Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Vinicius Romanini]

(For some reason, the message below did not go through. I repost it. Sorry
if there is redundancy)

Jack, list

The concept of degeneration comes from projective geometry. It does not
carry any moral judgement. You can degenerate a tridimensional figure by
projecting it on a plane, and then further degenerate it by projection on a
line. Something similar happens when we apply the categories.

A legisign can be seen as a general rule that ought to be applied when we
generate its replicas. Any word, considered as a representamen, is a
legisign, or general sign. Whenever and wherever we use it, we generate one
of its replicas and by doing so we degenerate it from thirdness (general)
to secondness (its instantiation in space and time).

If we didn't have the Rosetta Stone to decipher the ancient Egyptian, every
single carved hieroglyph would still be a replica of its legisign. It's
symbolic nature would be buried though, maybe forever.

Now, a particular hieroglyph before your (a replica) is a cognizable
pattern that is destined to become a brute fact of your experience. It has
existence as its final interpretant. In fact, any replica of a legisign is
cognized as a pattern (a thirdness) that is destined to become a past
memory of our experience (a secondness).

Legisigns do not end as past memories of particular minds. As generals,
their final interpretants are all the general possible memories, or
sensations, that would or could be produced by a community of possible
interpreters. Its final nature is the esse in futuro.

In the same vein, holosigns are cognizable patterns (thirdness) that are
destined to become feelings (firstness), maybe even non-conscious ones.
When we look at a painting by Pollock for the first time, we cognize
patterns that produce feelings for their final interpretant. If we
encounter it for a second time, then we might feel the experience of a
replica, and the effect of memorization is stronger than the original
effect of musement.

Well, maybe things are now more complicated than when we started. Sorry for
that.

Vinicius

Em sáb., 6 de nov. de 2021 às 12:37, Vinicius Romanini 
escreveu:

> Dear colleagues,
>
> This is an interesting thread. I have been working on these questions for
> a while now.
> My ideas are inspired by Peirce but not exactly identical to Peirce's.
> Tony Jappy once called me a Neo-Peircean, which I found OK. Better than
> post or ante Peircean, anyway.
>
> I will restrict my comment to sign qua sign, or the proper representamen.
> In my opinion, a truly pragmatic account of signhood must consider not only
> how the sign is perceived but also how it ought to be experienced in the
> long run. I mean that we must take into account the final interpretant,
> which is the sign as it is destined to be interpreted.
>
> Roughly,
> A genuine qualisign has firstness both for the representamen and the final
> interpretant.
> A genuine sinsign has secondness both for the representamen and the final
> interpretant.
> A genuine legising has thirdness both for the representamen and the final
> interpretant.
>
> I think the above is plain.
>
> A replica is a degenerate legisign that has thirdness for the
> representamen but secondness for the final interpretant. Replicas are well
> understood too.
>
> I call holisigns those degenerate legisigns that have thirdness for the
> representamen but firstness for the final interpretant.
> I call altersings those degenerate sinsigns that have secondness for the
> representamen but firstness for the final interpretant.
>
> Holisigns are ephemeral patterns. They are patterns but tend to dissolve
> in experience as qualitative effects. A dune might be seen as a holisign as
> its shape continuously changes until it vanishes. The melody of jazz music
> is another example. If you gaze at the clouds in the sky, holisigns will
> appear in a multitude of changing patterns. A wave in itself is a holisign.
> General qualities, such as temperature, are holisigns.
>
> Altersigns are gentle signs of otherness. They do not have the lasting
> friction and brute forte of sinsigns. They pop up in perception but
> dissolve themselves as possibilities. Altersings are instantiations of
> holisigns as much as sinsigns are instantiations of legisigns.
> What we perceive of a holisign at any moment is an altersign. It is any
> alternative configuration of a pattern, if you want. The perceived feeling
> of a temperature is an altersign. In fact, it is the embodiment of the
> holisign.
>
> Holisings and altersigns are very important to the semeiotic of art.
>
> I believe these distinctions are important for the grounding and
> presentation of the representamen. Others will be necessary if we go up
> towards representation and communication. Such  considerations that can
> help render semeiotic intelligible and useful, at least as I understand it.
>
> All the best,
> Vinicius
>
>
> Em sex., 5 de nov. de 2021 às 21:51, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Theosemiotic, the entire universe as a narrative or argument?

