| If mind is grounded in triadic relations
| and reality is grounded in triadic relations
| then what remains is to study the ways that
| more mindful materials and less mindful materials
| differ within the variety of triadic relations.
http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.inquiry/3979
http://
Exposition:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14000
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14045
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14062
Discussion:
SR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14047
F
Dear Frederik, lists,
You're right about the context of discovery, and that the establishment
of a deductive result makes the novelty or the nontiviality fade. I
think I remarked some weeks ago that sometimes mathematicians say, often
only half-jokingly, that a result is trivial just because i
Frederik wrote:
"So we should give up the empiricist idea that it (6814-1)
is a cumbersome process of abstraction in the mind
of each individual, taking us from detailed ideas
to less determinate, abstract ones. Rather general
ideas, on many different levels of generality, is
rather the
I disagree, Sung, for the organizational capacities of Mind are not defined
as only continuous habits , but as all categorical modes, which includes the
ability for adaptive novelty, the ability for direct dyadic experimental
connections..and, the ability to generalize particulars into continuou
Dear Stan, Gary, lists -
I think intersubjectivity is widely different from social constructivism.
Husserl's take on the former is that objectivity is the correlate to
intersubjectivity, and despite his (prudent) caution with the subject-object
terminology, I think Peirce's theory of science with
List, Frederik,
On Sep 13, 2014, at 7:44 PM, Deely, John N. wrote:
> Just as semiotics is the generic name for the study of semiosis, and
> anthroposemiotics the specific name for the study ofanthroposemiosis allowing
> of many substudies, and zoösemiotics is the name for the study of
> zoösem
Edwina,
The Universe is both organized and disorganized, because without
dissipating free energy into heat (i.e, disorganization), no organization
is possible. Peirce probably did not know of this principle, which
emerged only in the latter part of the 20th century through the works of
irreversib
Stan, my answer to your question (below) is a little different from Edwina’s,
but similar.
From: Stanley N Salthe [mailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu]
Sent: 14-Sep-14 3:44 PM
Gary noted [quoting Peirce]:
Consciousness may mean any one of the three categories. But if it is to mean
Thought i
Dear Jeffs, lists,
Good P-quotation with refusals of competing approaches. I would immediately
answer your question with reference to the threat of relativism (truth as
dependent upon historical, psychological, physcial etc. variation tends to
dissolve truth eventually) - but the funny thing i
Dear Ben, lists -
Thanks for good comments. We certainly agree about the centrality of
theorematical reasoning. An important reason for its prominence in Peirce is
his extension of logic to embrace both contexts of discovery and contexts of
justification, to repeat Reichenbach's famous distinct
Jeff K., Frederik, Lists,
I agree with Peirce in thinking that the normative theory of logic should serve
as an important basis for our inquiries in metaphysics. If we start with an
account of the metaphysical categories and then use it in setting up the
logical theory, then we would be puttin
Dear Gary, lists -
Thanks for some important comments - you highlight an issue which has not been
so central in our discussions on (anti-)psychologism until now - namely the
fact that psychological reductions of logic very often downplay or even deny
the generality of meaning.
If we think meani
Dear Frederik, lists,
I don't see that we disagree on any fundamental points as to, for
examples, the difference between philosophical logic and idioscopic
psychology, or the pertinence of the theorematic-corollarial distinction
(which I've brought up on peirce-l at various times; I also did t
Jon. May as well confess that I got my sense of triadic thinking from
Brent's exposition which is hardly as complex as the whole thing with all
of its emendations. It was from this encounter that I devised my own root
triad Reality, Ethics, Aesthetics. I understood Brent to say that the First
is a
Gary R,
I'd quibble about the concept of 'same' relation. After all, if the
Representamen-Interpretant Relation is in a mode of Firstness, while the
Representamen-Object Relation is in a mode of Secondness - then, this is not
the SAME relation. There's a difference between 'genuine and degener
Succinct, clear and beautifully outlined. Thanks, Gary F.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Gary Fuhrman
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; 'Peirce List'
Sent: Sunday, September 14, 2014 12:38 PM
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2
Lists,
I'd like t
Lists,
I'd like to introduce here a couple of comments on Chapter 2 of NP
(specifically, on the beginning of 2.5), but I'd also like to note that much
of the valuable conversation on these issues has been taking place under
other subject lines, and this post is meant to reflect on that previous
List, Sung:
On Sep 13, 2014, at 9:21 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
> In other words, I claim that
>
> “A TRIADIC SET of three DYADIC RELATIONS is not the same (6795-3)
> as a TRIADIC RELATION among three relata, because the latter
> is by definition a mathematical category while the former
> need
Edwina, John,
I will, as ever, agree with John in this matter. If, as Peirce says, the
interpretant stands in the *same *relation to the object as the
representamen does, then that 'same' points to what in existential graphs
Peirce calls a relationship of 'teridentity'. For example, he writes:
t
Exposition:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14000
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14045
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14062
Discussion:
SR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14047
F
Further, John, to what I just wrote, to reduce the triadic Sign to being ONE
relation ignores that each aspect of the triad can be in a different
categorical mode - and, that this categorical mode can change. So, you can have
the triadic Sign as a Rhematic Iconic Qualisign; and you can have it a
John, I don't agree. The interaction between, eg, the Representamen and the
Object can't be reduced to 'a term'. The action of the Reprsentamen in itself
as it deals with the stimuli data from the external dynamic object can't be
reduced to and defined as 'a term'. Same with the interaction of
For the trillionth time, Sung, I've never considered that the relation
between the, eg, Representamen and the Object is a dyad. I'd appreciate it
if you would stop constantly rewriting what I believe and then, presenting
it to others as if such were my views. You are quite wrong. A dyad would
e
Dear Stephen, Howard, lists -
I tend to share Stephen's position here. But Howard is right that there is no
simple way of deciding the basic issues of the foundation of mathematics and
logic. It is a question which can not be decided by empirical evidence -
because that begs the question (to de
Dear Mary, John S., lists -
John already gave the background of the dabbit-ruck.
Peirce, however, has a drawing stating some related (though not quite
identical) points. from the Lectures on Pragmatism, 1903, 5.183 - a curved
line which may alternately be perceived as a stone wall. P claims he
Dear Howard, lists -
But then neither is the opposite …
Best
F
Den 14/09/2014 kl. 03.51 skrev Howard Pattee
mailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com>>
:
At 04:35 PM 9/13/2014, Frederik wrote:
Dear Stan, lists -
Good. I tend to side with Peirce here - though I would change the wording
slightly: logic exisi
Dear Sung, lists -
I am not sure that this is the proper comparison.
It is possible to chart thresholds in many continuous processes - that does not
alter their continuous nature nor make them fundamentally discontinuous in any
sense. Continuity may include discontinuities - the opposite is not t
I think an analogy from cyber development is pertinent when discussing what
is within and without human scope. We denote things that assist us as
utilities. We could say that logic and math are utilities. But utilities
depend in some cases on things that already exist and could be said to be
within
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