to be a
growing consensus of people who work in the field, mostly ecologists, not
social scientists.
John
From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: May 26, 2015 7:52 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R
. According to my view (final cause, needs / example cause, wishes) it
has a self then. But: Is this really so? Or is the self of the ecosystem
reducible to the selves of the members? I guess the answer is in your papers
you mentioned (John).
Cheers,
Helmut
Von: John Collier colli
...@hum.ku.dk]
Sent: April 27, 2015 5:09 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce-L 1
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8498] Re: Natural Propositions,
Dear John, lists,
Den 27/04/2015 kl. 21.49 skrev John Collier
colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za
:
In my case, at least, as I have
, John Collier wrote:
I am not denying 1ns. Never have. I claim it does not stand on its own, and as
a result cannot itself be foundational. It requires further mental actions to
pick out 1ns. It is not manifested in itself. It is not given. It cannot be
the foundation for an epistemology.
You seem
Gary, lists,
However I don't deny the reality of 1ns, my claim is that they must be
abstracted in Locke's sense of partial consideration, which is similar if not
identical to Peirce's notion of precission. Basically, I think the Frederik has
it right. This is the argument I have been trying to
of partial consideration -
F
Den 26/04/2015 kl. 18.37 skrev John Collier
colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za
:
Gary,
I would say it is an abstraction from the perceptual judgment, where
abstraction is understood as Locke's partial consideration. At least that is
the way I seem
From: John Collier [colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2015 9:55 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce-L
Subject: [biosemiotics:8468] Re: Natural Propositions,
No, I definitely classify my sensations as I have them. I did have one weird
...@me.com]
Sent: April 27, 2015 11:25 AM
To: Peirce-L
Cc: John Collier
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8468] Re: Natural Propositions,
John: you write:
I limit myself to dynamic structures.
then:
. I use it in the physical, not the mathematical sense.
Your very simple answer
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
From: John Collier [colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2015 9:37 AM
To: Gary Richmond; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8454] Re: Natural Propositions,
Gary,
I
it in the physical,
not the mathematical sense.
John
From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com]
Sent: April 27, 2015 10:58 AM
To: Peirce-L
Cc: John Collier
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8468] Re: Natural Propositions,
John:
On Apr 27, 2015, at 8:24 AM, John Collier wrote:
I limit
it is helpful to prescissively
abstract 1ns from the other two categories.
Best,
Gary
[Gary Richmond]
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 9:13 AM, John Collier
colli
718 482-5690
On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 12:37 PM, John Collier
colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote:
Gary,
I would say it is an abstraction from the perceptual judgment, where
abstraction is understood as Locke's partial consideration. At least that is
the way I seem to experience
iconic qualisign.
Best,
Gary
[Gary Richmond]
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 8:41 AM, John Collier
colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote:
I find
I find this discussion very interesting. In it deals with some issues that I
have raised in the past about the experience of firstness. I maintained there
is no such thing in itself (except as an abstraction). These passages and
discussion seem to me to confirm that view in a way that I have no
Bob,
The problem I see with that is it assumes that the classes on which the
induction works are given already. This is also a problem with Bayesian
methods. One of the problems in science is that the classes are often not
obvious, and scientific work often involves reclassifications. In the
I am inclined to agree, Jerry, but I think your concept of entropy is too
narrow. Thermodynamics has been subsumed under statistical mechanics which is
both more general and more powerful. Boltzmann grounded it in what he called
the complexions of a system, by which he meant the independent
Quite, Clark. We have some people who still believe meaning is fully determined
and that one can determine truth or falsity thereby. This is a view that does
not understand how language works. Peirce recognized that making meanings clear
was a process, not an endpoint. This is an endpoint that
posted it to reflect two discussions on the list
previously, the origin of time and the nature of information.
John
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
Sent: March 31, 2015 9:00 PM
To: John Collier
Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce Discussion Forum
(peirc...@iulist.iupui.edu)
Subject: Re
Ericsson-Zenith
Sent: March 30, 2015 7:55 PM
To: John Collier
Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8162] Re: Article on origina of the
universe
If there is anything that I have learned at all, ever and anywhere, it is that
because people
the nature of information and it is for this reason that
it is the corner stone of modern information theory.
In information theory it is important to understand the separation of ideas:
i.e., the message from the messenger.
Regards,
Steven
On Wed, Apr 1, 2015 at 1:35 PM, John Collier
colli
further discussion on this is
pointless. Fortunately that doesn’t make discussion on other issues a problem.
John
From: stevenzen...@gmail.com [mailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of
Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Sent: April 1, 2015 5:29 PM
To: John Collier
Cc: Steven Ericsson-Zenith; peirce-l
. Of course you
would not be able to see this if I am right.
John
From: stevenzen...@gmail.com [mailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of
Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Sent: March 30, 2015 3:04 PM
To: John Collier
Cc: Steven Ericsson-Zenith; Edwina Taborsky; Biosemiotics; Peirce Discussion
Forum (peirc
from nothing. It goes to show what you get from an
ungrounded purely mathematical education.
