already can re-sign
messages.
I don't remember the details, though. Anyway,
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On Mar 31, 2008, at 6:15 AM, Ian Eiloart wrote:
As far as DKIM is concerned, I think Mailman already can re-sign
messages.
I don't remember the details, though. Anyway, I think re-signing is
the
correct thing for a list to do. Again, Mailman
--On 29 March 2008 09:09:30 +0900 Stephen J. Turnbull
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
There's friction in their [SPF and DKIM] adoption because certain
features of
email (notably mail forwarding, but also some others) have no
regard for these features.
By which you mean that SPF and DKIM
--On 28 March 2008 12:47:48 + Julian Mehnle [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Until no email service provider accepts message submissions outside of
their own domains, all email providers offer message submission on port
587, all message submissions are autheticated, and mail forwarders
accept
Kenneth Porter writes:
[Wikipedia says:]
A vigilante is a person who ignores due process of law and enacts his own
form of justice when they deem the response of the authorities to be
insufficient.
I see nothing wrong with that. Where I live, self-defense is
acceptable.
If you
Julian Mehnle writes:
You expect me to provide URLs showing what?
Actually, I consider you rather unlikely to provide any URLs at all.
You seem to be missing that the e-mail system is essentially an
anarchy.
No, I just don't apply judgmental terms like rightfully blacklisted
and
--On Saturday, March 29, 2008 3:51 PM +0900 Stephen J. Turnbull
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If you equate self-defense with justice, you are wrong. Vigilantes go
beyond self-defense, and that's where they go wrong.
We're quibbling over definitions. It's impossible to find agreement under
such
Ian Eiloart writes:
At a penny per user, I could raise £100. That wouldn't do the job.
No, but if you can find 9 more like you, it would. We heard from one
current Navy personnel, according to Jo Rhett that's a cool $25,000.
Hey, that could probably buy a month of Barry's time ... can you
Stephen J. Turnbull wrote:
Ian Eiloart writes:
I ask, where are these requirements written?
You mean the requirement that the mail system be able to reject
email from non-members at SMTP time?
I mean the document that says that backscatter is a mortal sin, not
the document that says
I really think this should happen for 2.2, though, and that 2.2 (or
something) should happen quite soon. I plan to fix up my secondary MX
situation shortly, but not everybody in my situation can do that.
[This stuff isn't written anywhere more reliable than Wikipedia,
and that is] why
Ian Eiloart wrote:
I think the reason that backscatter isn't subject to any RFC is that
the real problem is the lack of authentication and accountability for
return-paths in the original messages. Bouncing would be fine if you
know that the email really came from the owner of the return-path.
Julian Mehnle writes:
There is no such document.
Jo Rhett keeps talking about technical problems. Well, conformance
to a published standard is a technical problem. Deciding what to do
in the absence of such a standard is not, and you tell us there isn't
one.
But I can tell you this for
Ian Eiloart writes:
I think the reason that backscatter isn't subject to any RFC is that the
real problem is the lack of authentication and accountability for
return-paths in the original messages. Bouncing would be fine if you know
that the email really came from the owner of the
--On Saturday, March 29, 2008 8:58 AM +0900 Stephen J. Turnbull
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
However you know that it's a mortal sin when you end up on several
blacklists (and rightly so!) for having sent backscatter to
innocent bystanders.
Oh, brother! Look up vigilante, and meditate on
Stephen J. Turnbull wrote:
Julian Mehnle writes:
There is no such document.
Jo Rhett keeps talking about technical problems. Well, conformance
to a published standard is a technical problem. Deciding what to do
in the absence of such a standard is not, and you tell us there isn't
one.
--On 27 March 2008 08:56:54 +0900 Stephen J. Turnbull
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Ian Eiloart writes:
No, that's not true. I have about 10,000 users here.
Interesting. I bet we're talking hundreds of thousands of users, just
with the three or four of you medium-to-large-site admins that
--On 26 March 2008 05:18:44 +0900 Stephen J. Turnbull
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Eino Tuominen writes:
You are missing the point. Of course you can inform of a delivery
problem, but only when you really need to do it. Every organisation
should know of every recipient within their
Jo Rhett wrote:
More to the point, I solved this problem for the Navy. 2.5 MILLION e-
mail accounts, and they needed to stop accepting e-mail for accounts
which didn't exist.
Hi Jo,
I assume you're talking NMCI. I just tested this by sending to a bogus
NMCI address from .com and .mil
Ian Eiloart writes:
No, that's not true. I have about 10,000 users here.
Interesting. I bet we're talking hundreds of thousands of users, just
with the three or four of you medium-to-large-site admins that have
posted so far. At a penny per user, I'm sure you could find somebody
to do this
Stephen J. Turnbull wrote:
Jo Rhett writes:
On Mar 24, 2008, at 6:45 PM, Mark Sapiro wrote:
I still don't get what you mean by properly deal with DSNs. Are you
saying that an MTA should never return a DSN? It should either reject
the mail during the incoming SMTP transaction or
Mark Sapiro wrote:
Well, it does simplify the MTA's job. Instead of all that queueing and
retrying and such, you just have during SMTP (hold on a minute while I
attempt to deliver this to the next hop and return that result to
you)*N, a system that doesn't seem to scale well. Either that or
On Mar 25, 2008, at 1:06 PM, Eino Tuominen wrote:
Mark Sapiro wrote:
Well, it does simplify the MTA's job. Instead of all that queueing
and
retrying and such, you just have during SMTP (hold on a minute
while I
attempt to deliver this to the next hop and return that result to
you)*N,
Jason Pruim wrote:
But how would you scale that to the size of say... yahoo? Multiple data
centers around the world, all processing mail for different domains
under yahoo's control... How would one be able to synchronize all that
data from tons of different places like that?
Well,
Stephen J. Turnbull wrote:
Eino Tuominen writes:
You are missing the point. Of course you can inform of a delivery
problem, but only when you really need to do it. Every organisation
should know of every recipient within their authority. You should know
the recipient if you
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On Mar 25, 2008, at 5:51 PM, Eino Tuominen wrote:
Stephen J. Turnbull wrote:
Eino Tuominen writes:
You are missing the point. Of course you can inform of a delivery
problem, but only when you really need to do it. Every organisation
should know
On Mar 25, 2008, at 10:10 AM, Jason Pruim wrote:
But how would you scale that to the size of say... yahoo? Multiple
data centers around the world, all processing mail for different
domains under yahoo's control... How would one be able to synchronize
all that data from tons of different places
On Mar 25, 2008, at 1:18 PM, Stephen J. Turnbull wrote:
You are missing the point. Of course you can inform of a delivery
problem, but only when you really need to do it. Every organisation
should know of every recipient within their authority. You should
know
the recipient if you accept a
On Mar 25, 2008, at 2:51 PM, Eino Tuominen wrote:
The times, they are a-changing... We are facing a new world and old
habits are not the best ways to do things anymore. I'm certainly
not one
of those deeming all DSN's as evil, but it really hurts our users when
some spammer starts a
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