Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Praxis interpreters of Marxism
I certainly quote all those often. Charles On 4/14/10, Ralph Dumain rdum...@autodidactproject.org wrote: I'm in a rush right now, but the main inspirations for my perspective come from: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htmIntroduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, in Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, February, 1844. Thesis 3 of http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/index.htmTheses on Feuerbach, 1845 http://www.autodidactproject.org/quote/marxsci1.htmlPrivate Property and Communism from the Economic-Philosophical Manuscriptshttp://www.autodidactproject.org/quote/marxsci1.html of Karl Marx (1844) Marx of course made key statements on praxis from the doctoral dissertation Epicurean notebooks of 1841 through The German Ideology and Theses on Feuerbach (1945). At 01:57 PM 4/14/2010, c b wrote: On 4/14/10, Ralph Dumain rdum...@autodidactproject.org wrote: Syntactic ambiguity or ineptitude on my part. I meant: . . . nor is attempting to deny Marx's materialism necessary in order to develop the concept of praxis. ^^^ CB: Yes. Do you derive praxis from Marx's phrase practical-critical activity in the first Thesis on Feuerbach ? The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism that of Feuerbach included is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from the thought objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective activity. Hence, in The Essence of Christianity, he regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and fixed only in its dirty-judaical manifestation. Hence he does not grasp the significance of “revolutionary”, of “practical-critical”, activity. ^^^ At 01:40 PM 4/14/2010, c b wrote: It's not necessary to develop the concept of praxis ? On 4/14/10, Ralph Dumain rdum...@autodidactproject.org wrote: Here is where I would agree with Hillel-Rubin as against Robinson, Dunayevskaya, and many others. Trying to play off Marx's advocacy of naturalism as a transcendence of both idealism and materialism is the bogus ploy here. But note please that praxis philosophers do not all go for this gambit, nor is it necessary to develop the concept of praxis. See also my review: http://www.autodidactproject.org/my/ruben-dh-2.htmlReview of David-Hillel Rubin, http://www.autodidactproject.org/my/ruben-dh-2.htmlMarxism and Materialism: A Study in Marxist Theory of Knowledge ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Praxis interpreters of Marxism
But man is no abstract being squatting outside the world. -- Introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Hegels Philosophy of Right To have one basis for life and another for science is apriori a lie. -- Private Property and Communism from the Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts of Karl Marx (1844) At 09:20 AM 4/15/2010, c b wrote: I certainly quote all those often. Charles On 4/14/10, Ralph Dumain rdum...@autodidactproject.org wrote: I'm in a rush right now, but the main inspirations for my perspective come from: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htmIntroduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Hegels Philosophy of Right, in Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, February, 1844. Thesis 3 of http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/index.htmTheses on Feuerbach, 1845 http://www.autodidactproject.org/quote/marxsci1.htmlPrivate Property and Communism from the Economic-Philosophical Manuscriptshttp://www.autodidactproject.org/quote/marxsci1.html of Karl Marx (1844) Marx of course made key statements on praxis from the doctoral dissertation Epicurean notebooks of 1841 through The German Ideology and Theses on Feuerbach (1945). ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
[Marxism-Thaxis] Praxis interpreters of Marxism
Advanced Search Praxis interpreters of Marxism Results 1 - 10 of about 58,600 for Praxis interpreters of Marxism. (0.33 seconds) Search ResultsMarx's ontology of the praxis-relations of social productionby W Yu - 2009 - Related articles Orthodox interpreters have distorted Marx's philosophy as the ontology of .. Marx's philosophy has often been interpreted as the “ontology of praxis”, ... www.springerlink.com/index/5774p73561278213.pdf The purpose of knowledge: pragmatism and the praxis of marxist ...by P O'Malley - 1988 - Related articles offspring of bourgeois legality. It is not long ago that marxists became fixated on Pashukanis and his latter-day discoverers and interpreters (e.g., Balbus ... www.springerlink.com/index/K8227404H657374J.pdf - Similar Show more results from www.springerlink.com Marxism and the interpretation of culture - Google Books ResultCary Nelson, Lawrence Grossberg - 1988 - Literary Criticism - 738 pages Some interpreters of Marx have come to think that the analysis of people as beings of praxis can be incorporated into the inherited theory of historical ... books.google.com/books?isbn=0252014014... Review of Outline of a Theory of Praxis - (Review of Outline of a ...by D Rasmussen - 1981 theory of praxis. No doubt the outlines ofthat theory have been obscured, if not by. Marx himself then by his interpreters, in such a manner that Marx's own ... www.jstor.org/stable/20008809 PRAXIS International, issue: 3 / 1981 — The Unhappy Consciousness ...by M Wartofsky - 1981 Praxis International. 