John,
Why don't we put this on hold for later discussion?
What you say goes to the heart of a problem I saw in
Natural Propositions, whether it was Peirce's account
or Stjernfelt's analysis I did not have time to decide
as the schedule of the slow reading went too fast for me
to take it up on the
Sorry, everybody. I admit I've been somewhat disengaged from peirce-l
lately.
I mistakenly provided a link to a page of links to the slow read of
Waal's _Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed_, not to the slow read of
Stjernfelt's _Natural Propositions_, for which we don't have a nicely
organized p
John, Jon, list,
We had a chapter-by-chapter slow read of Stjernfelt's _Natural
Propositions_ here at peirce-l during January to June 2014. Arisbe has a
page of links to the threads. (There are links to IUPUI archives, gmane
archives, and mail archives. The gmane links mostly don't work but th
On 6/28/2017 1:44 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
The short shrift for now is that neither Peirce nor I is talking about
propositions in the sense of dicisigns or dicent symbols at this juncture
but rather the simpler sorts of propositions that fall under the heading
of the Propositional Calculus in curren
John,
Yes, I gave it a careful reading back when the List took it up:
http://web.archive.org/web/20150116150400/http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13825
I find some remnants of my comments here:
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2014/10/12/semiotic-theory-of-information-3/
John, speaking of Frederik Stjernfelt’s Natural Propositions, you may not be
aware that peirce-l (and the biosemiotics list) hosted an intensive discussion
of it that lasted through most of 2015. Frederik participated very generously
in it, especially in the early months.
At Gary Richmond’s
Jon,
That's an important topic to explore:
JA
we can take up the issue of propositions in more detail
as it arises in the relevant context.
For a good analysis of the issues, I recommend the following book:
Stjernfelt, Frederik (2014) Natural Propositions: The Actuality
of Peirce’s Doctrine o
Peircers,
The easier-on-the-eyes blog version of my first Discussion post —
from which point it is also easier to follow the links to the
first six Selections from Peirce — is here:
{ Information = Comprehension × Extension } • Discussion 1
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/06/26/information-c
John, list:
On 6/27/2017 6:08 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
> Thanks for making what might otherwise appear confusing and complex, clear
> and simple.
Not I, but Gary said the above
I saw what you were doing... explaining by means of itself.
best,
J
On Tue, Jun 27, 2017 at 10:19 PM, John F Sowa wr
On 6/27/2017 6:08 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
Thanks for making what might otherwise appear confusing and complex,
clear and simple.
I hope I didn't make it too clear and simple -- because I agree with
Peirce (and with modern lexicographers) that word senses are definitely
not clear and simple. I wa
John, list:
yeah, that was a great post!
J
On Tue, Jun 27, 2017 at 4:34 PM, Gary Richmond
wrote:
> John,
>
> Thanks for making what might otherwise appear confusing and complex, clear
> and simple.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical T
John,
Thanks for making what might otherwise appear confusing and complex, clear
and simple.
Best,
Gary R
[image: Gary Richmond]
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
On Tue, Jun
Jon,
The subject line raises some complex issues:
Information = Comprehension × Extension
A more fundamental term is 'proposition', which is informally
defined as the "meaning" of a sentence. That meaning is usually
analyzed as comprehension (AKA intension) and extension.
Given that definit
Peircers,
Here's my 1st Comment on Selections 1 through 6 —
{ Information = Comprehension × Extension } • Comment 1
===
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/05/26/information-comprehension-x-extension-%e2%80%a2-comment-1/
At this point in his i
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