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., Gary R., List:

GF (via GR below): What’s the difference between a narrative and an
argument?


An argument is a specific kind of sign as distinguished from a proposition
or a name in that it distinctly represents its interpretant, namely, its
conclusion (CP 2.95, 1902). Accordingly, I suggest that the question is
really whether a narrative qualifies as an argument, or is merely a
copulative proposition. If "every true poem is a sound argument" (CP 5.119,
EP 2:194, 1903), then it is at least plausible that a narrative could also
be an argument. But what exactly is a *true *poem as opposed to a *false *poem?
Is the latter still an argument, though presumably an *unsound *one? Is a
true narrative likewise a sound argument, while a false narrative is an
unsound argument? What about a *fictional *narrative?

GF: Is the entire universe both? (Or neither; or something else.)


Peirce maintains that "the Universe as an argument is necessarily a great
work of art, a great poem--for every fine argument is a poem and a
symphony" (ibid). My proposed argumentation for the reality of God relies
on the semeiotic principle that every sign must be determined by an *object
*that is external to, independent of, and unaffected by that sign
itself--namely, its *dynamical *object. Of course, a case for the same
conclusion could also be made on the basis that every work of art requires
an artist, every poem requires a poet, and every symphony requires a
composer. Likewise, if the entire universe is conceived as "a single grand
narrative," then it seems to me that it requires a narrator.

GF (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-11/msg00028.html):
A *narrative
*is basically a representation of *a sequence of events* which is not
necessarily meaningful in any way.


On the contrary, a narrative is a sign, and every sign is "meaningful" by
virtue of having an immediate interpretant that is *internal *to it and a
final interpretant that it *would *determine under ideal circumstances, as
well as a dynamical interpretant that it *does *determine whenever it is
actually interpreted. Moreover, events are *entia rationis* that must be
prescinded from the continuous flow of time and change, so constructing a
narrative involves deliberately selecting and demarcating *which *events in
the sequence to include rather than ignore--i.e., which events to treat as
*significant*.

GF: However, I notice that the term *narrative*, as used nowadays in the
psychological and social sciences, has itself taken on an implication of
purposefulness. We use our “narratives” to *make sense* of our lives and
the lives of others, to discern the connections between actions and events.


Exactly, and we also use our "narratives" in an effort to influence how *others
*make sense of their lives and the world. This is especially evident in the
media these days--which events and details are selected vs. ignored
reflects a certain point of view that the narrator takes for granted and
either assumes to be already shared by readers/listeners/viewers or hopes
to be adopted by them. Such a "narrative" is surely an argument defined as
"any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a definite belief"
(CP 6.456, EP 2:435, 1908).

GF: This is a natural development because we know that our actions
have *consequences
*and we would like to know what they are.


Indeed, I have suggested in my articles and presentations on "the logic of
ingenuity" that just as engineers develop mathematical diagrams to model
the problems that they encounter and work out potential solutions, humans
in general develop narratives for the same purpose in everyday contexts,
including ethical deliberation (https://www.structuremag.org/?p=11107).
Before I knew much about Peirce, I wrote a column in the same magazine
about "Narrative and Engineering" (https://www.structuremag.org/?p=8249)
that concluded, "For better or for worse, a good story can often be more
persuasive than a sound argument."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Nov 2, 2021 at 11:18 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> List,
>
> In an off List message Gary Fuhrman offered this quotation by the Peirce
> scholar, most recently president of the Charles S. Peirce Society (now past
> president) through the covid lockdown year of 2020, Michael Ramposa.
>
>
> “For anyone who embraces theosemiotic, the entire universe is a text, not
> so much a library, where two separate volumes might be pulled off the
> shelves and juxtaposed, but a single grand narrative, with an infinite
> variety of subplots.”  —Raposa, Michael L.. *Theosemiotic* (pp. 189-190).
> Fordham University Press. .
>
>
> In regard to this quotation Gary F asked the question:  "What’s the
> difference between a narrative and an argument? Is the entire universe
> both?" (Or neither; or something else.)
>
>
> It would 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

GF: Clearly the type/token distinction has many uses outside of semiotics
(unless we think that everything is a sign and nothing is non-semiotic).