Steven
On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 9:47 AM, John Collier
colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote:
Dear lists,
The following article is relevant to issues of “What came before the Big
Bang
) are fairly well confirmed, and
presumably the preceding processes are similar.
What exactly is your beef?
John
From: stevenzen...@gmail.com [mailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of
Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Sent: March 30, 2015 3:33 PM
To: John Collier
Cc: Steven Ericsson-Zenith; Edwina Taborsky
is 'matter-that-is-organized' such that it is differentiated from
other matter. This matter exists because it is in-form-ed, i.e., organized
within a particular form. Therefore, I agree with the outline provided by John
Collier.
To me, information has nothing to do with the secondary level
.
Steven
On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 1:20 PM, John Collier
colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote:
Yeh, the sort of information talked about in the article is “stuff”. It from
bit.
John
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.camailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: March 30, 2015 5:18 PM
Ironic, yes, and it shows how dependent Bayes methods are on priors. Pick bad
priors (and that can even involve assigning equal probability to all unknowns)
and with a bit of bad luck you can end up in a self-confirming loop. But
usually it works.
My Bayesian spam detector (actually
Thanks, Frederik. I think that to properly call a view Platonist it must reject
the existence of particulars in favour of universals. Russell fits this
description because fairly early in his (long) career he explicitly rejected
particulars, and argued that instances were combinations of
Lists,
It may not be extreme, but I think that most current realist metaphysicians
(ones who accept universals as real, like myself and David Armstrong, for
example) take a line closer to the Duns Scotus one. The more extreme view seems
to most to be difficult to distinguish from Platonism
topic this year for the
Biosemiotics Gathering is Are genes signs and if so what are they signs of?
Cheers,
John
-Original Message-
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
Sent: March 5, 2015 2:01 PM
To: John Collier; Helmut Raulien; Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Relations
.(013015-11)
All the best.
Sung
On Sat, Jan 31, 2015 at 10:30 AM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote:
Re: John Collier
JC: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15541
JC: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15549
JC: http
a system that is a lot easier to use.
John
From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com]
Sent: January 31, 2015 8:45 PM
To: John Collier; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8047] Re: Triadic Relations
John C., Gary F.,
Well, clearly I'm
other influences. And I can’t
argue with that.
gary f.
} A path is made by people walking on it; things are so because they are called
so. [Chuangtse 2] {
www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htmhttp://www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ gnoxics
From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: 31-Jan-15
Gary, Lists
In logic the simplest case of determination I can think of is P - Q. I this
case, on the condition, or limitation to the scope of P, Q.
I don't think this helps your case, Gary.
It occurs to me that there is a sense of 'determine' in which we determine
something (e.i., we
This is the message that Ben mentioned that I missed sending to the list. I
miss my old mailer. I also miss the relative reliability we had in our email
before the power blackouts started en mass at the beginning of the year. Only
two more years of them to go (sigh).
From: John Collier
Sent
I find this a bit weird, Gary and Edwina. Perhaps it is just the fine details.
I once published
This requires a triadic production of what Peirce calls the interpretant, a
relation in which the sign (representamen) bears some variety of correspondence
to its reference through the immediate
Ben, List,
I believe that a weaker is required for an ordered triple. Any finite set can
be ordered. The Axiom of Choice, which is controversial, implies that any set
including infinite ones can be ordered. The order need not be anything like
'more' or 'less' in any intuitive sense. For
Of
Sungchul Ji
Sent: January 28, 2015 7:06 PM
To: John Collier
Cc: Peirce Discussion Forum (PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu); biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question about the triadic relation of Sign
John, Gary R, Edwina, Jeff, lists,
I wan to address the question whether
thenceforward.)
Best, Ben
On 1/29/2015 3:52 AM, John Collier wrote:
Ben, List,
I believe that a weaker is required for an ordered triple. Any finite set can
be ordered. The Axiom of Choice, which is controversial, implies that any set
including infinite ones can be ordered. The order need
, but there are a lot of
other constraints like valence and so on.
Best,
John
-Original Message-
From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com]
Sent: January 29, 2015 11:07 PM
To: Peirce-L
Cc: Benjamin Udell; John Collier
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Relations
John, List
:00 AM, John Collier
colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote:
There is a fairly good paper dealing with the issue of degeneracy in biology at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/cplx.21534/abstract
The issue came up previously on this list.
John
Dear list,
If you want to look at the representamen as dynamical (which I am pretty sure
that Perice sanctions (I don't have relevant quotes handy), then it is, I would
think, a state, not a process. To be a process it has to change its state, but
it does not. I am pretty sure that Edwina has
Contraries and contradictories and versions of opposition are to be found in
many elementary logic texts. One I used many years ago for teaching that
contains a description of the square of opposition and relates it to modern
logic (modern universal quantification does not imply existence, but
:
CFP: Diagrams as Vehicles of Scientific Reasoning
Date:
Mon, 15 Dec 2014 12:07:10 -0500
From:
Center for Philosophy of Science pittc...@pitt.edumailto:pittc...@pitt.edu
Reply-To:
pittc...@pitt.edumailto:pittc...@pitt.edu
Organization:
Center for Philosophy of Science
To:
John Collier ag
you ask about
complex endobiosemiotics leaking out into its umwelt.)
gary f.
