Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)
John, list I’d add Peirce’s term of ‘pragmaticism’ - a focus on the practical consequences of a semiosic function, ie, a process, rather than a focus on the theory. I’d also comment that, in my view, Peircean semiosis is a function of a complex adaptive world, where, for example, matter becomes self-organizing and where semiosis is a process of exploratory openness enabling diversity of form [ and habits] and expansion of networking . That is, the DI [Dynamic Interpretant] is merely a current and local ’task closure’ and is the normal experience of the semiosic process. But the FI [ Final Interpretant ] which occurs less often is exploratory within its environment [ which is where the notion of community in its definition enters] and thus, both evolution and adaptations cannot be prestated or determined, but remain open to both Firstness and influences from the habits from other existences/Signs. [5.477 where habits change; also 6. 262, and ‘primordial habit-taking]. Peirce was not an a priori essentialist but an evolutionist [and not a Darwinist , ie, he rejected total randomness as the sole means of generating adaptation] and thus, his semiosis had to enable interactional openness to the information from other current semiotic forms as well as chance - to enable changes in habits and phenomena. His outline of protoplasm, evolution etc - is obviously not a focus on abstract theory - but on pragmatic realities. Edwina > On Jan 24, 2024, at 7:03 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Jon, Helmut, List, > > I don't disagree with your analysis. But what it shows is that abstract > analysis provides zero information about any particular case. > > Peirce revolutionized the field of logic, he made major contributions to > methods of reasoning, to methods of analysis and to methods of representation > in lexicography, phaneroscopy, semeiotic, and, scientific research > (methodeutic). His 10 classes of signs are important, but beyond that, he > could only give a few examples, and he never showed the value of that > abstract analysis with any concrete results for any kind of application. > > Fortunately, Lady Welby had an enormous influence on Peirce. She had zero > interest in those abstractions. In evaluating the importance of Peirce's late > writings, it's essential to read his letters to her. She kept him focused on > reality. > > It's not an accident that Peirce dropped the word 'phenomenology' and > replaced it with 'phaneroscopy', which puts more emphasis on concrete > examples, rather than formal analysis. In his last decade, his examples and > methods of analysis show a strong influence of Welby's interests and subject > matter. He kept working on EGs, but he used them to represent subjects that > are more concrete than abstract -- he kept that goal of representing images, > especially stereoscopic moving images. > > Although Welby did not understand EGs, I believe that she kept him focused on > representing imagery.And I believe that the importance of imagery is the > reason why he replaced the trichotomy of word oriented rheme-dicisign-arguent > with the more general trichotomy that included imagery: seme-pheme-delome. > > John > > > From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" > > Helmut, List: > > HR: it is the interpreter, who does the inference ... it is the interpreter, > who receives the sign, and then forms the interpretant > > As I have said before, this is true in the sense that the interpreter's mind > is another sign, which co-determines the dynamical interpretant along with > the individual sign being analyzed. That is why the same individual sign can > have different dynamical interpretants--different interpreters have different > collateral experience and different habits of interpretation. Any dynamical > interpretant of an individual sign (the effect that it actually does have) is > a misinterpretation to the extent that it deviates from the final > interpretant of that sign (the effect that it ideally would have), which > obviously must be consistent with its immediate interpretant (the range of > effects that it possibly could have). The proper aim of inquiry in accordance > with the normative science of logic as semeiotic is conforming all our > dynamical interpretants of signs to their final interpretants, i.e., adopting > only true beliefs such that the corresponding habits of conduct would never > be confounded by any possible future experience. > > HR: The sign anyway is prescinded from the, in reality not reducible, sign > triad. ... Prescission might be seen as an error, so this is error > propagation. > > Again, in my view, each individual genuine triadic relation with its three > individual correlates is prescinded from the continuous process of semiosis. > Prescission should not be seen as an error--it "consists in supposing a state > of things in which one element is present without the other, the one
Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)
Jon, Helmut, List, I don't disagree with your analysis. But what it shows is that abstract analysis provides zero information about any particular case. Peirce revolutionized the field of logic, he made major contributions to methods of reasoning, to methods of analysis and to methods of representation in lexicography, phaneroscopy, semeiotic, and, scientific research (methodeutic). His 10 classes of signs are important, but beyond that, he could only give a few examples, and he never showed the value of that abstract analysis with any concrete results for any kind of application. Fortunately, Lady Welby had an enormous influence on Peirce. She had zero interest in those abstractions. In evaluating the importance of Peirce's late writings, it's essential to read his letters to her. She kept him focused on reality. It's not an accident that Peirce dropped the word 'phenomenology' and replaced it with 'phaneroscopy', which puts more emphasis on concrete examples, rather than formal analysis. In his last decade, his examples and methods of analysis show a strong influence of Welby's interests and subject matter. He kept working on EGs, but he used them to represent subjects that are more concrete than abstract -- he kept that goal of representing images, especially stereoscopic moving images. Although Welby did not understand EGs, I believe that she kept him focused on representing imagery.And I believe that the importance of imagery is the reason why he replaced the trichotomy of word oriented rheme-dicisign-arguent with the more general trichotomy that included imagery: seme-pheme-delome. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Helmut, List: HR: it is the interpreter, who does the inference ... it is the interpreter, who receives the sign, and then forms the interpretant As I have said before, this is true in the sense that the interpreter's mind is another sign, which co-determines the dynamical interpretant along with the individual sign being analyzed. That is why the same individual sign can have different dynamical interpretants--different interpreters have different collateral experience and different habits of interpretation. Any dynamical interpretant of an individual sign (the effect that it actually does have) is a misinterpretation to the extent that it deviates from the final interpretant of that sign (the effect that it ideally would have), which obviously must be consistent with its immediate interpretant (the range of effects that it possibly could have). The proper aim of inquiry in accordance with the normative science of logic as semeiotic is conforming all our dynamical interpretants of signs to their final interpretants, i.e., adopting only true beliefs such that the corresponding habits of conduct would never be confounded by any possible future experience. HR: The sign anyway is prescinded from the, in reality not reducible, sign triad. ... Prescission might be seen as an error, so this is error propagation. Again, in my view, each individual genuine triadic relation with its three individual correlates is prescinded from the continuous process of semiosis. Prescission should not be seen as an error--it "consists in supposing a state of things in which one element is present without the other, the one being logically possible without the other" (EP 2:270, 1903). We can suppose an individual sign with its individual object and its individual interpretant being present, apart from other signs with their own objects and interpretants, because these are all entia rationis--"fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions" (R 295, 1906). As an engineer, I routinely employ prescission to create diagrams of buildings that include only their primary members and connections, omitting everything else that is really present but incidental to their structural behavior. Such a model is not erroneous as long as it adequately captures every aspect that is significant for the analysis being performed (https://www.structuremag.org/?p=10373). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Jan 24, 2024 at 9:13 AM Helmut Raulien wrote: Jon, Cecile, List, Jon, in your first paragraph you wrote about inference. I agree. Therefore I find it a bit problematic to say, that the sign determines the interpretant, because the sign doesn´t infere, it is the interpreter, who does the inference. But ok, I guess we might say, that Peirce prescinds the semiosis from the interpreter, so, ok, the flow of determination goes from the sign to the interpretant, because it is the interpreter, who receives the sign, and then forms the interpretant, and, if you donot mention the interpreter, well, then you just skip her/him/it. But I think, that this skipping is
Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)
Helmut, List: HR: it is the interpreter, who does the inference ... it is the interpreter, who receives the sign, and then forms the interpretant As I have said before, this is true in the sense that the interpreter's mind is *another *sign, which *co-determines* the dynamical interpretant along with the individual sign being analyzed. That is why the *same *individual sign can have *different *dynamical interpretants--different interpreters have different collateral experience and different habits of interpretation. Any *dynamical *interpretant of an individual sign (the effect that it *actually does* have) is a *misinterpretation *to the extent that it deviates from the *final* interpretant of that sign (the effect that it *ideally would* have), which obviously must be consistent with its *immediate *interpretant (the range of effects that it *possibly could* have). The proper aim of inquiry in accordance with the normative science of logic as semeiotic is conforming all our dynamical interpretants of signs to their final interpretants, i.e., adopting only true beliefs such that the corresponding habits of conduct would never be confounded by any possible future experience. HR: The sign anyway is prescinded from the, in reality not reducible, sign triad. ... Prescission might be seen as an error, so this is error propagation. Again, in my view, each *individual *genuine triadic relation with its three *individual *correlates is prescinded from the *continuous *process of semiosis. Prescission should *not *be seen as an error--it "consists in supposing a state of things in which one element is present without the other, the one being logically possible without the other" (EP 2:270, 1903). We can suppose an individual sign with its individual object and its individual interpretant being present, apart from other signs with their own objects and interpretants, because these are all *entia rationis*--"fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions" (R 295, 1906). As an engineer, I routinely employ prescission to create diagrams of buildings that include only their primary members and connections, omitting everything else that is really present but incidental to their structural behavior. Such a model is not *erroneous *as long as it adequately captures every aspect that is significant for the analysis being performed ( https://www.structuremag.org/?p=10373). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Jan 24, 2024 at 9:13 AM Helmut Raulien wrote: > Jon, Cecile, List, > > Jon, in your first paragraph you wrote about inference. I agree. Therefore > I find it a bit problematic to say, that the sign determines the > interpretant, because the sign doesn´t infere, it is the interpreter, who > does the inference. But ok, I guess we might say, that Peirce prescinds the > semiosis from the interpreter, so, ok, the flow of determination goes from > the sign to the interpretant, because it is the interpreter, who receives > the sign, and then forms the interpretant, and, if you donot mention the > interpreter, well, then you just skip her/him/it. But I think, that this > skipping is only justified, if the interpretant is true, because then it > (the interpretant) is a subset of the final interpretant, and not a > misinterpretation. But: Can we take that for granted? > > Talking about precission: The sign anyway is prescinded from the, in > reality not reducible, sign triad. If we say, that something prescinded > determines something else, this determination too is prescinded. > Prescission might be seen as an error, so this is error propagation. That, > i guess, is the reason, why this whole determination affair is somehow > confusing. It surely is, if we take "determination" too literally, I mean, > if we take it too muchly for real. Do you agree? You see, I have been > trying very hard to not contradict Peirce. > > Best, Helmut > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
