*Gary (R) – the principled realism of 3) and 4) is very nice – thanks for
that!*
*Cathy*
Jim Willgoose once analyzed Peirce's dictum that "Generals are really
operative in nature" from the standpoint of semiotic, and I would tend to
agree with his analysis:
1) "Really operative" signs are n
Gary M. Phyllis, list,
Gary, here, as in yesterday's long post on the same topic (Peirce's view
that generals are real), you keep saying things like "Gary R. said" or,
here, referring to "Gary's" point as to what constitutes a nominalist--in
that earlier long post even copying snippets of Peirce q
GCM: GR's point was that he said that Nominalists, like he said we all are as
opposed to himself, do not believe in "real generals" or "Thirdness" or the
"Interpretant". I proposed purely provisionally that I and Umberto Eco do not
believe in "real generals" but do believe in "Thirdness" and th
Am I correct in interpreting Peirce's concept of Nominalism as believing that
we make it up as we go; that before we name a thing or concept, it does not
have being? And that Peirce's realism says things, including concepts and
stuff, have being (and therefore reality) whether anyone ever knows
