Jerry, list,
Peirce's idea includes the idea that nature tells us things, and that's
something that Frederik is getting at in discussing natural
propositions. For example, an air sock dances, and that tells us that
the air is windy. The idea is that facts and representational relations
are
List,
I am looking for some of the letters that Peirce wrote to
James...especially the ones in which he critiques James' understanding of
pragmatism. If someone can help me to locate them in Chronological Edition.
And if someone can guide me for any secondary work in this regard.
Thanks
Asim
Well, we all love a man in uniform ...
;}
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Ben, List:
On Oct 14, 2014, at 8:37 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Jerry, list,
Peirce's idea includes the idea that nature tells us things, and that's
something that Frederik is getting at in discussing natural propositions. For
example, an air sock dances, and that tells us that the air is
Thanks for catching that typo, Jon. GR
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 12:44 PM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote:
Well, we all love a man in
It's actually one of my favorite stat geek puns, since a Uniform Distribution
is a Maximally Uninformed Distribution (MUD).
Jon
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Gary F., Mary, Ben, lists,
Thanks for extracting these important ideas from 3.10, Gary.
You first pointed out that when an utterer or interpreter is using a
'system of signs'. . .to convey information, the current circumstances of
the utterance. . .[the 'objective context'] are actually an
On Oct 14, 2014, at 1:21 PM, Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com wrote:
An important point. For now I would only add, perhaps anticipating what is to
come in Chapter 6, that we should recall that Peirce says somewhere that the
utterer or interpreter need not be a person, but that
Howard, list,
I didn't reply to your previous post to me on this general subject,
because we're going in circles. What's more, it's become hard to see
what you do think.
On one hand you argue that such questions as those of realism and
nominalism can't ever be settled and that mentioning
STOI. Semiotic Theory Of Information
1. http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2014/10/10/semiotic-theory-of-information-1/
2. http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2014/10/11/semiotic-theory-of-information-2/
3. http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2014/10/12/semiotic-theory-of-information-3/
4.
I have to say, I just don't get this idea of real facts from reading
Peirce. On the one hand, we have the denotation of the subject, something
we all seem to agree on. On the other hand, Peirce describes the
signifying of the predicate, in discussing the icon more generally, as:
If it [an
At 04:07 PM 10/14/2014, Benjamin Udell wrote:
On one hand you argue that such questions as those of realism and
nominalism can't ever be settled and that mentioning them adds
nothing; and on the other hand you argue against realism and call
nominalism the best bet.
HP: I said no such thing.
Lists,
Several comments have been made about our contemporary use of the terms
'denotation' and 'connotation'. It might help if we keep in mind that Peirce
thought Mill's (mis)use of these terms would likely lead to confusion. As far
as I can tell, Peirce was on the mark in his comments
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