List:
I wish to clarify my intended meaning.
> On Sep 14, 2018, at 11:07 AM, Jerry LR Chandler
> wrote:
>
> Semantics alone is merely philosophy abused.
>
I simply mean that mother nature (including humanity) is a union of units,
everything is part of the whole, that is, not alone.
>
List:
> On Sep 13, 2018, at 10:33 AM, John F Sowa wrote:
>
> But
> everything that is imaginable can be described by some theory
> of pure mathematics.
How can one describe a “feeling” in pure mathematical terms?
I will answer my own question.
Simply quote W.O Quine:
“To be is to be a
John:
The origin of the six “bullets” listed below is unclear.
Are these your personal evaluations of CSP texts?
I ask because it appears to me that # 2 is simply false.
The chemical alphabet is finite.
Cheers
Jerry
>
> On Thu 13/09/18 10:03 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net
>
John, list,
First, I wish to thank John for his comments to my earlier post to the
list. I agreed with all, but one point. Which consist in an, to my mind,
unwarranted focus on classifications. Peirce in several occasions wrote
about KINDS. (Should be easy enought to google). - Kinds (as a
John S., List:
JFS: I would also add that phenomenology is not a normative science. But
Peirce used logic to analyze and specify the phenomenological categories.
That application of logic is prior to normative science, and it establishes
the theory of semiotic.
I agree that phenomology is not
Jerry R, Helmut, and Jon AS,
This note is rather long, but each of your questions requires
a lot of explanation supported by quotations.
JR
But my reservation about not treating bacteria as quasi-mind remains.
How is this even possible?
I'll answer that question with another question: A
John,
I see that you still put semiotics beneath phenomenology.
My question: if speculative grammar, with alternative name semiotics is not the
first of the normative logic branch anymore, what occupies this spot instead?
You seem to argue that because semiotic is not normative it cannot be
John S., List:
JAS: Peirce repeatedly made it very clear that he considered Logic as
Semeiotic to be a Normative Science, not a branch of phenomenology.
JFS: No. He explicitly said that logic is a branch of mathematics.
Please provide a citation for this claim. The first branch of
John, list,
linguistics can only be better developed than biosemiotics, if it is not a branch of it´s, i.e. if there are inanimate things that speak. Logic is only a ready, unchanged by new experience science, if it is not based on words, like the greek root meaning both suggests. Mathematics is
Dear John, list,
You quotes Margolis:
The growth, reproduction, and communication of these moving, alliance-
forming bacteria become isomorphic with our thought, with our happiness,
our sensitivities and stimulations.
I agree with this, too.
But my reservation about not treating bacteria
Edwina, Jerry R, Jon AS, and Jerry LRC,
Peirce answered your questions. I like his 1903 *outline* because
it's a clean and simple summary of everything he wrote about the
sciences and their interrelationships. But as an outline, it omits
nearly all the details.
ET
I wonder if this list will
Edwina, list,
I apologize, I was just provocating by reversing the classification of logic as cenoscopis, and biology as idioscopic. I agree that both are or can be both (if that is what you meant) Sorry!
14. September 2018 um 18:35 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
Helmut, list
Could you
Helmut, list
Could you explain to me the functional difference, to a research
program, whether you define it as cenoscopic [study of the data
already acquired] vs idioscopic [discovers new phenomena]. And what
is 'language-based idioscopic' in biology?
If you are a
Jerry LR Chandler, list,
Yes! I both humbly (just pretending?) and provocatingly ask: Is biosemiotics cenoscopic, and language-based logic idioscopic?
Best,
Helmut
14. September 2018 um 18:07 Uhr
"Jerry LR Chandler" wrote:
List:
The recent post by Jerry Rhee and Edwina
List:
The recent post by Jerry Rhee and Edwina deserve deep perusal.
In spirit , these posts parallel my own feelings.
Semantics alone is merely philosophy abused.
Mathematics alone is not even logic.
