Jon, List,
Thanks for these additional comments and examples as they further clarify
Peirce's bold logical move. As you noted:
JFS: Throwing everything possible into the subject recognizes the
*indexical *nature of most words--functioning much like proper names, since
one must already be
Gary, List:
GR: It makes clear why you titled this new thread "The Proper Way in
Logic," which, when I first read it, sounded quite shocking.
Of course, that characterization is Peirce's own, again written in late
1908 (NEM 3:885) when he evidently adopted it rather suddenly and
decisively.
Jon,
Your post sheds light on both associated matters that you discussed in it.
This snippet of a quotation -- and which I've reflected on a number of
times previously -- represents for me something of a succinct summary of
the matter, especially as emphasizing the need for collateral knowledge.
Gary R, Robert M, Jon AS, Edwina, List,
Thanks, Gary, for explaining our points of agreement. As you emphasize in bold
face, we all agree with Nathan Houser and with Short that Peirce’s later
taxonomy “is sketchy, tentative, and, as best I can make out, incoherent”
(Short 2007, p. 260). But
Gary, List:
GR: However, this passage seems to me to need a bit of 'unpacking' to be
entirely clear.
I am happy to elaborate, although it is mostly a matter of providing rather
extensive excerpts from the various relevant passages that I merely cited
at the end of my last post. I apologize for
List,
I agree with JAS on the architectonic character of the classification of
the sciences. I want to complement what he says further and be even more
precise about Peirce's deeper thinking. Indeed, JAS is perfectly suitable
to note that applying the principle of classification (which Peirce