Indeed, the type/token distinction seems to be one of Peirce's most
commonly employed insights, although I doubt that very many people who use
it know that it came from him or are aware of its primary application
within a theory of signs. Personally, I do tend to think that the entire
universe is "composed exclusively of signs," not just "perfused with signs"
(CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906), but I consider material/physical phenomena to
be *degenerate* manifestations of semiosis in accordance with objective
idealism (CP 6.24-25, EP 1:292-293, 1891).

GF: I take “uttering” to be synonymous with “externalizing”, so I can’t say
that an internal thought is an “utterance” as Jon does.


I instead take "uttering" to be nearly synonymous with "embodying," such
that there is a sense in which *every *sign token can be conceived as an
"utterance," even when it is strictly an internal thought. That seems to be
Peirce's view, as well, based on his remarks about a proverb being "one and
the same representamen" not only when it "is written or spoken in English,
Greek, or any other language," but also "every time it is thought of" (CP
5.138, EP 2:203, 1903). It also explains why "signs require at least two
Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a *Quasi-interpreter*," such that "it is
not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every
logical evolution of thought should be dialogic" (CP 4.551, 1906).

GF: Come to think of it, this may be relevant to the question Gary posted
the other day, whether to regard the universe as a *narrative *(Raposa) or
an *argument *(Peirce).


I am glad that you brought this up again--I have been thinking about
responding to those questions, but holding off since this topic has been
prompting so much fruitful discussion. I will address them in the other
thread.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Nov 6, 2021 at 10:04 AM  wrote:

> Gary R, Jon AS, Phyllis, Jeff *et al.*,
>
> Clearly the type/token distinction has many uses *outside* of semiotics
> (unless we think that everything is a sign and nothing is non-semiotic).
> Gary’s subway token furnishes one example.
>
> My question was whether an unuttered, internal thought is a token. (I take
> “uttering” to be synonymous with “externalizing”, so I can’t say that an
> internal thought is an “utterance” as Jon does.) In a physiological
> context, specifically that of dynamic systems theory, I would say that it
> is probably a token of a type which is an *attractor in the state space*
> of the brain. Such attractors tend to be reiterated many times, but some of
> them are “strange” so that no two iterations are exactly alike, and
> naturally they all differ in time of occurrence, so I think the type/token
> distinction applies.
>
> Momentary brain events are not necessarily tokens conforming to *any*
> type, not even to a chronic condition such as epilepsy or bipolar disorder.
> They may be random occurrences. But a *thought*, I would think, would
> always belong to a *type* of a semiotic nature: it would be a *signal* as
> opposed to *noise*, or an attractor in a *meaning space
> *. Even a *spontaneous* thought can
> turn out to be significant, or can find itself adapted to some purpose, as
> all creative artists know.
>
> Come to think of it, this may be relevant to the question Gary posted the
> other day, whether to regard the universe as a *narrative* (Raposa) or an
> *argument* (Peirce ).
>
> A *narrative* is basically a representation of *a sequence of events*
> which is not necessarily meaningful in any way. An *argument*, on the
> other hand, represents a logical relation of *consequence.* Peirce says
> that the universe is “a great symbol of God's purpose”; an argument must
> have (and must *represent*) an element of *purposefulness* that a
> narrative can do without. Peirce’s assertion that the universe is an
> argument implies that it has a purpose. I’m inclined to associate this
> assertion with the 19th-century optimism which is also expressed in his
> belief that the universe was *progressing* in a definite direction,
> reflected anthropomorphically in a progress toward “concrete
> reasonableness.” As a 21st-century post-Peircean, I can’t honestly say
> that I share those beliefs. Nor do I believe that every *event* is
> significant.
>
> However, I notice that the term *narrative,* as used nowadays in the
> psychological and social sciences, has itself taken on an implication of
> purposefulness. We use our “narratives” to *make sense* of our lives and
> the lives of others, to discern the connections between actions and events.
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, Jon AS, Gary R, Phyllis, et al.


Sometimes, such as when I'm done thinking about a philosophical question, I 
look at the time and wonder where it went. I didn't write anything down, and I 
didn't talk to anyone about it. Gary F's question takes the following form:  
are my unuttered thoughts during this period internal sign tokens?


Consider a set of similar cases:


A.  I'm lost in thought, but occasionally muttering to myself. There is no one 
around to hear it, and I'm not even noticing that I'm quietly muttering.