From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: 18-Nov-14 3:16 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce
Discussion Forum
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions 6
Still problems
Hi,
I have a longish post on chapter 6 in my other mail system, but it is suddenly
giving me a SSL negotiation rejected, though it worked fine three hours ago. I
will try again tomorrow morning. If it doesn't work then I will try to transfer
it to this system, but it has no record of my
, and bootstrapping.
These all have technical meanings in distributed cognition, and I won’t try to
explain them in an email list context; they require extensive study.
John
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: November 15, 2014 10:09 PM
To: John Collier; sb; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject
Stefan, List,
That is indeed a good quote. It is on precisely that point that Putnam diverges
from Peirce in his “brain in a vat” argument. He says “we determine meaning if
anything does”. This leads him to his internal realism and rejection of
metaphysical realism. I think that we can still
to be
metaphysically confused.
I hope this is reasonably clear.
John
John
Collier
colli...@ukzn.ac.za
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa
T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F:
+27 (31) 260 3031
Http://web.ncf.ca/collier
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click
Jerry, List,
The usual reason beauty and truth are taken to be teleological terms is that
they are values. They can't be given a purely descriptive definition that
doesn't require empirical justification. That means that they can't be given
nontrivial definitions. The inability to define truth
recommend it.
Best, Ben
On 9/23/2014 12:54 PM, John Collier wrote:
Ben, Lists,
Richard Rorty in his appeal to “ironicism” argues that it is best, if you are a
postmodernist social constructivist, not to talk about truth at all. He
considers it to be irrelevant. I would disagree with him
of physical
theory inspired the development of calculus etc. and could be called a
genealogical basis for the more abstract subjects.
Best, Ben
On 9/8/2014 10:26 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
[John Collier] He thought that we set aside a certain class of experiences
that we take (fallibly in each
. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Professor John
Collier
colli...@ukzn.ac.za
Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South
Africa
T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F:
+27 (31) 260 3031
Http://web.ncf.ca/collier
.
Professor John
Collier
colli...@ukzn.ac.za
Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South
Africa
T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F:
+27 (31) 260 3031
Http://web.ncf.ca/collier
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY
Professor John
Collier
colli...@ukzn.ac.za
Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South
Africa
T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F:
+27 (31) 260 3031
Http://web.ncf.ca/collier
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY
that Stephen and I have been talking past each other. We had a short
exchange privately that I am content with.
John
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: August 3, 2014 10:00 PM
To: Stephen C. Rose; John Collier
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re
is something
you take to be fundamental to reality.
Yes, but this is rather beside the point. I am not arguing that pure
firsts are not real; I am arguing that they are not what we
experience directly.
John
--
Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za
. (Again, noting that one can simply mine Peircean semiotics
without taking all his thought)
Thus my point about knowledge of a system and whether that system can be
conceived of semiotically.
Professor John
Collier
colli...@ukzn.ac.za
Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban
to be habitual, but an index cannot be habitual, because it must
designate something here and now: an individual, not a general. This is the
germ of the idea that Natural Propositions is about.
gary f.
From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: 31-Jul-14 4:31 PM
To: Clark Goble; Søren Brier
. At that time I thought that semiotics was too far from
my audience that I didn't mention it, tough I have dome some extensions
in later papers.
John
Professor John
Collier
colli...@ukzn.ac.za
Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South
Africa
T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260
intimate connection to reality and meaning. I find your example of
the Higgs boson is very misleading and a bit offending. Makes me
wonder if you have really understood me.
Best
Søren
Fra: John Collier
[
mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sendt: 17. juni 2014 06:38
Til: Edwina Taborsky; Søren Brier
of the examination of massless to mass transformation, or
philosophically, with the use of the transformation of the potential to
the actual.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Søren Brier
To: 'John Collier' ;
Edwina Taborsky ;
Catherine Legg ;
Gary Richmond ;
g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc
when they catch me drinking your water? Harris
asked the supervisor in one of the recordings.
Thats when we hang you, the supervisor responded.
Professor John
Collier
colli...@ukzn.ac.za
Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South
Africa
T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260
in self-organizing
processes.
John
Professor John
Collier
colli...@ukzn.ac.za
Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South
Africa
T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F:
+27 (31) 260 3031
Http://web.ncf.ca/collier
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click
On 4/10/2014 4:05 PM, John Collier wrote:
Dear Ben, List,
Ben, I agree with most of what you say, but the last part on
self-authority goes somewhat against current research. For those
interested more, I include a link to a short news item. Apparently the
smartest among us are better at both self
: Monday, April 07, 2014 10:55 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science
--
Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za
Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa
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