Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-12 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Francesco, List: FB: Since the IO was introduced in 1904, we have no alternative to explicating what that notion meant in 1904. Of course we have an alternative--we can take into account Peirce's *further development* of that notion over the subsequent years. Why should we be limited to his

Re: Semiotics and Identity, CP 6.339 Was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?)

2018-09-12 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Jerry C., List: JLRC: Why do you associate this excerpt with Icons, Indices and Symbols? Because we know from the preceding paragraph that "each kind of sign" refers specifically to Icon/Index/Symbol. CSP: All thinking is dialogic in form. Your self of one instant appeals to your deeper self

Semiotics and Identity, CP 6.339 Was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?)

2018-09-12 Thread Jerry LR Chandler
List, Jon, Francesco: > On Sep 11, 2018, at 8:14 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > He also wrote later that the three different forms of thought--corresponding > to Icons, Indices, and Symbols--are best explained by positing three > different "modes of metaphysical being." > > CSP: You will

[PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-12 Thread Edwina Taborsky
Helmut, list I'm a great admirer of the epistemic cut [see Harold Atmanspacher for a good analysis] - but, in the case of a rheme, which is in a mode of pure Firstness, I suggest that there is no epistemic cut. The rheme is a STATE of pure feeling with no distinction between

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-12 Thread John F Sowa
On 9/12/2018 2:28 PM, Francesco Bellucci wrote: In any case, I am not ultimately seeking to explicate Peirce's 1904-1906 efforts at classifying Signs; I am trying to develop a viable framework for understanding Signs and their relations based on Peirce's /entire /corpus, especially his late

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-12 Thread Jerry Rhee
Dear Francesco, list, Well, the passage seems obvious to me just as it is obvious to JAS, which is to say that it is vague. Now, if it is vague, we could simply apply the logic of vagueness, of which you must obviously be aware. And if the logic of vagueness is merely something like a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-12 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Jeff, Francesco, List: I agree that this passage is very difficult to untangle. It might help, for the sake of clarity, to spell out what all Peirce said there about Percepts and Perceptual Judgments. - For all thought, the Immediate Object is the Percept, and the Immediate Interpretant

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-12 Thread Helmut Raulien
    Supplement: I refer to a text by Joseph Ransdell http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/useabuse.htm and I dont understand it, neither that some sign should not have an IO. The DO is what is, the thing itself, and the IO is what it appears to be in the semiosic process,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-12 Thread Francesco Bellucci
Jeff, List This passage from Prolegomena is exceedingly obscure to me. Peirce says that the IO of all knowledge is the percept, but then he also says that the IO of a percept is vague. He also says that the percept is the DO of the perceptual judgment. My impression – which because of the

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-12 Thread Francesco Bellucci
Jon, List > I still reject the first premiss of your summary syllogism. > > FB: Now Peirce says in 1904–1906 that signs are according to their IO are > either p, s, or u. > > > Technically he said that Signs are vague (not particular), singular, or > general (not universal). > There is plenty

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-12 Thread Jeffrey Brian Downard
Francesco, Jon S, List, I find the interpretative argument that only propositions and arguments have immediate objects interesting, but I'm trying to square it with other things Peirce says about immediate objects and the classification of signs. Consider the following passages, where Peirce

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-12 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Francesco, List: I still reject the first premiss of your summary syllogism. FB: Now Peirce says in 1904–1906 that signs are according to their IO are either p, s, or u. Technically he said that Signs are vague (not particular), singular, or general (not universal). In any case, I am not

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-12 Thread Jeffrey Brian Downard
Francesco, Jon S, List, I find the interpretative argument that only propositions and arguments have immediate objects interesting, but I'm trying to square it with other things Peirce says about immediate objects and the classification of signs. Consider the following passage, where Peirce

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-12 Thread Helmut Raulien
Francesco, Edwina, Jon, List,   to me it seem as if "is mortal" might have a subject, and is quantifiable, if it means "belongs to the set of mortal entities". But does "is mortal" mean "will die" or "may die"? In the first case, bacteria dont belong to the set, in the latter they do. So, if

[PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-12 Thread Edwina Taborsky
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } Francesco, list Thanks for the clear and logical analysis. I would simply say that a rheme is in a mode of Firstness and as such, is a STATE and not an act of cognition or interpretation. As a