RE: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)
Helmut, That is certainly true: "I find it a bit problematic to say, that the sign determines the interpretant, because the sign doesn´t infer, it is the interpreter, who does the inference." In fact, Peirce said many times in many ways that signs grow. The interpretation of any mark (sign object) depends on the context, the interpreter, and all the background knowledge that the interpreter has. As the person learns more or has different interests and goals, the same mark may be interpreted in very different ways. It's important to recognize that anything may be a mark that some human or animal or living thing of any species may interpret as a sign object. And the same individual may interpret the same or similar marks in different ways at different times for different reasons. It's important to remember that Peirce often talked about dogs, parrots, crystals, bees, and even plants. All of them are sign interpreters. And remember the Mayan inscriptions, which many people thought were decorations, until some observers decided to relate them to the language that living Mayans spoke.The same sign objects took on radically different interpretations. There is no such thing as a unique interpretant for any sign-mark. John From: "Helmut Raulien" Jon, Cecile, List, Jon, in your first paragraph you wrote about inference. I agree. Therefore I find it a bit problematic to say, that the sign determines the interpretant, because the sign doesn´t infere, it is the interpreter, who does the inference. But ok, I guess we might say, that Peirce prescinds the semiosis from the interpreter, so, ok, the flow of determination goes from the sign to the interpretant, because it is the interpreter, who receives the sign, and then forms the interpretant, and, if you donot mention the interpreter, well, then you just skip her/him/it. But I think, that this skipping is only justified, if the interpretant is true, because then it (the interpretant) is a subset of the final interpretant, and not a misinterpretation. But: Can we take that for granted? Talking about precission: The sign anyway is prescinded from the, in reality not reducible, sign triad. If we say, that something prescinded determines something else, this determination too is prescinded. Prescission might be seen as an error, so this is error propagation. That, i guess, is the reason, why this whole determination affair is somehow confusing. It surely is, if we take "determination" too literally, I mean, if we take it too muchly for real. Do you agree? You see, I have been trying very hard to not contradict Peirce. Best, Helmut _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)
Jon, Cecile, List, Jon, in your first paragraph you wrote about inference. I agree. Therefore I find it a bit problematic to say, that the sign determines the interpretant, because the sign doesn´t infere, it is the interpreter, who does the inference. But ok, I guess we might say, that Peirce prescinds the semiosis from the interpreter, so, ok, the flow of determination goes from the sign to the interpretant, because it is the interpreter, who receives the sign, and then forms the interpretant, and, if you donot mention the interpreter, well, then you just skip her/him/it. But I think, that this skipping is only justified, if the interpretant is true, because then it (the interpretant) is a subset of the final interpretant, and not a misinterpretation. But: Can we take that for granted? Talking about precission: The sign anyway is prescinded from the, in reality not reducible, sign triad. If we say, that something prescinded determines something else, this determination too is prescinded. Prescission might be seen as an error, so this is error propagation. That, i guess, is the reason, why this whole determination affair is somehow confusing. It surely is, if we take "determination" too literally, I mean, if we take it too muchly for real. Do you agree? You see, I have been trying very hard to not contradict Peirce. Best, Helmut Gesendet: Mittwoch, 24. Januar 2024 um 00:06 Uhr Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" An: "Peirce-L" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908) Cécile, List: CC: It seems to me that there are lots of objects everywhere and they don't get to begin the process of semiotic determination. Objects can only take part in the process of semiotic determination insofar as they are referred to by a sign for an interpretant. I prefer to say that something only serves as the object (or interpretant) of a sign within the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating. Nevertheless, it is always the object that determines the sign to determine the interpretant, not the sign that determines the object to serve as such. "In its relation to the Object, the Sign is passive; that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon the Sign, the Object remaining unaffected" (EP 2:544n22, 1906). Moreover, the object is logically prior to the sign--"the essential difference there is between the nature of an object and that of an interpretant ... is that the former antecedes, while the latter succeeds the sign" (EP 2:410, 1907). Just as reasoning moves from the premisses through an inference to the conclusion, and time flows from the past through the present toward the future, semiosis always proceeds in one direction--from the object through the sign to the interpretant. CC: There's only signs in a semiosis. Indeed, as I have said before, I conceive the entire universe as a semiosic continuum, and "a continuum is that of which every part has itself parts of the same kind” (CP 6.168, c. 1903-4). We prescind individual signs from it as artifacts of analysis, each of which is determined by its dynamical object. "Every sign stands for an object independent of