Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

Hi Gary, List, I like your analysis and I see its logic. I (and others on the list) have at times been confused as to whether abduction was in Firstness or Thirdness. I still feel that abduction is applied to the "surprising fact" that causes us to question

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

Mike, List, Thanks for your generous comments and support. It did take a bit of research to come up with the citations to support the argumentation of that post, so I'm glad you found it of interest. I do think that this matter of the distinction Peirce makes between existence (2ns) and reality

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

Hi Gary, List, Excellent response. However, the snippet below caught my eye: As for the reality of possibles, Peirce holds that  ". . . it is the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

Jon S, John S, list, Jon S wrote in reflecting on John S conclusion in a discussion of the language and logic used to discuss "existence" and "reality": Jon: By Peirce's definitions--at least, the ones that he carefully employed late in his life--the verb "exist" may only be used to talk about

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.1

List, Just a couple of notes about the beginning of Lecture 2. Peirce's opening remarks are crucial for understanding everything that follows. First, the system of diagramming that Peirce is to develop here is designed to for the study of mathematical or "necessary" reasoning; he sees no

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

List: > On Oct 18, 2017, at 11:06 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Kirsti, >> Possibilities may be real, but they do not exist until they >> become actual. > > In that sentence, three words raise debatable issues: 'real', > 'exist', and 'actual'. To analyze the issues, I

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }John, thanks for a great post. I think that we don't pay enough attention to relations. Edwina On Wed 18/10/17 12:06 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent: Kirsti and Gary R, If a debate doesn't converge, the

[PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

John S., List: JFS: For actual things that interact with the environment, Peirce used first-intentional logic. For relations that represent generals and possibilities, he used second intentional logic, which may refer to anything that has a "cognitionary character" in thought. By Quine's

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

Kirsti and Gary R, If a debate doesn't converge, the traditional solution (since Socrates) is to find which words are causing confusion and either (a) avoid using them or (b) define them more precisely. Kirsti, Possibilities may be real, but they do not exist until they become actual. In

Re: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Categories

Helmut - yes, Again, Peirce refers to external and internal frequently - see for example, all through A guess at the riddle. 1. 354- Yes, I can see the degenerate modes as submodes - except what is interesting about them is that they include the other modes, which thus makes

Re: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Categories

Helmut - yes, I see how you define your descriptions of the modal categories, both the genuine and degenerate. I describe them using the analysis by Peirce of just the modes, - and I don't assign them to the parts of the sign, although I acknowledge and see the point and