B. I'm lost in thought and sketching a diagram. The diagram is something of a 
mess, and my thoughts are rather confused. I consider several changes that I 
might make, perhaps adding lines here, erasing some there, but I don't make the 
all of the changes considered. After an hour of doodling, I take the sheet of 
paper and throw it away. I don't come back to it later, nor does anyone else 
read it.


Whatever answer we give to your question about internal signs, I think the 
explanations should flow naturally to cover cases A and B. Similarly, the 
explanations should fit variations on A and B where someone else comes along 
and says, "you're muttering" what are you saying and I say "oh it's nothing" 
or, conversely, I reflect and offer an explanation of my thoughts. So, too, for 
the case of the diagram on the piece of paper when someone pulls it out of the 
trash and asks what I was thinking about when making the figure, and I give 
similar responses.


What is clear is that patterns of thought unuttered today may, at some point in 
the future, be uttered. As such, the analysis of those unuttered thoughts 
should account for the future possible forms in which they might be expressed 
verbally, in writing or in some other form of action.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Saturday, November 6, 2021 8:04:29 AM
To: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

Gary R, Jon AS, Phyllis, Jeff et al.,
Clearly the type/token distinction has many uses outside of semiotics (unless 
we think that everything is a sign and nothing is non-semiotic). Gary’s subway 
token furnishes one example.
My question was whether an unuttered, internal thought is a token. (I take 
“uttering” to be synonymous with “externalizing”, so I can’t say that an 
internal thought is an “utterance” as Jon does.) In a physiological context, 
specifically that of dynamic systems theory, I would say that it is probably a 
token of a type which is an attractor in the state space of the brain. Such 
attractors tend to be reiterated many times, but some of them are “strange” so 
that no two iterations are exactly alike, and naturally they all differ in time 
of occurrence, so I think the type/token distinction applies.
Momentary brain events are not necessarily tokens conforming to any type, not 
even to a chronic condition such as epilepsy or bipolar disorder. They may be 
random occurrences. But a thought, I would think, would always belong to a type 
of a semiotic nature: it would be a signal as opposed to noise, or an attractor 
in a meaning space. Even a spontaneous 
thought can turn out to be significant, or can find itself adapted to some 
purpose, as all creative artists know.
Come to think of it, this may be relevant to the question Gary posted the other 
day, whether to regard the universe as a narrative (Raposa) or an argument 
(Peirce).
A narrative is basically a representation of a sequence of events which is not 
necessarily meaningful in any way. An argument, on the other hand, represents a 
logical relation of consequence. Peirce says that the universe is “a great 
symbol of God's purpose”; an argument must have (and must represent) an element 
of purposefulness that a narrative can do without. Peirce’s assertion that the 
universe is an argument implies that it has a purpose. I’m inclined to 
associate this assertion with the 19th-century optimism which is also expressed 
in his belief that the universe was progressing in a definite direction, 
reflected anthropomorphically in a progress toward “concrete reasonableness.” 
As a 21st-century post-Peircean, I can’t honestly say that I share those 
beliefs. Nor do I believe that every event is significant.
However, I notice that the term narrative, as used nowadays in the 
psychological and social sciences, has itself taken on an implication of 
purposefulness. We use our “narratives” to make sense of our lives and the 
lives of others, to discern the connections between actions and events. This is 
a natural development because we know that our actions have consequences and we 
would like to know what they are. Even when our actions do not have conscious 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: Signs, Types, and Tokens

[JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY]

Vincinius, List,

VR: I call holisigns those degenerate legisigns that have thirdness for the 
representamen but firstness for the final interpretant.
I wonder if you would be able to clarify on this notion a little. Perhaps 
delineating exactly what you consider a "degenerate legisign" to be, and then 
how it alters when the mode is "thirdness for representament" and "firstness 
for the final interpretant"?

This is an idiosyncratic request on my part, but lately my mind has been awash 
with abstract terminology. I often read the discourse on this list and wonder 
if contributors shouldn't have to furnish practical analogies in order to 
clarify their use of terms, because trying to ground some of these concepts is 
not easy when everyone seems to be using a similar code with different meanings 
in various places.


Best

Jack


From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Vinicius Romanini 
Sent: Saturday, November 6, 2021 3:37 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

*Warning*

This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not 
reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know 
the content is safe.