itself; but it can only be a sign of that object in so far as that object is itself of the nature of a sign or thought" (CP 1.538, 1903). "Thus, it is said to be a necessary result of the analysis that the object represented by the sign, and whose characters are independent of such representation, should itself be of the nature of a sign, so that its characters are not independent of all representation" (EP 2:328, 1904). "The object is something external to and independent of the sign which determines in the sign an element corresponding to itself" (R 145, 1905). The upshot is that although "really being and being represented are very different" (EP 2:303, c. 1901), really being and being representable--hence, likewise being of the nature of a sign--are the same. "The very entelechy of being lies in being representable" (EP 2:324, c. 1901), such that the three Universes of Experience together contain whatever is capable of serving as dynamical objects of signs--"all mere Ideas," "the Brute Actuality of things and facts," and "everything whose Being consists in active power to establish connections between different objects" (CP 6.455, EP 2:435, 1908); or alternatively, "Possibles," "Existents," and "Necessitants" (EP 2:478-479, 1908). CC: It's like saying that the function of a language is to refer to the world (or that we use words to talk about the world), when in fact the function of a language is to refer to our interpretation of the world (we use words to talk about the way we see the world). There is some truth to this, in the sense that a language is a system of symbols
Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)
Cécile, List: CC: It seems to me that there are lots of objects everywhere and they don't get to begin the process of semiotic determination. Objects can only take part in the process of semiotic determination insofar as they are referred to by a sign for an interpretant. I prefer to say that something only *serves *as the object (or interpretant) of a sign *within *the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating. Nevertheless, it is always the object that determines the sign to determine the interpretant, not the sign that determines the object to serve as such. "In its relation to the Object, the Sign is *passive*; that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon the Sign, the Object remaining unaffected" (EP 2:544n22, 1906). Moreover, the object is logically prior to the sign--"the essential difference there is between the nature of an object and that of an interpretant ... is that the former antecedes, while the latter succeeds the sign" (EP 2:410, 1907). Just as reasoning moves from the premisses through an inference to the conclusion, and time flows from the past through the present toward the future, semiosis always proceeds in one direction--from the object through the sign to the interpretant. CC: There's only signs in a semiosis. Indeed, as I have said before, I conceive the entire universe as a semiosic continuum, and "a continuum is that of which every part has itself parts of the same kind” (CP 6.168, c. 1903-4). We prescind *individual *signs from it as artifacts of analysis, each of which is determined by *its *dynamical object. "Every sign stands for an object independent of itself; but it can only be a sign of that object in so far as that object is itself of the nature of a sign or thought" (CP 1.538, 1903). "Thus, it is said to be a necessary result of the analysis that the object represented by the sign, and whose characters are independent of such representation, should itself be of the nature of a sign, so that its characters are not independent of *all *representation" (EP 2:328, 1904). "The object is something external to and independent of the sign which determines in the sign an element corresponding to itself" (R 145, 1905). The upshot is that although "*really being* and *being represented* are very different" (EP 2:303, c. 1901), really being and being *representable*--hence, likewise being of the nature of a sign--are the same. "The very entelechy of being lies in being representable" (EP 2:324, c. 1901), such that the three Universes of Experience together contain whatever is capable of serving as dynamical objects of signs--"all mere Ideas," "the Brute Actuality of things and facts," and "everything whose Being consists in active power to establish connections between different objects" (CP 6.455, EP 2:435, 1908); or alternatively, "Possibles," "Existents," and "Necessitants" (EP 2:478-479, 1908). CC: It's like saying that the function of a language is to refer to the world (or that we use words to talk about the world), when in fact the function of a language is to refer to our interpretation of the world (we use words to talk about the way we see the world). There is some truth to this, in the sense that a *language* is a system of symbols, and therefore relies on established habits of interpretation to maintain the relations between words and their objects. However, I would argue that it is very much the function of *signs* more generally--including indices and icons, as well as symbols--to refer to the world, as well as signify facts about it. After all, if the *semiosic synechism* that I sketch above is correct, then signs *comprise *the world, although not in the reductionist sense of being the fundamental units from which it is built up. Instead, the whole is ontologically prior to its parts (https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHPTC-2). CSP: The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe. ... The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe *qua *fact, will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. The "Truth," the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign. (EP 2:304, c. 1901) CSP: [T]he Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities play in an argument, that they of course play in the Universe, that Universe being precisely an argument. (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194, 1903) CSP: There is a science of semeiotics whose results no more afford room for differences of opinion than do those of
Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)
