[peirce-l] Meeting Peirceans in New York, blogs

[Catherine Legg]

For my part, I just want to say I enjoyed the SAAP session on Richard Robin
very much, and it was particularly lovely to meet in person for the very
first time those legendary behind-the-scenes supporters of Arisbe and the
Peirce-L: Gary Richmond and Ben Udell! Guys, I never realised before quite
how much you were doing to keep alive the Peirce online community,
particularly since Joe's passing. Thank you. I know the work you do comes
from a genuine passion for Peirce's ideas.

2 more members of this list who I happen to know have philosophical blogs
are Jason Hills and Tom Gollier. I wonder whether they might be persuaded
to share the URLs with everyone...:-)

Cheers, Cathy

On Mon, Mar 19, 2012 at 8:24 AM, Gary Richmond wrote:

> Ben, List,
>
> I hope to 'file' a brief report to the list on SAAP in the next few days,
> but wanted to quickly follow up on your remark concerning the philosophical
> "sweethearts" attending the conference, at least some of those whose work
> many list members may be familiar with including, Tom Short, Robert Lane,
> Jaime Nubiola, and Cathy Legg. I did not get the opportunity to meet him
> personally, but was able to ask Richard Bernstein a question at the Keynote
> Panel organized to honor him and his work. He is clearly a sweetheart too.
> Yes, philosophers can be really nice people!
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
> On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 4:14 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
>
>>  Jon, list,
>>
>> Let's toss Michael Shapiro's blog a link while we're at it.
>>
>> Language Lore http://www.languagelore.net/. Shapiro persistently
>> brings a pragmatist's perspective to linguistics.
>>
>> I actually ventured into the S.A.A.P. session in honor of Richard Robin
>> on Thursday and met some of the people whom I slightly know from online.
>> Contrary to the reputations of philosophers in general as "mean," they were
>> a bunch of what Gary Richmond called "sweethearts." One person
>> self-identified as a linguist and made an interesting statement (but I
>> wasn't taking notes). I wondered whether it was Michael Shapiro. Later I
>> realized that I had omitted Shapiro's five-volume _*Peirce Seminar Series
>> *_ from the Arisbe page of journals and book series. I've added it now
>> http://www.cspeirce.com/journals.htm
>>
>> Some blogs and home pages are listed at
>> http://www.cspeirce.com/individs.htm
>>
>> The blogs are those of some peirce-l members and, I've notice, aren't
>> always focused on Peirce, but, well, they're blogs, we're not all focused
>> on Peirce all the time.
>>
>> If anybody has a more-or-less Peirce-related blog or a home page that
>> s/he would like to see added, please let me know.
>>
>> Best, Ben
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> From: "Jon Awbrey"
>> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
>> Sent: Sunday, March 18, 2012 1:40 PM
>> Subject: [peirce-l] Inquiry and Analogy in Aristotle and Peirce
>>
>> Peircers,
>>
>> A recent blog post by Michael Shapiro on “The Pragmatistic Force of
>> Analogy in Language Structure”
>> reminded me of some work I started on “Inquiry and Analogy in Aristotle
>> and Peirce”, parts of which
>> may be of service in our discussions of the “Categorical Aspects of
>> Abduction, Deduction, Induction”.
>>
>> Here is the link --
>>
>> •
>> http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Papers/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> --
>>
>> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
>> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
>> mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey
>> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
>> word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/
>> word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
>>
>> -
>> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L
>> listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to
>> lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body
>> of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to
>> PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
>
>
>
> -
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Re: [peirce-l] Inquiry and Analogy in Aristotle and Peirce

[Gary Richmond]

Ben, List,

I hope to 'file' a brief report to the list on SAAP in the next few days,
but wanted to quickly follow up on your remark concerning the philosophical
"sweethearts" attending the conference, at least some of those whose work
many list members may be familiar with including, Tom Short, Robert Lane,
Jaime Nubiola, and Cathy Legg. I did not get the opportunity to meet him
personally, but was able to ask Richard Bernstein a question at the Keynote
Panel organized to honor him and his work. He is clearly a sweetheart too.
Yes, philosophers can be really nice people!

