Helmut, Gary F., List:
I do not think we can say that all Dynamic Objects *are* (mere)
representations. As Peirce clearly stated, "*really being* and *being
represented* are very different" (EP 2:303; 1904). Instead, I think we can
say that all Dynamic Objects are *capable* of representation
Gary, List,
I agree. Maybe "representation" suits better than "concept". So, is the DO all existing representations? That would be consistent for both existing and not existing things: In the case of existing things the DO would be the representations including those of the existing thing(s)
Helmut,
Unicorns and phoenixes (phoenices?) do not exist apart from their being
represented, but representations of them certainly do exist, and thus can serve
as dynamic objects that determine future references to them, and as objects of
study. Myths are not factual, but mythologies are. The
Dear list,
I’m convinced our construction and communication of Peirce’s system is a
unicorn;
or even more appropriately- a phoenix.
For I distinctly recall this conversation to have happened before..
then it died..
And now, it bursts forth to reliably disappear again..
It is
Jon, List,
ok, but "unlimited and final study would" not show what a phoenix or a unicorn would be, because if it does not exist, why "would" it anything? This study would only show the concept´s extension. And: "What unlimited and final study would show it to be" is now: A concept. So I am not
Helmut, List:
Peirce's example was a phoenix, rather than a unicorn.
CSP: A Replica of the word "camel" is likewise a Rhematic Indexical
Sinsign, being really affected, through the knowledge of camels, common to
the speaker and auditor, by the real camel it denotes, even if this one is
not
Jon, List,
I just want to tell how I came to my view: To understand a theory or a mathematical equation, it is good to look at the extreme conditions. An extreme condition for a DO would be, that it does not exist, like a unicorn. In the unicorn case, people (somebody in this list many years
Helmut, List:
With all due respect, that does not solve any problems, it just changes the
terminology in a way that deviates from Peirce's own consistent usage. The
DO *is* "the thing itself," while the IO is closer to "the thing's concept."
CSP: ... the *immediate* object, if it be the idea
And about replicas, types and tokens: What I wrote: " The IO (2.1.) is the part of the intension that is brought along with the sign." is all about that, I think, and I feel that to call every sign a replica is blowing the topic up and distorting it until it appears like a Platonic copycat
Dear colleagues,
Interesting discussion: but I can no longer resist telling of Marks and
Spencer’s rejecting a computer system designed for stock management in favour
of easier access to the under-the-display storage-space. Staff were trained to
check the piles of underwear, not by trying
eculative Grammar”)]
>
> What could be clearer?
>
> Gary f.
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt
>
> *Sent:* 5-Aug-18 22:34
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Interpretants
>
>
>
> Gary F., List:
>
> After digging around s
Edwina, List:
As far as I am aware, no one disputes that there is no Sign without a
Dynamic Object that *determines *it. What I find problematic is any claim
that the Dynamic Object is a *part *or *component *of the Sign, since
Peirce clearly stated (in what I quoted below and elsewhere) that it
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Interpretants
Gary F., List:
After digging around some more, I wonder if I had in mind this quote.
CSP: A Sign is a Cognizable that, on the one hand, is so determined (i.e.,
specialized, bestimmt,) by something other than itself, called
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list
And this suggests that my insistence that the Sign cannot exist 'per
se', as an isolate actuality, but is necessarily interactive with an
'other than itself', i.e., with the Dynamic Object is a valid
Gary F., List:
After digging around some more, I wonder if I had in mind this quote.
CSP: A Sign is a Cognizable that, on the one hand, is so determined (i.e.,
specialized, *bestimmt*,) by something *other than itself*, called its
Object ... while, on the other hand, it so determines some
Jon, thanks for posting this. Responses inserted (paragraphs beginning GF: ).
Gary f.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 2-Aug-18 14:52
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Interpretants
Gary F., Gary R., List:
Prompted by the on-List exchange below a couple of days ago,
16 matches
Mail list logo
