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}Jon - my own quite logical example. I know that he did refer to the
syllogism somewhere but I'm not going to look it up..but, it's
obviously quite a logical assumption.
Edwina
On Mon 05/02/18 3:26 PM , Jon Alan
Edwina, List:
Peirce explicitly associated the conclusion of an Argument with its
Interpretant--e.g., "An *Argument *is a sign which distinctly represents
the Interpretant, called its *Conclusion*, which it is intended to
determine" (CP 2.95; 1902). Just curious--is there any text where he
Helmut - No, I consider that the bird's perception of the loud sound
is NOT the representamen. The bird has several means of 'perception'.
IO: the Immediate Object is a first sensual perception of an
external existentiality; the bird's senses absorb the sound
II - the
Edwina, Jon, Gary, List,
I wonder if this might be agreeable to all of you: The loud sound itself is not the representamen. The bird´s perception of the loud sound is. This has to do with memory: If the bird would not know (by memory e.g. due to instinct, due to neural structure, or due to
Jon, Edwina, list,
I think I'm going to drop out of the discussion as well principally,
because as I wrote before my eye operations, I've already begun to move in
different directions this year. I noted, Jon that you'll be reading
Peirce's late Pragmatism piece (1907) which I am currently
Edwina:
I am probably going to bow out of this conversation now, because otherwise
I fear that it is going to get contentious. You keep pressing me on where
to "locate" collateral experience and habits of interpretation, when the
whole point of this thread is that I am trying to figure out
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}Jon - I don't separate Mind and Matter. Mind exists AS matter.
Matter couldn't exist without habits-of-formation. And Mind couldn't
exist without being those habits within Matter...Pure Aristotle.
Edwina
On Mon
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}Jon - but you still haven't brought the habits into the semiosic
process. How does the single semiosic action contact the habits?
And you reduce the Representamen to merely being a 'representation'
of the
Edwina, List:
As anticipated, I cannot agree with this analysis, since I understand the
Representamen to be limited to whatever stands for (i.e., *represents*) the
loud sound in the human's mind. The Representamen does not *itself *include
the person's memories and habits; instead, the latter
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}Jon, list
1. See my most recent post - which has the Representamen as the
mediation between the O and the I. As to whether this semiosic triad
can function 'outside or inside' - to me, that doesn't make any
Jon, Gary R, list:
OK - let's try a human example, but it won't be different:
DO: loud sound. It happens to be the old oak tree falling but I
don't know that.
IO: my hearing of the loud sound. IF I am partly deaf, I hear it
differently than my cat or dog or
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