Best,

Gary

On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 4:14 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

>  Jon, list,
>
> Let's toss Michael Shapiro's blog a link while we're at it.
>
> Language Lore http://www.languagelore.net/. Shapiro persistently brings a
> pragmatist's perspective to linguistics.
>
> I actually ventured into the S.A.A.P. session in honor of Richard Robin on
> Thursday and met some of the people whom I slightly know from online.
> Contrary to the reputations of philosophers in general as "mean," they were
> a bunch of what Gary Richmond called "sweethearts." One person
> self-identified as a linguist and made an interesting statement (but I
> wasn't taking notes). I wondered whether it was Michael Shapiro. Later I
> realized that I had omitted Shapiro's five-volume _*Peirce Seminar Series*_
> from the Arisbe page of journals and book series. I've added it now
> http://www.cspeirce.com/journals.htm
>
> Some blogs and home pages are listed at
> http://www.cspeirce.com/individs.htm
>
> The blogs are those of some peirce-l members and, I've notice, aren't
> always focused on Peirce, but, well, they're blogs, we're not all focused
> on Peirce all the time.
>
> If anybody has a more-or-less Peirce-related blog or a home page that s/he
> would like to see added, please let me know.
>
> Best, Ben
>
> - Original Message -
> From: "Jon Awbrey"
> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> Sent: Sunday, March 18, 2012 1:40 PM
> Subject: [peirce-l] Inquiry and Analogy in Aristotle and Peirce
>
> Peircers,
>
> A recent blog post by Michael Shapiro on “The Pragmatistic Force of
> Analogy in Language Structure”
> reminded me of some work I started on “Inquiry and Analogy in Aristotle
> and Peirce”, parts of which
> may be of service in our discussions of the “Categorical Aspects of
> Abduction, Deduction, Induction”.
>
> Here is the link --
>
> •
> http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Papers/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> --
>
> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
> mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey
> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/
> word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
>
> -
> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L
> listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to
> lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body
> of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to
> PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

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Re: [peirce-l] a question

[Gary Richmond]

Ben, Gary F, Jason, List,



Thanks for locating that post of mine on time, Ben. I'd hesitated
contributing to this thread because I knew I'd written most of what I
wanted to say regarding Peirce on time & the categories in that post,
but having had no time (!) to hunt it up, I thought I'd postpone
commenting until I had. So, again, much appreciated. 


You highlighted two key points in that earlier message, namely that for
Peirce the instant is a mathematical abstraction, while the minimum of
at least experiential time is the tripartite moment. In that earlier
post I also noted that the vectorial movement of past (2ns) -> present
(1ns) -> future (3ns) paralleled the famous  of path of semiosis whereas
the object (2ns) determines--in Peirce's non-mechanical sense of
'determination' discussed previously on the list--the sign (1ns) for the
interpretant sign (3ns). 


In addition, as both Peirce and Bergson analyze it (and, btw, Peirce
approved of Bergson's analysis of durée in *Time and Free Will* while
finding it unduly complicated), there is an overlap of each moment with
the next so that the *middle* of the the last moment becomes the
*beginning* of the new, etc.).


I should note at once that I see the 6 possible vectors as, perhaps,
more logical than chrono-logical (temporal), although there is a strong
sense of temporality in at least three of them (e.g., for the vector of
process, 1ns -> 3ns -> 2ns, both of Peirce's most frequent examples of
this vector--evolution and inquiry--exhibit a temporal character to some
considerable  extent). 