Dear colleagues,

This is an interesting thread. I have been working on these questions for a 
while now.
My ideas are inspired by Peirce but not exactly identical to Peirce's.
Tony Jappy once called me a Neo-Peircean, which I found OK. Better than post or 
ante Peircean, anyway.

I will restrict my comment to sign qua sign, or the proper representamen. In my 
opinion, a truly pragmatic account of signhood must consider not only how the 
sign is perceived but also how it ought to be experienced in the long run. I 
mean that we must take into account the final interpretant, which is the sign 
as it is destined to be interpreted.

Roughly,
A genuine qualisign has firstness both for the representamen and the final 
interpretant.
A genuine sinsign has secondness both for the representamen and the final 
interpretant.
A genuine legising has thirdness both for the representamen and the final 
interpretant.

I think the above is plain.

A replica is a degenerate legisign that has thirdness for the representamen but 
secondness for the final interpretant. Replicas are well understood too.

I call holisigns those degenerate legisigns that have thirdness for the 
representamen but firstness for the final interpretant.
I call altersings those degenerate sinsigns that have secondness for the 
representamen but firstness for the final interpretant.

Holisigns are ephemeral patterns. They are patterns but tend to dissolve in 
experience as qualitative effects. A dune might be seen as a holisign as its 
shape continuously changes until it vanishes. The melody of jazz music is 
another example. If you gaze at the clouds in the sky, holisigns will appear in 
a multitude of changing patterns. A wave in itself is a holisign. General 
qualities, such as temperature, are holisigns.

Altersigns are gentle signs of otherness. They do not have the lasting friction 
and brute forte of sinsigns. They pop up in perception but dissolve themselves 
as possibilities. Altersings are instantiations of holisigns as much as 
sinsigns are instantiations of legisigns.
What we perceive of a holisign at any moment is an altersign. It is any 
alternative configuration of a pattern, if you want. The perceived feeling of a 
temperature is an altersign. In fact, it is the embodiment of the holisign.

Holisings and altersigns are very important to the semeiotic of art.

I believe these distinctions are important for the grounding and presentation 
of the representamen. Others will be necessary if we go up towards 
representation and communication. Such  considerations that can help render 
semeiotic intelligible and useful, at least as I understand it.

All the best,
Vinicius


Em sex., 5 de nov. de 2021 às 21:51, Jon Alan Schmidt 
mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> escreveu:
Gary R., Phyllis, List:

GR: But on further reflection, it is quite clear what the 'type' of the subway 
token is ...

I am likely belaboring the point now, but a subway token is not a token in the 
semeiotic sense, and its type is not a type in the semeiotic sense. The English 
term "subway token" is a type, and each individual instance where and when 
"subway token" is written, spoken, thought of, or otherwise embodied is a token 
of that type.

GR: ... but what is the 'type' (and object) of your unexpressed thought?

The type is whatever definitely significant form is embodied by the unexpressed 
thought-token, whether words in a language, an image, a diagram, etc. The 
object is whatever the unexpressed thought-token denotes, i.e., that which it 
is about.

GR: Or is the first unexpressed thought more like a dream? The fact of the 
dream is real, but the content of it isn't (quite; but surely more so than the 
dream, I would expect).

Even 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Vinicius Romanini]

Dear colleagues,

This is an interesting thread. I have been working on these questions for a
while now.
My ideas are inspired by Peirce but not exactly identical to Peirce's.
Tony Jappy once called me a Neo-Peircean, which I found OK. Better than
post or ante Peircean, anyway.

I will restrict my comment to sign qua sign, or the proper representamen.
In my opinion, a truly pragmatic account of signhood must consider not only
how the sign is perceived but also how it ought to be experienced in the
long run. I mean that we must take into account the final interpretant,
which is the sign as it is destined to be interpreted.

Roughly,
A genuine qualisign has firstness both for the representamen and the final
interpretant.
A genuine sinsign has secondness both for the representamen and the final
interpretant.
A genuine legising has thirdness both for the representamen and the final
interpretant.

I think the above is plain.

A replica is a degenerate legisign that has thirdness for the representamen
but secondness for the final interpretant. Replicas are well understood too.

I call holisigns those degenerate legisigns that have thirdness for the
representamen but firstness for the final interpretant.
I call altersings those degenerate sinsigns that have secondness for the
representamen but firstness for the final interpretant.