297 is a sophisticated interpreter of Marx. He knows how to read Marx well enough to see through the usual simple minded, ... www.ceeol.com/aspx/getdocument.aspx?logid=5id=3235f9bd... Marx's Lucretian ProjectIn both respects, Marx's choice of Lucretius as the favored interpreter of Epicurus ... and announce the revolutionary role of praxis in world history. ... www.allacademic.com/meta/p362900_index.html - Cached - Similar Zygmunt Bauman - Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaInitially, Bauman remained close to orthodox Marxist doctrine, but influenced by Press ISBN 0-7190-0502-7 (Polish original 1960); 1973: Culture as Praxis. ... ISBN 0-907427-18-9; 1987: Legislators and interpreters - On Modernity, ... en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zygmunt_Bauman - Cached - Similar ^ CB: Hmmm whose this: Ralph Dumain: Autodidact Project: David-Hillel Ruben on ...Jan 11, 2008 ... I will look at three of Marx's interpreters, Georg Lukacs, Marxism is literally the study of praxis, because praxis is its object. ... www.autodidactproject.org/other/ruben-dh-1.html - Cached Marx's Social Critique of Culture - Google Books ResultLouis Dupré - 1959 - Social Science - 302 pages TM Marxist interpreters continue to emphasize strongly the connection of ideology with praxis, and even with class.36 In the next three sections we shall ... books.google.com/books?isbn=0300035179... Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, by Richard J. BernsteinBeyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis, by Richard J. an interpretation beyond the individual whim of the interpreter? ... and was far too willing to invoke Marxist categories like praxis himself. ... www.friesian.com/bernsten.htm - Cached - Similar ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
[Marxism-Thaxis] Praxis interpreters of Marxism
Ralph Dumain: Autodidact Project: David-Hillel Ruben on ...Jan 11, 2008 ... I will look at three of Marx's interpreters, Georg Lukacs, Marxism is literally the study of praxis, because praxis is its object. ... www.autodidactproject.org/other/ruben-dh-1.html - Cached David-Hillel Ruben on Materialism Praxis The second point I wish now to mention concerning the notion of essential independence is this. Sometimes, when one advances the idea that nature or natural things can exist independently of thought, or the human, the question is raised whether or not thought, or human praxis, isn't also part of nature. Do we deny that it is? And if thought isn't part of nature, to what sort of supernatural existence do we wish to consign it? Of course, we are not denying that the human, that thought or praxis, are also part of the natural order. When Marx says that thought essentially depends on nature, he is asserting that thought is part of the overall system of nature. We might put our point this way. What materialism asserts is that there could be, indeed that there was in fact, a system of nature long before it came to have a particular feature or part, thought or human existence, a part which it does now in fact have. ^^ CB: Truly. the Self is a product of historically developing cultures in which infinite nature cognises and transforms itself ^^^ Karl Korsch seems, in his Marxism and Philosophy, to raise just this sort of accusation against what he calls 'vulgar socialism', those who 'separate' thought and being. He criticises any form of Marxism which attempts to 'draw a sharp line of division between consciousness and its object' and to 'treat consciousness as something given, something fundamentally contrasted to Being and Nature'. Korsch says that such views contain 'a primitive, predialectical and even pre-transcendental conception of the relation between consciousness and being'. [27] But to what sort of 'sharp line of division' or 'fundamental contrast' are we committed? We are certainly not, pace Korsch, committed to the thesis that thought and nature are somehow ontologically different, that the difference between them is one of a Cartesian-like irreducible ontological difference. Ontologically, thought too is a part of nature, and this is why we said that thought too is part of the overall system of nature. All any reflection theory need assume, against which Korsch argues, [28] is that the relation between particular thoughts and that which they are about is a contingent relation in both directions, but this certainly does not commit us to a 'sharp line of division' between thought and nature in some ontological sense. To think otherwise would be to conflate the epistemological requirement of two-way contingency between a particular thought and its object with an ontological distinction between thought (in general) and nature. Indeed, if one makes an ontological distinction between thought and being, then each of the pair