Interesting you mention Searle. I tangled a bit with him, using my
alter-ego fictional character Adam Panflick to have the following
conversation with him back in 2008.
Adam Panflick Converses With John Searle | Stephen C. Rose
http://buff.ly/1pLecpZ
*@stephencrose
Section 3.5 of NP takes up The Indexical Side of Dicisigns by first
showing the importance of (and the more recent terminology for) Peirce's
advances in the algebra of logic which made it possible to separate the
subject and predicate parts of the proposition, and thus the indexical and
iconic
Gary, List,
Pragmatic objects are intentional objects.
Jon
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
On Oct 3, 2014, at 11:48 AM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
Section 3.5 of NP takes up “The Indexical Side of Dicisigns” by first showing
the importance of (and
Jon,
So?
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
Sent: 3-Oct-14 12:21 PM
Gary, List,
Pragmatic objects are intentional objects.
Jon
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Sungchul,
I lack the background in math and physics and other sciences to make any
serious assessment of your conjectures about the recurrence of
Planck-like distributions in various fields. From what I've read or
skimmed over the years, I'd say that most likenesses among distributions
turn
Jon
Trying to comprehend triadic relations by
means of their projective trichotomies is a project
ultimately doomed to fail.
A couple of concrete examples would help in understanding what you mean by
the doomed failure you are referring to.
With all the best.
Sung
Ben, Jeff, Jon, lists,
1) Can we say that there can be many triads, depending one how one
defines them, but the Peircean triad is special and identical with a
mathematical category ?
2) Triad is a system of three entities, while trichotomy is the
process of dividing a system into three parts,
Sungchul, list
I know next to nothing about category theory.
Most generally a triad is a trio. A predicate is called triadic if it
is predicated of three objects like so: /Pxyz/. In Peirce's system a
genuine triad is one involving irreducibly triadic action, called
semiosis, among three
On Oct 3, 2014, at 5:41 AM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote:
This conclusion seems consistent with the postulate I proposed in 2012
that the wave-particle complementarity operates not only in physics, but
also in biology and semiotics (see Table 2.13 in the chapter entitled
Hi Gary F.,
What is the difference between saying that every dicisign involves an
intention, and saying that every dicisign involves (or is somehow related to) a
purpose? My untutored assumption is that 'purpose' is the more general term,
and the word 'intention' refers to a species of
I don’t have much to say on Peirce and QM. Although I have the following quote
in my notes that might be of interest. I’m not sure it’s fair to say that
Peirce is anticipating QM in this although there clearly are some interesting
parallels.
. . . Let us next consider how a state of
Thread:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14286
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14290
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14313
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14350
On Oct 3, 2014, at 12:20 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote:
On 10/3/2014 2:04 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
Ben, Jeff, Jon, lists,
1) Can we say that there can be many triads, depending one how one
defines them, but the Peircean triad is special and identical with a
mathematical
On Oct 3, 2014, at 12:30 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu
wrote:
Perhaps we should distinguish between different ways that the word
'intention' is used in Peirce's texts. There is the common meaning that is
expressed when I say, for instance, that my intention in
Clark, list,
Sowa's note was forwarded to peirce-l by Gary Richmond as a comment on
Anellis's earlier peirce-l post on April 30, 2006
http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/709 which said
the following:
[Quote Anellis]
I had earlier noted that, in going back to
Ben, list,
It is my understanding that the mathematical category is another name for
semiosis. In other words, a category is to mathematicians hat semiosis is
to semioticians.
To quote Peirce from http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM:
A sign is anything, A, which,
(1) in
Jon,
I am afraid your answer is as incomprehensible to me as was your original
remark that prompted my question.
With all the best.
Sung
Thread:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14286
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14290
On Oct 3, 2014, at 2:28 PM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
I wasn't referring to intentionality in the sense of aboutness, or to the
scholastic ideas of first and second intentions; I guess it's tautologically
true that informational signs must involve intentions in that sense.
(Sorry if the figure gets distorted.)
Clark quoted Sowa as having said that
There are other developments, such as DNA and Heisenberg's(100314-1)
uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics, which are much
closer to themes that Peirce had discussed. Those could be
considered support for
Peircers,
The more I pondered the first two quotations from the Syllabus that Frederik
cited in Chapter 3.4, the more I felt compelled to study that part of the text
in detail, and I eventually copied out a longer extract from EP 2, 275–277,
taking that over the comparable but editorially
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