hi claudio, I am traveling through the middle of next week, with only my iphone
to hand. that was a rather abbreviated way of explaining categories and would
require supplementation. if it were only a matter of mathematics, that would
suffice, but we are talking about phenomenology, categories
Message -
From: Khadimir
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Saturday, March 17, 2012 12:29 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] a question
Would it not be fair to say that the conscious experience of the immediate
present must always be at least a second? That is the view I hold.
Jason H
Diane, Steven, Jon:
I have tried, but I am not yet happy with these trichotomies concerning
time. However, should ordinary linear time sequencing rather than tenseless
earlier/later relations (so called B-series) be the pivot for their
conception, then, perhaps, actual indexicality (Secondness)
Well, in terms of the quality-fact-law trichotomy, if the present is pure
quality, then facts only calcify out of that flux of pure qualities once the
present has passed.
-m
At 11:56 AM -0400 3/14/12, Diane Stephens wrote:
In the book Semiotics I by Donald Thomas, he includes a chart which
Dear Diane,
I agree with those that question whether Peirce would be comfortable using
notions of linear time, as Jon's quote highlights.
In the context of time conceptions (for me, time is simply a way of speaking) I
would prefer:
1st = the immediate experience
2nd = the
Jason,
Universal is an ambiguous word sometimes used to translate Aristotle's
_katholos_ even when Aristotle means merely that which in everyday English is
called general, something true of more than one object.
Some philosophers say universals and particulars where Peirce (with his
better
Dear Jason,
I've published a paper which distinguishes between 'universals' as
discussed in contemporary Australian metaphysics (most particularly in
the work of D.M. Armstrong), and 'generals' as discussed by Peirce.
Here is the abstract:
This paper contrasts the scholastic realists of David
