I am not denying 1ns. Never have. I claim it does not stand on its own, and as a result cannot itself be foundational. It requires further mental actions to pick out 1ns. It is not manifested in itself. It is not "given". It cannot be the foundation for an epistemology.
You seem to still be misunderstanding my use of "abstraction". I am using it in the time honoured way initiated by Locke as partial consideration. Berkeley missed this and thought of ideas as little pictures, so we can't have an idea of man because every man has specific characteristics. Locke had already answered this. Yesterday I saw a man in the bushes. I did not see his colour, the number of limbs (though it was at least two) or a bunch of other things. I have no problem saying this was a perceptual experience. But it must have involved judgment. I know there must have been things that I experienced that led to this, but I couldn't well say what they were, since that would bring them under generalities, which aren't 1ns. But I further maintain that 1ns is useless for thought, because thought requires generalities. Perhaps that is what you don't like. John From: Gary Richmond [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: April 27, 2015 2:12 PM To: Peirce-L Cc: [email protected] Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8485] Re: Natural Propositions, John, You first wrote: "the experience of firstness. I maintained there is no such thing in itself (except as an abstraction)." But now you say that you agree with Frederik's analysis. But I do not think that Frederik is saying that there is "so such thing in itself" as an "experience of firstness," but that we must prescissively abstract it out if we are to "focus" on in certain analyses. Frederik has just written that he does not deny 1ns. You however seem to to saying that it is merely "an abstraction," has its being as an abstraction, has no other reality than that. Again, this does not appear to me to be how Frederik sees it (he'll correct me, I'm sure, if I'm wrong). All he seems to be saying is that for some analytical purposes it is helpful to prescissively abstract 1ns from the other two categories. Best, Gary [Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 9:13 AM, John Collier <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Agreed, Frederik. I think this is really important. John From: Frederik Stjernfelt [mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>] Sent: April 26, 2015 6:41 PM To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>; Peirce-L 1 Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8466] Re: Natural Propositions, ps - Peirce's three distinctions are subtypes of partial consideration - F Den 26/04/2015 kl. 18.37 skrev John Collier <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> : Gary, I would say it is an abstraction from the perceptual judgment, where abstraction is understood as Locke's partial consideration. At least that is the way I seem to experience things myself. Perhaps others are different. John
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