Holisigns are ephemeral patterns. They are patterns but tend to dissolve in
experience as qualitative effects. A dune might be seen as a holisign as
its shape continuously changes until it vanishes. The melody of jazz music
is another example. If you gaze at the clouds in the sky, holisigns will
appear in a multitude of changing patterns. A wave in itself is a holisign.
General qualities, such as temperature, are holisigns.

Altersigns are gentle signs of otherness. They do not have the lasting
friction and brute forte of sinsigns. They pop up in perception but
dissolve themselves as possibilities. Altersings are instantiations of
holisigns as much as sinsigns are instantiations of legisigns.
What we perceive of a holisign at any moment is an altersign. It is any
alternative configuration of a pattern, if you want. The perceived feeling
of a temperature is an altersign. In fact, it is the embodiment of the
holisign.

Holisings and altersigns are very important to the semeiotic of art.

I believe these distinctions are important for the grounding and
presentation of the representamen. Others will be necessary if we go up
towards representation and communication. Such  considerations that can
help render semeiotic intelligible and useful, at least as I understand it.

All the best,
Vinicius


Em sex., 5 de nov. de 2021 às 21:51, Jon Alan Schmidt <
jonalanschm...@gmail.com> escreveu:

> Gary R., Phyllis, List:
>
> GR: But on further reflection, it is quite clear what the 'type' of the
> subway token is ...
>
>
> I am likely belaboring the point now, but a subway token is *not *a token
> in the semeiotic sense, and its type is *not *a type in the semeiotic
> sense. The English *term *"subway token" is a type, and each *individual 
> *instance
> where and when "subway token" is written, spoken, thought of, or otherwise
> embodied is a token of that type.
>
> GR: ... but what is the 'type' (and object) of your unexpressed thought?
>
>
> The type is whatever definitely significant form is embodied by the
> unexpressed thought-token, whether words in a language, an image, a
> diagram, etc. The object is whatever the unexpressed thought-token
> *denotes*, i.e., that which it is *about*.
>
> GR: Or is the first unexpressed thought more like a dream? The fact of the
> dream is real, but the content of it isn't (quite; but surely more so than
> the dream, I would expect).
>
>
> Even though the events that take place in a dream are not real, the dream
> itself is still an *actual *thought-token. After all, the events that
> take place in a fictional narrative are not real, but the spoken or written
> story is still an *actual *text-token.
>
> GR: What if it were a random, yet highly original thought? A thought come
> "out of the blue" as the expression has it.
>
>
> It would still be a token of a type, an individual embodiment of a
> definitely significant form; and it would still be about something other
> than itself, namely, its object. It would also be a dynamical interpretant
> of the (quasi-)mind that thinks it, which consists of all the signs that
> have previously determined it--a system of connected signs that constitutes
> one sign and thus can determine one such interpretant.
>
> GR: Perhaps this is the sort of matter which can make one feel that it
> might be better *to focus on the process of semiosis* rather than on the
> terminology forged in semeiotic grammar.
>
>
> I have gradually come to agree with James Liszka (
> https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2018-0089) that a concentration on *classifying
> signs* is misplaced, and that it is indeed more fruitful to analyze the 
> *process of
> 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[gnox]

Gary R, Jon AS, Phyllis, Jeff et al.,

Clearly the type/token distinction has many uses outside of semiotics (unless 
we think that everything is a sign and nothing is non-semiotic). Gary’s subway 
token furnishes one example. 

My question was whether an unuttered, internal thought is a token. (I take 
“uttering” to be synonymous with “externalizing”, so I can’t say that an 
internal thought is an “utterance” as Jon does.) In a physiological context, 
specifically that of dynamic systems theory, I would say that it is probably a 
token of a type which is an attractor in the state space of the brain. Such 
attractors tend to be reiterated many times, but some of them are “strange” so 
that no two iterations are exactly alike, and naturally they all differ in time 
of occurrence, so I think the type/token distinction applies.

Momentary brain events are not necessarily tokens conforming to any type, not 
even to a chronic condition such as epilepsy or bipolar disorder. They may be 
random occurrences. But a thought, I would think, would always belong to a type 
of a semiotic nature: it would be a signal as opposed to noise, or an attractor 
in a   meaning space. Even a spontaneous 
thought can turn out to be significant, or can find itself adapted to some 
purpose, as all creative artists know.