It also seems to me that there is most likely an interpenetration of
hierarchies of vectorial relationship so that in any given experience
one could analyze more than one genuine trichotomic relation or vector
functioning all-at-once-together. I think something like this may be the
case in consideration of Ben's suggesting that time, being the
quintessential example of continuity for Peirce, might be analyzed
(past/present/future) as comprised of the 2ns, 1ns, and 3ns of
thirdness; and this *might* correspond  to Gary F's notion:


GF: The presence of Firstness is its spontaneity, but Secondness has a
kind of actual ‘in-your-face’ presence too. The force of actuality makes
things and events definite and determinate, and that’s what connects it
with the past (while the future is indeterminate and the present instant
doesn’t exist). But if i were making a chart like that i would put it
like this:

 First - presence 
Second - occurrence 
Third - time


GR: Certainly, the *lived* occurrence does have "a kind of actual
'in-your-face'" character which cannot be denied and which is *not* the
third category. Still, one has to imagine that durée (cf. Peirce's
'moment') implies that the past en*dur*es in the present toward the
future in, for prime example, the evolutionary sense that when a
biological structure which did not previously exist but evolved,
continues to function in the present towards future functioning. As for
the 1ns of presence as it appears in Gary F's chart, those who meditate
(or do a certain kind of phenomenology) might have a sense of his
meaning here. Anyhow, Gary, I'm sure you'll correct me if I'm
misinterpreting you in any of this. 


This thread again reminded me that St. Augustine (a profound analyzer of
time in his own right) once remarked to the effect that time seems such
a simple thing until one begins to reflect on it. Indeed!


Gary R


Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
E202-O
718 482-5700

*** *** *** ***
>>> Benjamin Udell  03/17/12 1:00 PM >>>
Jason, list, 

That's a good question. In the relevant paragraph (CP 7.536, of which I
quoted only the last part), Peirce begins by saying: "It remains to be
shown that this element is the third Kainopythagorean category. All flow
of time involves learning; and all learning involves the flow of time."
The element that he was discussing was a "continuity" which he had just
called a "direct experience" (CP 7.535). (This is also another 'score'
for Gary Richmond in his April 8, 2011 post
http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/6995 to
peirce-l, in which he said "It seems to me that for Peirce being present
means being present to the flow, which flow implies all three
modalities: past, present, and future")

I'm kind of reluctant to go out on a limb right now, having
misinterpreted Peirce's Oct. 12, 1904 letter to Lady Welby and spent a
number of posts cleaning up after myself. My guess is that, in virtue of
their triadic parts in the flow of learning, inference, and
representation and interpretation, all three times are Thirds, with
Secondness, Firstness, and Thirdness strong but not overwhelmingly so in
past, present, and future, respectively. In other words, learning-past
as Secundan Third, learning-present as Priman Third, and learning-future
as Tertian Third. But I have no strong opinion at t

Re: [peirce-l] Inquiry and Analogy in Aristotle and Peirce

[Benjamin Udell]

Jon, list,

Let's toss Michael Shapiro's blog a link while we're at it.

Language Lore http://www.languagelore.net/. Shapiro persistently brings a 
pragmatist's perspective to linguistics.

I actually ventured into the S.A.A.P. session in honor of Richard Robin on 
Thursday and met some of the people whom I slightly know from online. Contrary 
to the reputations of philosophers in general as "mean," they were a bunch of 
what Gary Richmond called "sweethearts." One person self-identified as a 
linguist and made an interesting statement (but I wasn't taking notes). I 
wondered whether it was Michael Shapiro. Later I realized that I had omitted 
Shapiro's five-volume _Peirce Seminar Series_ from the Arisbe page of journals 
and book series. I've added it now http://www.cspeirce.com/journals.htm 

Some blogs and home pages are listed at http://www.cspeirce.com/individs.htm

The blogs are those of some peirce-l members and, I've notice, aren't always 
focused on Peirce, but, well, they're blogs, we're not all focused on Peirce 
all the time.

If anybody has a more-or-less Peirce-related blog or a home page that s/he 
would like to see added, please let me know.

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: "Jon Awbrey" 
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Sent: Sunday, March 18, 2012 1:40 PM 
Subject: [peirce-l] Inquiry and Analogy in Aristotle and Peirce 

Peircers,

A recent blog post by Michael Shapiro on “The Pragmatistic Force of Analogy in 
Language Structure”
reminded me of some work I started on “Inquiry and Analogy in Aristotle and 
Peirce”, parts of which
may be of service in our discussions of the “Categorical Aspects of Abduction, 
Deduction, Induction”.