would have to be essentially independent of the other, as Descartes for example would claim. The essence of thought and being would be different. But Marx argues for a contingent relation in one direction, between being and thought, but an essential relation in the other. Thus, although the 'essence' of being does not include thought, the essence of 'thought' includes being. ^^^ CB: Nice formulation. Being is a necessary condition of thought. ( not being, not thought) Thought is a sufficient condition of being , but not a necessary condition of it. ^ The distinction between them cannot be ontological--they cannot constitute two separate kinds of things, since thought is not essentially independent of being. Because, in classical philosophy, the criterion for something's being a thing is its logical independence of everything else, for us the essential dependence of mind or consciousness on nature prevents them from constituting an ontological duality. This is why the whole-part metaphor seems to us more accurate, in the sense that parts cannot be what they are apart from the totality in which they are situated. Our epistemological distinction between thought and reality does not commit us, then, to an ontological dualism. ^ CB: Go ahead, comrade ! Full at: http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/ruben-dh-1.html ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Praxis interpreters of Marxism
It's not necessary to develop the concept of praxis ? On 4/14/10, Ralph Dumain rdum...@autodidactproject.org wrote: Here is where I would agree with Hillel-Rubin as against Robinson, Dunayevskaya, and many others. Trying to play off Marx's advocacy of naturalism as a transcendence of both idealism and materialism is the bogus ploy here. But note please that praxis philosophers do not all go for this gambit, nor is it necessary to develop the concept of praxis. See also my review: http://www.autodidactproject.org/my/ruben-dh-2.htmlReview of David-Hillel Rubin, http://www.autodidactproject.org/my/ruben-dh-2.htmlMarxism and Materialism: A Study in Marxist Theory of Knowledge At 01:15 PM 4/14/2010, c b wrote: Ralph Dumain: Autodidact Project: David-Hillel Ruben on ...Jan 11, 2008 ... I will look at three of Marx's interpreters, Georg Lukacs, Marxism is literally the study of praxis, because praxis is its object. ... www.autodidactproject.org/other/ruben-dh-1.html - Cached David-Hillel Ruben on Materialism Praxis The second point I wish now to mention concerning the notion of essential independence is this. Sometimes, when one advances the idea that nature or natural things can exist independently of thought, or the human, the question is raised whether or not thought, or human praxis, isn't also part of nature. Do we deny that it is? And if thought isn't part of nature, to what sort of supernatural existence do we wish to consign it? Of course, we are not denying that the human, that thought or praxis, are also part of the natural order. When Marx says that thought essentially depends on nature, he is asserting that thought is part of the overall system of nature. We might put our point this way. What materialism asserts is that there could be, indeed that there was in fact, a system of nature long before it came to have a particular feature or part, thought or human existence, a part which it does now in fact have. ^^ CB: Truly. the Self is a product of historically developing cultures in which infinite nature cognises and transforms itself ^^^ Karl Korsch seems, in his Marxism and Philosophy, to raise just this sort of accusation against what he calls 'vulgar socialism', those who 'separate' thought and being. He criticises any form of Marxism which attempts to 'draw a sharp line of division between consciousness and its object' and to 'treat consciousness as something given, something fundamentally contrasted to Being and Nature'. Korsch says that such views contain 'a primitive, predialectical and even pre-transcendental conception of the relation between consciousness and being'. [27] But to what sort of 'sharp line of division' or 'fundamental contrast' are we committed? We are certainly not, pace Korsch, committed to the thesis that thought and nature are somehow ontologically different, that the difference between them is one of a Cartesian-like irreducible ontological difference. Ontologically, thought too is a part of nature, and this is why we said that thought too is part of the overall system of nature. All any reflection theory need assume, against which Korsch argues, [28] is that the relation between particular thoughts and that which they are about is a contingent relation in both directions, but this certainly does not commit us to a 'sharp line of division' between thought and nature in some ontological sense. To think otherwise would be to conflate the epistemological requirement of two-way contingency between a particular thought and its object with an ontological distinction between thought (in general) and nature. Indeed, if one makes an ontological distinction between thought and being, then each of the pair would have to be