In my view, CSP focused on language as a path of syntaxies to arguments that
illuminated
Gary F., John S., List:
I agree with Gary F.--the whole point of Peirce's three phenomenological
Categories is to identify the *irreducible *elements of the Phaneron, only *one
*of which is mediation (including representation). The other two--quality
and brute reaction--are not Signs themselves,
Dear John, list,
My question was a follow-up to your own question on where to place semiotic
in CSPsemiotic.jpg.
Question: Where is semeiotic?
To which, you said,
As a formal theory, it would be classified with formal logic
under mathematics. But semeiotic is also an applied science when
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}John, list
I fully agree with your admiration for Peircean classification. I'm
not against it. I'm not saying that his classifications don't cover
everything!
My point - which you don't seem to get, is
On 9/13/2018 11:27 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
How do you classify biosemiotic using your scheme?
Very simply. Every living thing, from a bacterium on up, has
a quasi-mind with a phaneron that contains the kinds of signs
it recognizes and responds to.
When Peirce said "present to the mind in any
John, you wrote, “If Peirce ever said that there are things in the mind, in
thought, or in the phaneron that are not signs, I'd like to see the quotation.”
Peirce to James, 1904: “Percepts are signs for psychology; but they are not so
for phenomenology” (CP 8.300)
On the “ultimate logical
John, list,
How do you classify biosemiotic using your scheme?
If there is no room for it, then what good is the classification?
Thanks,
Jerry R
On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 10:05 PM, John F Sowa wrote:
> Edwina and Jon AS,
>
> ET
>
>> My concern is that this list seems to focus almost
Edwina and Jon AS,
ET
My concern is that this list seems to focus almost exclusively
on debates about terminology and classification of research areas,
and doesn't venture outside the seminar room into the mud and dirt
of the real matter-as-mind world.
Peirce had a long career in science
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}John, list
Exactly - 'all possible theories about anything [ET: and I'd add
everything] are related". And yes "all possible modes of inquiry are
interrelated".
And this means, I suggest, that we can't
On 9/13/2018 11:10 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
What's the point of these seminar-room analyses of terminology, of
classification of areas of study? Surely it can't mean that one is
barred from studying X within the area of Y because X is strictly
classified in another area of re
It shows how
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}John, list
Thanks for your, as usual, clear and reasoned outline. But I have a
question.
What's the point of these seminar-room analyses of terminology, of
classification of areas of study? Surely it
Jon AS, Auke, and Jeff BD,
Both subject lines are closely related. For modes of being,
I'll quote Bertrand Russell, whom I rarely cite:
Mathematics may be defined as the subject in which we never know
what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true.
That is a dramatic way
Jerry C., List:
JLRC: Why do you associate this excerpt with Icons, Indices and Symbols?
Because we know from the preceding paragraph that "each kind of sign"
refers specifically to Icon/Index/Symbol.
CSP: All thinking is dialogic in form. Your self of one instant appeals to
your deeper self
List, Jon, Francesco:
> On Sep 11, 2018, at 8:14 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
> wrote:
>
> He also wrote later that the three different forms of thought--corresponding
> to Icons, Indices, and Symbols--are best explained by positing three
> different "modes of metaphysical being."
>
> CSP: You will
Jon, list,
A further thought. You wrote:
JAS: Perhaps I need to reconsider my association of "modes of being" with
metaphysics. However, if instead they belong to phenomenology--since
Peirce said that we can *directly *observe them in the elements of the
Phaneron, and *explicitly *referred to
Jon, Jeff, list,
I'm beginning to imagine that, as we've emphasized in various other
contexts, looking at this matter of the three Universal categories in
phenomenology, logic as semeiotic, and metaphysics from the perspective of
continuity might prove fruitful.
What I'm suggesting is that
Jon S., List,
You say: Perhaps I need to reconsider my association of "modes of being" with
metaphysics
I'd recommend looking at what Peirce says about the role of our implicit
metaphysical principles in shaping the way we see the world. One role of a
theory of metaphysics is to help us
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