Here is the link --

• 
http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Papers/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy

Regards,

Jon

-- 

academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey 
inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ 
mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey 
oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey 
word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/ 
word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ 

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[peirce-l] Inquiry and Analogy in Aristotle and Peirce

[Jon Awbrey]

Peircers,

A recent blog post by Michael Shapiro on “The Pragmatistic Force of Analogy in 
Language Structure”
reminded me of some work I started on “Inquiry and Analogy in Aristotle and 
Peirce”, parts of which
may be of service in our discussions of the “Categorical Aspects of Abduction, 
Deduction, Induction”.

Here is the link --

• 
http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Papers/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy

Regards,

Jon

--

academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey
oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/
word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/

-
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Re: [peirce-l] a question

[Stephen C. Rose]

Typically, Wikipedia defines simultaneity in binary terms.  We should fight
back.

All things happen in the present http://ping.fm/H1Ofo


*ShortFormContent at Blogger* 



On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 6:26 AM, Eduardo Forastieri  wrote:

>  Ben, list:
> Thank you for these references on Firstness, Ben, and for reminding us of
> Gary Richmond’s posts; specially for the notion of a “triadic moment”.  It
> does not seem to me as an acquiescence to Kant’s time intuition. I am not
> familiar with Schelling’s ideas on time, yet these Peircean references on
> the *ego*, consciousness and Firstness (with a definite exclusion of the
> notion of the Self) reminds me of some references I gathered on this
> subject long time ago before CD-ROM and hypertext, but that I cherished
> immensely while transcribing: 1.306 and following;  1. 324 and following;
> 5.265 and following [mostly from *Concerning Certain Faculties*] 5.289;
> 5.44; 5. 462; 7.364 and following;  7.531; 7.540; and many others.
> I am most grateful for your recent inklings on this subject and Gary’s,
> and if there is more of Peirce to it (the “triadic moment”), it would be
> more than inklings. Great insights.
> Eduardo Forastieri-Braschi
>
>
> On 3/17/12 1:00 PM, "Benjamin Udell"  wrote:
>
> Jason, list,
>
> That's a good question. In the relevant paragraph (CP 7.536, of which I
> quoted only the last part), Peirce begins by saying: "It remains to be
> shown that this element is the third Kainopythagorean category. All flow of
> time involves learning; and all learning involves the flow of time." The
> element that he was discussing was a "continuity" which he had just called
> a "direct experience" (CP 7.535). (This is also another 'score' for Gary
> Richmond in his April 8, 2011 post
> http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/6995 to
> peirce-l, in which he said "It seems to me that for Peirce being present
> means being present to the flow, which flow implies all three modalities:
> past, present, and future")
>
> I'm kind of reluctant to go out on a limb right now, having misinterpreted
> Peirce's Oct. 12, 1904 letter to Lady Welby and spent a number of posts
> cleaning up after myself. My guess is that, in virtue of their triadic
> parts in the flow of learning, inference, and representation and
> interpretation, all three times are Thirds, with Secondness, Firstness, and
> Thirdness strong but not overwhelmingly so in past, present, and future,
> respectively. In other words, learning-past as Secundan Third,
> learning-present as Priman Third, and learning-future as Tertian Third. But
> I have no strong opinion at this point!
>
> Best, Ben
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Khadimir
> *To:* PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> *Sent:* Saturday, March 17, 2012 12:29 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [peirce-l] a question
>
> Would it not be fair to say that the conscious experience of the immediate
> present must always be at least a second?  That is the view I hold.
>
> Jason H.
>
> On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 11:24 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
>
>
>
>
> Claudio, Eduardo, Diane, Gary R., list,
>
>
> I've found more of Peirce on the present-past-future trichotomy. This
> time,  from Chapter 1 of the _*Minute Logic*_ (1902) manuscript, in  CP
> 2.84 (on the past as Second), 2.85 (on the present as First), and 2.86  (on
> the future as Third). From CP 2.85:
>
>
> Let us now consider what could appear as being in the present  instant
> were it utterly cut off from past and future. We can only guess; for
>  nothing is more occult than the absolute present. There plainly could be
> no  action; and without the possibility of action, to talk of binarity
> would be  to utter words without meaning. There might be a sort of
> consciousness, or  feeling, with no self; and this feeling might have its
> tone. Notwithstanding  what William James has said, I do not think there
> could be any continuity  like space, which, though it may perhaps appear in
> an instant in an educated  mind, I cannot think could do so if it had no
> time at all; and without  continuity parts of the feeling could not be
> synthetized; and therefore  there would be no recognizable parts. There
> could not even be a degree of  vividness of the feeling; for this [the
> degree of vividness] is the  comparative amount of disturbance of general
> consciousness by a feeling. At  any rate, such shall be our hypothesis, and
> whether it is psychologically  true or not is of no consequence. The world
> would be reduced to a quality of  unanalyzed feeling. Here would be an
> utter absence of binarity. I cannot  call it unity; for even unity supposes
> plurality. I may call its form  Firstness, Orience, or Originality. It
> would be something _*which is what  it is without reference to anything
> else*_ within it or without it,  regardless of all force and of all
> reason. Now the world is full of this  element of irresponsible, free,
> Originality. Why shou