essentially independent of the other, as Descartes for example would claim. The essence of thought and being would be different. But Marx argues for a contingent relation in one direction, between being and thought, but an essential relation in the other. Thus, although the 'essence' of being does not include thought, the essence of 'thought' includes being. ^^^ CB: Nice formulation. Being is a necessary condition of thought. ( not being, not thought) Thought is a sufficient condition of being , but not a necessary condition of it. ^ The distinction between them cannot be ontological--they cannot constitute two separate kinds of things, since thought is not essentially independent of being. Because, in classical philosophy, the criterion for something's being a thing is its logical independence of everything else, for us the essential dependence of mind or consciousness on nature prevents them from constituting an ontological duality. This is why the whole-part metaphor seems to us more accurate, in the sense that parts cannot be what they are apart from the totality in which they are situated. Our epistemological distinction between
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Praxis interpreters of Marxism
On 4/14/10, Ralph Dumain rdum...@autodidactproject.org wrote: Syntactic ambiguity or ineptitude on my part. I meant: . . . nor is attempting to deny Marx's materialism necessary in order to develop the concept of praxis. ^^^ CB: Yes. Do you derive praxis from Marx's phrase practical-critical activity in the first Thesis on Feuerbach ? The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from the thought objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective activity. Hence, in The Essence of Christianity, he regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and fixed only in its dirty-judaical manifestation. Hence he does not grasp the significance of “revolutionary”, of “practical-critical”, activity. ^^^ At 01:40 PM 4/14/2010, c b wrote: It's not necessary to develop the concept of praxis ? On 4/14/10, Ralph Dumain rdum...@autodidactproject.org wrote: Here is where I would agree with Hillel-Rubin as against Robinson, Dunayevskaya, and many others. Trying to play off Marx's advocacy of naturalism as a transcendence of both idealism and materialism is the bogus ploy here. But note please that praxis philosophers do not all go for this gambit, nor is it necessary to develop the concept of praxis. See also my review: http://www.autodidactproject.org/my/ruben-dh-2.htmlReview of David-Hillel Rubin, http://www.autodidactproject.org/my/ruben-dh-2.htmlMarxism and Materialism: A Study in Marxist Theory of Knowledge ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Praxis interpreters of Marxism
I'm in a rush right now, but the main inspirations for my perspective come from: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htmIntroduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Hegels Philosophy of Right, in Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, February, 1844. Thesis 3 of http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/index.htmTheses on Feuerbach, 1845 http://www.autodidactproject.org/quote/marxsci1.htmlPrivate Property and Communism from the Economic-Philosophical Manuscriptshttp://www.autodidactproject.org/quote/marxsci1.html of Karl Marx (1844) Marx of course made key statements on praxis from the doctoral dissertation Epicurean notebooks of 1841 through The German Ideology and Theses on Feuerbach (1945). At 01:57 PM 4/14/2010, c b wrote: On 4/14/10, Ralph Dumain rdum...@autodidactproject.org wrote: Syntactic ambiguity or ineptitude on my part. I meant: . . . nor is attempting to deny Marx's materialism necessary in order to develop the concept of praxis. ^^^ CB: Yes. Do you derive praxis from Marx's phrase practical-critical activity in the first Thesis on Feuerbach ? The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism that of Feuerbach included is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from the thought objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective activity. Hence, in The Essence of Christianity, he regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and fixed only in its dirty-judaical manifestation. Hence he does not grasp the significance of revolutionary, of practical-critical, activity. ^^^ At 01:40 PM 4/14/2010, c b wrote: It's not necessary to develop the concept of praxis ? On 4/14/10, Ralph Dumain rdum...@autodidactproject.org wrote: Here is where I would agree with Hillel-Rubin as against Robinson, Dunayevskaya, and many others. Trying to play off Marx's advocacy of naturalism as a transcendence of both idealism and materialism is the bogus ploy here. But note please that praxis philosophers do not all go for this gambit, nor is it necessary to develop the concept of praxis. See also my review: http://www.autodidactproject.org/my/ruben-dh-2.htmlReview of David-Hillel Rubin, http://www.autodidactproject.org/my/ruben-dh-2.htmlMarxism and Materialism: A Study in Marxist Theory of Knowledge ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