Come to think of it, this may be relevant to the question Gary posted the other 
day, whether to regard the universe as a narrative (Raposa) or an argument ( 
 Peirce).

A narrative is basically a representation of a sequence of events which is not 
necessarily meaningful in any way. An argument, on the other hand, represents a 
logical relation of consequence. Peirce says that the universe is “a great 
symbol of God's purpose”; an argument must have (and must represent) an element 
of purposefulness that a narrative can do without. Peirce’s assertion that the 
universe is an argument implies that it has a purpose. I’m inclined to 
associate this assertion with the 19th-century optimism which is also expressed 
in his belief that the universe was progressing in a definite direction, 
reflected anthropomorphically in a progress toward “concrete reasonableness.” 
As a 21st-century post-Peircean, I can’t honestly say that I share those 
beliefs. Nor do I believe that every event is significant.

However, I notice that the term narrative, as used nowadays in the 
psychological and social sciences, has itself taken on an implication of 
purposefulness. We use our “narratives” to make sense of our lives and the 
lives of others, to discern the connections between actions and events. This is 
a natural development because we know that our actions have consequences and we 
would like to know what they are. Even when our actions do not have  
 conscious purposes, they have 
motivations or intentions which can be read as natural signs or tokens of some 
type of “purpose”, or as intimations of Thirdness in the universe.

Consequently I think that in calling the universe a narrative, Raposa is not 
denying that the universe is an argument or has a purpose, he is merely leaving 
that question open. A kind of agnosticism, perhaps.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 5-Nov-21 20:53
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

 

Gary R., Phyllis, List:

 

GR: But on further reflection, it is quite clear what the 'type' of the subway 
token is ...

 

I am likely belaboring the point now, but a subway token is not a token in the 
semeiotic sense, and its type is not a type in the semeiotic sense. The English 
term "subway token" is a type, and each individual instance where and when 
"subway token" is written, spoken, thought of, or otherwise embodied is a token 
of that type.

 

GR: ... but what is the 'type' (and object) of your unexpressed thought?

 

The type is whatever definitely significant form is embodied by the unexpressed 
thought-token, whether words in a language, an image, a diagram, etc. The 
object is whatever the unexpressed thought-token denotes, i.e., that which it 
is about.

 

GR: Or is the first unexpressed thought more like a dream? The fact of the 
dream is real, but the content of it isn't (quite; but surely more so than the 
dream, I would expect).

 

Even though the events that take place in a dream are not real, the dream 
itself is still an actual thought-token. After all, the events that take place 
in a fictional narrative are not real, but the spoken or written story is still 
an actual text-token.

 

GR: What if it were a random, yet highly original thought? A thought come "out 
of the blue" as the expression has it.

 

It would still be a token of a type, an individual embodiment of a definitely 
significant form; and it would still be about something other than itself, 
namely, its object. It would also be a 

[PEIRCE-L] To the benefit of those who have an answer for everything ...

[robert marty]

List,

>From MS 498, undated  (transcription Ahti-Veiko Pietarinen, DOI
10.1007/s11229-014-0498-y) :

"















*I may remark that in no science, not even in comparative anatomy, are
questions ofclassification so vital as they are in phaneroscopy and
semeiotics. My classificationof signs is not yet fully matured. I have been
at work upon it, or at least have kept it inmind since 1863, but still
confidently expect important improvements in it. If I live tocomplete it,
it will be the contribution to exact logic that has cost me the most labor,
andit will be recognized by exact logicians as a very positive and
indisputable contributionto exact logic even if I should leave it in its
present imperfect state. There remain manyhundreds of difficult questions
yet to be considered, though the majority of them havereceived an
examination which cannot justly be called careless or summary. Lest
itshould be suspected that I exaggerate in saying that there are many
hundred questionsI will say that the exact number, so far, is 205 billion
891132 million 94619. Butthese are not all independent. From the answers to
some the answers to others canbe deduced. The total number of really
independent and really difficult questions,requiring each some days of
laborious consideration is only 1073 million 741794. Sothat if I should
have the good fortune to live 82 or 83 million years longer I mighthope to
exhaust the subject. It is not to be expected that I should live long
enough toanswer them all with positive assurance"*

This gives rise to a little humility ...

Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *
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