Cécile, Edwina, Jon, List, James Liszka made an important observation about Peirce's classification of signs: “the theory is more complex than the phenomenon it hopes to explain." Since Peirce himself was constantly rewriting and revising the details, we can't be sure what he would have written if he had a few more years to write. And we have no right to claim that anything we (or anybody else) would write is what Peirce would approve. Peirce's correspondence with Lady Welby is an important key to almost everything he wrote after 1903. Up to 1903, his writings about phenomenology followed abstract issues in a style influenced by Kant -- even on issues where he differed from or went beyond Kant. But after he read Welby's book on significs and began his correspondence with her, his writings on phaneroscopy are very different from anything he had written about phenomenology. They are more concrete and address issues they are both discussing in their letters. Please reread the excerpts from letters to Lady Welby in EP2, pp 477 ff. Note how tentative and uncertain he is about those issues. On p. 483, "The ten divisions appear to me to be all Trichotomies; but it is possible that some of them are not properly so. Of these Ten Trichotomies, I have a clear apprehension of some (which I mark...), and unsatisfactory and doubtful notion of others (which I mark ...), and a tolerable but not thoroughly tried conception of others (which I mark ... for ...), almost clear, for ... hardly better." (The Greek letters do not copy properly.) On p. 488, he writes as if he is not sure of himself: "From the summer of 1905 to the same time in 1906,1 devoted much study to my ten trichotomies of signs. It is time I reverted to the subject, as I know I could now make it much clearer. But I dare say some of my former names are better than those I now use If Peirce is unsure of how to proceed, we cannot assume that we know better than he did. Any attempt to say anything beyond what Peirce wrote is an opinion of the person who does the writing. It may be better, it may be worse. But all we can say is that it is not what Peirce wrote. Nobody can claim that their opinion is what Peirce intended. On p. 490, he admits "I don't know whether these trichotomies will suggest anything to you or not. No doubt you [Welby] have studied relations to Interpretants in some directions much further than I.[...] In summary, anything not written by Peirce himself is the opinion of the person who writes it.Nobody can claim that their summary, paraphrase, or extension is anything that Peirce intended.And even writings that Peirce intended on one occasion may be something he later rejected or restated in a different way. Fundamental principle: Any comment about anything Peirce wrote, is a personal opinion of the author. Other people may have good reasons for disagreeing -- or not. That's why we need open-ended discussions, especially about topics that Peirce himself was not clear about. However, there are some subjects -- in mathematics and mathematical logic and in experimental sciences -- where developments during the past century have gone far beyond Peirce. But even in those areas, Peirce has important points to add, and experts in those fields often agree that Peirce was right. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)
Cécile, List: CC: Would it be too much of a stretch, in the interest of clarity (while still respecting the essential nature of Peirce's work), to consider the following equivalences as relatively acceptable? This is precisely the mistake that I have been trying to help you avoid. (1) below is true, but (2) and (3) are false. Icon/index/symbol is is the 2nd trichotomy in 1903 and the 4th trichotomy in 1908, while abstractive/concretive/collective is the 3rd trichotomy in 1908. Rheme/dicent/argument is the 3rd trichotomy in 1908 and the 9th trichotomy in 1908--generalized to seme/pheme/delome (see CP 5.438, 1906)--while gratific/actuous/temperative is the 8th trichotomy in 1908. Again, the fundamental difference here is that the 2nd and 3rd trichotomies in 1903 are for the sign's *relations *to its (dynamical) object and (final) interpretant, while the 1st and 3rd trichotomies in the 1908 diagram are for the dynamical object and final interpretant *themselves *(as correlates). CC: If this is not too far-fetched, then the rhematic indexical legisign (321 in the 1903 taxonomy) is relatively similar to the collective gratific token (321 in the 1908 diagram), isn't it? No, the only way that a rhematic indexical *legisign *(1903) can be a collective gratific *token* (1908) is if the latter happens to be a rhematic indexical *sinsign *that is a replica of the former (CP 2.259, EP 2:294). A legisign is a type, not a token; an index can be a concretive, not just a collective; and a rheme is not necessarily a gratific, unless the S-FI trichotomy comes *before *the FI trichotomy, which seems unlikely since it is reasonable to expect each relation trichotomy to come *after *the ones for its constituent correlates. Regards, Jon On Mon, Jan 22, 2024 at 3:52 PM Cécile Cosculluela < cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr> wrote: > Jon, List, > > Would it be too much of a stretch, in the interest of clarity (while still > respecting the essential nature of Peirce's work), to consider the > following equivalences as relatively acceptable? > > 1) Regarding the sign (or representamen) itself: qualisign / sinsign / > legisign are essentially of the same nature as tone / token / type. > 2) Regarding the sign (or representamen)'s dyadic relation to its > object: icon / index / symbol are essentially of the same nature as > abstractive / concretive / collective (CP 8.366). > 3) Regarding the sign (or representamen)'s triadic relation to its > interpretant via its object: rheme / dicisign / argument are essentially of > the same nature as gratific / to produce action / to produce self-control > (CP 8.372). > > If this is not too far-fetched, then the rhematic indexical legisign (321 > in the 1903 taxonomy) is relatively similar to the collective gratific > token (321 in the 1908 diagram), isn't it? > > Best regards, > > -- > *Cécile Cosculluela* > MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA > Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones > *Associate Professor of English as a Second Language* > *Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation* > > -- > *De: *"Jon Alan Schmidt" > *À: *"Peirce-L" > *Envoyé: *Lundi 22 Janvier 2024 22:13:05 > *Objet: *Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908) > > Cécile, List: > > 321 in the 1903 taxonomy (R 799) is a rhematic indexical legisign. The > sign itself is a general law (3 for legisign), its dyadic *relation *to > its object is existential (2 for indexical), and its dyadic *relation *to > its interpretant is a qualitative possibility (1 for rhematic). > > 321 in the 1908 diagram (CP 8.376/EP 2:491) is a collective gratific > token. The dynamical object *itself *is a necessitant (3 for collective), > the sign itself is an existent (2 for token), and the final interpretant > *itself > *is a possible (1 for gratific). > > In both cases, Peirce's "rule of determination" (EP 2:491) is such that > each successive digit always must be equal to or less than its predecessor. > Consequently, there is no class 223 in either taxonomy--the dicent > indexical legisign is 322 in the 1903 taxonomy as explicitly shown in R > 799, while 322 in the 1908 taxonomy is a collective actuous token. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Jan 22, 2024 at 2:55 PM Cécile Cosculluela < > cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr> wrote: > >> Thank you Edwina. I'd like to ask another question relative to your third >> point: >> >> "3] Peirce’s outline in 2.264 of the ten classes begins with the >> Interpretant relation, then the Object
Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)
Cécile, List: On the contrary ... - The 1st trichotomy in 1903 (sign itself) is also the 1st trichotomy in 1908 (sign itself). - The 2nd trichotomy in 1903 (sign's *relation *to its object) is the 4th trichotomy in 1908 (sign's relation to its *dynamical *object). - The 3rd trichotomy in 1903 (sign's *relation *to its interpretant) is the 9th trichotomy in 1908 (sign's relation to its *normal/final* interpretant). However, the 1st and 3rd trichotomies in the 1908 triangular diagram are *not *the 2nd and 3rd trichotomies in the 1903 taxonomy, *nor *the 4th and 9th trichotomies in the 1908 taxonomy. - The 1st trichotomy in the diagram is the 3rd trichotomy overall (dynamical object *itself*). - The 2nd trichotomy in the diagram is the 1st trichotomy overall (sign itself). - The 3rd trichotomy in the diagram is the 8th trichotomy overall (normal/final interpretant *itself*). Peirce's numbering of the ten trichotomies in CP 8.344/EP 2:482-483 and EP 2:483-490 is *not *their proper logical order for ascertaining sign classes in accordance with his "rule of determination" (EP 2:481). We know from the 1903 taxonomy that 1st (S) comes before 4th (DO-S), which comes before 9th (S-FI). We know from the triangular diagram that 3rd (DO) comes before 1st (S), which comes before 8th (FI). We know from EP 2:481 that 3rd (DO) comes before 2nd (IO), which comes before 1st (S), which comes before all three interpretants--8th (FI), 6th (DI), and 5th (II), although there is ongoing debate over whether "destinate" and "explicit" correspond to "final" and "immediate" (my view) or vice-versa. And we know from a 1904 letter to Lady Welby (CP 8.338) that 9th (S-FI) comes before 7th (S-DI). In summary, we know that a partial logical order of the trichotomies is 3rd (DO), 2nd (IO), 1st (S), 4th (DO-S), 9th (S-FI), 7th (S-DI). We do not know for sure where to insert the three interpretant trichotomies--5th (II), 6th (DI), 8th (FI)--except that they must come after 1st (S). We also do not know for sure where to insert 10th (DO-S-FI), although Peirce's corresponding names in some versions (abducent/inducent/deducent) suggest that it is a division of arguments, so it presumably comes after 9th (S-FI). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Jan 22, 2024 at 3:17 PM Cécile Cosculluela < cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr> wrote: > Thank you Jon for clarifying those points. I'd like to make sure I > understand correctly. Would you please confirm that the 1st, 4th, and 9th > respects according to which the chief divisions of signs are determined in > CP 8.344 are not essentially the same ones as the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd > trichotomies respectively in CP 2.244, 247 & 250 ? > > -- > *Cécile Cosculluela* > MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA > Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones > *Associate Professor of English as a Second Language* > *Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation* > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)
Jon, List, Would it be too much of a stretch, in the interest of clarity (while still respecting the essential nature of Peirce's work), to consider the following equivalences as relatively acceptable? 1) Regarding the sign (or representamen) itself: qualisign / sinsign / legisign are essentially of the same nature as tone / token / type. 2) Regarding the sign (or representamen)'s dyadic relation to its object: icon / index / symbol are essentially of the same nature as abstractive / concretive / collective (CP 8.366). 3) Regarding the sign (or representamen)'s triadic relation to its interpretant via its object: rheme / dicisign / argument are essentially of the same nature as gratific / to produce action / to produce self-control (CP 8.372). If this is not too far-fetched, then the rhematic indexical legisign (321 in the 1903 taxonomy) is relatively similar to the collective gratific token (321 in the 1908 diagram), isn't it? Best regards, Cécile Cosculluela MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones Associate Professor of English as a Second Language Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation De: "Jon Alan Schmidt" À: "Peirce-L" Envoyé: Lundi 22 Janvier 2024 22:13:05 Objet: Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908) Cécile, List: 321 in the 1903 taxonomy (R 799) is a rhematic indexical legisign. The sign itself is a general law (3 for legisign), its dyadic relation to its object is existential (2 for indexical), and its dyadic relation to its interpretant is a qualitative possibility (1 for rhematic). 321 in the 1908 diagram (CP 8.376/EP 2:491) is a collective gratific token. The dynamical object itself is a necessitant (3 for collective), the sign itself is an existent (2 for token), and the final interpretant itself is a possible (1 for gratific). In both cases, Peirce's "rule of determination" (EP 2:491) is such that each successive digit always must be equal to or less than its predecessor. Consequently, there is no class 223 in either taxonomy--the dicent indexical legisign is 322 in the 1903 taxonomy as explicitly shown in R 799, while 322 in the 1908 taxonomy is a collective actuous token. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian [ http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt | www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt ] / [ http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt | twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt ] On Mon, Jan 22, 2024 at 2:55 PM Cécile Cosculluela < [ mailto:cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr | cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr ] > wrote: Thank you Edwina. I'd like to ask another question relative to your third point: "3] Peirce’s outline in 2.264 of the ten classes begins with the Interpretant relation, then the Object Relation..endiing with the Representamen. So - 223 = a Dicent Indexical Legisign. Class VI is a Rhematic Indexical Legisign 321 - and it starts with the Interpretant [rhematic] ..then the Object Relation and finally- the Representamen. So, the number 3 refers to the Representamen." 321 is indeed the Rhematic Indexical Legisign according to CP 2.264, which starts with the Interpretant, then the Object, and finally the Representamen. But doesn't 321 according to CP 8.376 start with the object, then the Representamen, and finally the Interpretant? Cécile Cosculluela MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones Associate Professor of English as a Second Language Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)
Cécile, List: 321 in the 1903 taxonomy (R 799) is a rhematic indexical legisign. The sign itself is a general law (3 for legisign), its dyadic *relation *to its object is existential (2 for indexical), and its dyadic *relation *to its interpretant is a qualitative possibility (1 for rhematic). 321 in the 1908 diagram (CP 8.376/EP 2:491) is a collective gratific token. The dynamical object *itself *is a necessitant (3 for collective), the sign itself is an existent (2 for token), and the final interpretant *itself *is a possible (1 for gratific). In both cases, Peirce's "rule of determination" (EP 2:491) is such that each successive digit always must be equal to or less than its predecessor. Consequently, there is no class 223 in either taxonomy--the dicent indexical legisign is 322 in the 1903 taxonomy as explicitly shown in R 799, while 322 in the 1908 taxonomy is a collective actuous token. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Jan 22, 2024 at 2:55 PM Cécile Cosculluela < cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr> wrote: > Thank you Edwina. I'd like to ask another question relative to your third > point: > > "3] Peirce’s outline in 2.264 of the ten classes begins with the > Interpretant relation, then the Object Relation..endiing with the > Representamen. So - 223 = a Dicent Indexical Legisign. > > Class VI is a Rhematic Indexical Legisign 321 - and it starts with the > Interpretant [rhematic] ..then the Object Relation and finally- the > Representamen. So, the number 3 refers to the Representamen." > > 321 is indeed the Rhematic Indexical Legisign according to CP 2.264, which > starts with the Interpretant, then the Object, and finally the > Representamen. But doesn't 321 according to CP 8.376 start with the object, > then the Representamen, and finally the Interpretant? > > -- > *Cécile Cosculluela* > MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA > Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones > *Associate Professor of English as a Second Language* > *Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation* > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)
Cécile, List: I should add that the three-digit sign class identifiers in manuscript R 799 (undated by Robin) are for the 1903 taxonomy as indicated by the accompanying text, not the (abbreviated) 1908 taxonomy as shown in the triangular diagram. Again, in R 799, the first number is for the sign itself, the second is for its *relation *to its object, and the third is for its *relation *to its interpretant; while in CP 8.376/EP 2:491, the first number is for the object *itself*, the second is for the sign itself, and the third is for the interpretant *itself*. Regards, Jon On Mon, Jan 22, 2024 at 1:21 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > Cécile, List: > > As Peirce states in the accompanying text, the triangular diagram in CP > 8.376 (also EP 2:491) indicates ten sign classes that can be obtained from > three trichotomies--one for the object, one for the interpretant, and one > for the sign itself. It is very important to recognize two facts about > this. First, he does not stipulate the *order *of these trichotomies for > obtaining the ten classes; but in accordance with what I call the "rule of > determination" (EP 2:481), the numbers in the diagram are *only *consistent > with it being first the one for the object (upper left), then the one for > the sign (bottom), and finally the one for the interpretant (upper right). > Second, these are *not *the same three trichotomies that he uses to > obtain ten classes of signs in 1903; those are first the one for the > representamen *itself* (qualisign/sinsign/legisign), then the one for its > *dyadic relation > *to its object (icon/index/symbol), and finally the one for its *dyadic > relation > *to its interpretant (rheme/dicisign/argument). > > Consequently, it is a mistake to assign *any *of the 1903 class names to *any > *of the ten numbered combinations in the 1908 diagram--they are very > different taxonomies. After all, the 1908 diagram is in a postscript > written just three days after Peirce spells out *ten *trichotomies (EP > 2:479-480) from which *66 *sign classes can be obtained, once their > proper logical order is established--the subject of ongoing investigation > and considerable debate by Peirce scholars, because he never fully worked > it out himself. Six of the ten trichotomies are for the correlates > themselves--the sign (now synonymous with representamen), its two objects, > and its three interpretants. Three are for the sign's external dyadic > relations--to its dynamical object, its dynamical interpretant, and its > final interpretant. The last is for the sign's genuine triadic relation to > its dynamical object and its final interpretant. > > If we take the three trichotomies in the 1908 diagram as being for the > *genuine > *correlates--the dynamical object (abstractive/concretive/collective), > the sign itself (tone/token/type), and the final interpretant > (gratific/actuous=to produce action/temperative=to produce > self-control)--then the ten classes that result would be the following, > from left to right and from bottom to top. > >1. 333 - Collective Temperative Type >2. 332 - Collective Actuous Type >3. 331 - Collective Gratific Type >4. 322 - Collective Actuous Token >5. 321 - Collective Gratific Token >6. 311 - Collective Gratific Tone >7. 222 - Concretive Actuous Token >8. 221 - Concretive Gratific Token >9. 211 - Concretive Gratific Tone >10. 111 - Abstractive Gratific Tone > > Peirce names the 1903 classes in reverse order of the > trichotomies--interpretant relation, then object relation, then sign > itself--while my suggested names here correspond to dynamical object, then > final interpretant, then sign itself. The 1903 taxonomy has one class of > qualisigns, three classes of sinsigns, and six classes of legisigns; but > this (abbreviated) 1908 taxonomy has three classes of tones, four classes > of tokens, and three classes of types--again, the two taxonomies are very > different. > > In any case, I have come to agree with James Liszka ( > https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2018-0089) that increasingly elaborate > classifications of *individual *signs result from a "reductionist > approach to sign analysis that loses the holistic and integrative aspects > of its triadic character," with the problematic outcome that “the theory is > more complex than the phenomenon it hopes to explain." As he proposes, "the > remedy is to re-emphasize the processual and functional view of semiosis, > rather than to focus on particular classes of signs." Accordingly, I > advocate conceiving the entire universe as one immense sign--a vast > semiosic continuum in which the whole is ontologically prior to its parts, > which are likewise signs but indefinite unless and until deliberately > marked off for a particular purpose. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >
Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)
Cécile, List: As Peirce states in the accompanying text, the triangular diagram in CP 8.376 (also EP 2:491) indicates ten sign classes that can be obtained from three trichotomies--one for the object, one for the interpretant, and one for the sign itself. It is very important to recognize two facts about this. First, he does not stipulate the *order *of these trichotomies for obtaining the ten classes; but in accordance with what I call the "rule of determination" (EP 2:481), the numbers in the diagram are *only *consistent with it being first the one for the object (upper left), then the one for the sign (bottom), and finally the one for the interpretant (upper right). Second, these are *not *the same three trichotomies that he uses to obtain ten classes of signs in 1903; those are first the one for the representamen *itself* (qualisign/sinsign/legisign), then the one for its *dyadic relation *to its object (icon/index/symbol), and finally the one for its *dyadic relation *to its interpretant (rheme/dicisign/argument). Consequently, it is a mistake to assign *any *of the 1903 class names to *any *of the ten numbered combinations in the 1908 diagram--they are very different taxonomies. After all, the 1908 diagram is in a postscript written just three days after Peirce spells out *ten *trichotomies (EP 2:479-480) from which *66 *sign classes can be obtained, once their proper logical order is established--the subject of ongoing investigation and considerable debate by Peirce scholars, because he never fully worked it out himself. Six of the ten trichotomies are for the correlates themselves--the sign (now synonymous with representamen), its two objects, and its three interpretants. Three are for the sign's external dyadic relations--to its dynamical object, its dynamical interpretant, and its final interpretant. The last is for the sign's genuine triadic relation to its dynamical object and its final interpretant. If we take the three trichotomies in the 1908 diagram as being for the *genuine *correlates--the dynamical object (abstractive/concretive/collective), the sign itself (tone/token/type), and the final interpretant (gratific/actuous=to produce action/temperative=to produce self-control)--then the ten classes that result would be the following, from left to right and from bottom to top. 1. 333 - Collective Temperative Type 2. 332 - Collective Actuous Type 3. 331 - Collective Gratific Type 4. 322 - Collective Actuous Token 5. 321 - Collective Gratific Token 6. 311 - Collective Gratific Tone 7. 222 - Concretive Actuous Token 8. 221 - Concretive Gratific Token 9. 211 - Concretive Gratific Tone 10. 111 - Abstractive Gratific Tone Peirce names the 1903 classes in reverse order of the trichotomies--interpretant relation, then object relation, then sign itself--while my suggested names here correspond to dynamical object, then final interpretant, then sign itself. The 1903 taxonomy has one class of qualisigns, three classes of sinsigns, and six classes of legisigns; but this (abbreviated) 1908 taxonomy has three classes of tones, four classes of tokens, and three classes of types--again, the two taxonomies are very different. In any case, I have come to agree with James Liszka ( https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2018-0089) that increasingly elaborate classifications of *individual *signs result from a "reductionist approach to sign analysis that loses the holistic and integrative aspects of its triadic character," with the problematic outcome that “the theory is more complex than the phenomenon it hopes to explain." As he proposes, "the remedy is to re-emphasize the processual and functional view of semiosis, rather than to focus on particular classes of signs." Accordingly, I advocate conceiving the entire universe as one immense sign--a vast semiosic continuum in which the whole is ontologically prior to its parts, which are likewise signs but indefinite unless and until deliberately marked off for a particular purpose. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Jan 22, 2024 at 9:22 AM Cécile Cosculluela < cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr> wrote: > Dear all, > > In CP 8.376 (1908), the order in which to read the three numbers > (mentioned in the small triangles that make up the triangle with the ten > classes of signs) is not obvious because they are not written > sequentially on a line. Yet, to respect the logic of phaneroscopic > categories, the only possible order is to start with the object (top left), > then the representamen (bottom), and finally the interpretant (top > right). Not only is this not the order in which Peirce mentions them in > CP 8.376 (where, as underlined in the attached document), he mentions the > object, then the interpretant, and then the representamen that he calls > « the sign itself »), but more