Re: [peirce-l] a question

[Eduardo Forastieri]

Ben, list:
Thank you for these references on Firstness, Ben, and for reminding us of
Gary Richmond¹s posts; specially for the notion of a ³triadic moment².  It
does not seem to me as an acquiescence to Kant¹s time intuition. I am not
familiar with Schelling¹s ideas on time, yet these Peircean references on
the ego, consciousness and Firstness (with a definite exclusion of the
notion of the Self) reminds me of some references I gathered on this subject
long time ago before CD-ROM and hypertext, but that I cherished immensely
while transcribing: 1.306 and following;  1. 324 and following; 5.265 and
following [mostly from Concerning Certain Faculties] 5.289; 5.44; 5. 462;
7.364 and following;  7.531; 7.540; and many others.
I am most grateful for your recent inklings on this subject and Gary¹s, and
if there is more of Peirce to it (the ³triadic moment²), it would be more
than inklings. Great insights.
Eduardo Forastieri-Braschi


On 3/17/12 1:00 PM, "Benjamin Udell"  wrote:

> Jason, list, 
> 
> That's a good question. In the relevant paragraph (CP 7.536, of which I quoted
> only the last part), Peirce begins by saying: "It remains to be shown that
> this element is the third Kainopythagorean category. All flow of time involves
> learning; and all learning involves the flow of time." The element that he was
> discussing was a "continuity" which he had just called a "direct experience"
> (CP 7.535). (This is also another 'score' for Gary Richmond in his April 8,
> 2011 post http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/6995 to
> peirce-l, in which he said "It seems to me that for Peirce being present means
> being present to the flow, which flow implies all three modalities: past,
> present, and future")
> 
> I'm kind of reluctant to go out on a limb right now, having misinterpreted
> Peirce's Oct. 12, 1904 letter to Lady Welby and spent a number of posts
> cleaning up after myself. My guess is that, in virtue of their triadic parts
> in the flow of learning, inference, and representation and interpretation, all
> three times are Thirds, with Secondness, Firstness, and Thirdness strong but
> not overwhelmingly so in past, present, and future, respectively. In other
> words, learning-past as Secundan Third, learning-present as Priman Third, and
> learning-future as Tertian Third. But I have no strong opinion at this point!
> 
> Best, Ben
> 
> - Original Message -
> From: Khadimir 
> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> Sent: Saturday, March 17, 2012 12:29 PM
> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] a question
> 
> Would it not be fair to say that the conscious experience of the immediate
> present must always be at least a second?  That is the view I hold.
> 
> Jason H.
> 
> On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 11:24 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
>>  
>>  
>> 
>> Claudio, Eduardo, Diane, Gary R., list,
>>  
>> 
>> I've found more of Peirce on the present-past-future trichotomy. This time,
>> from Chapter 1 of the _Minute Logic_ (1902) manuscript, in  CP 2.84 (on the
>> past as Second), 2.85 (on the present as First), and 2.86  (on the future as
>> Third). From CP 2.85:
>>  
>>> Let us now consider what could appear as being in the present  instant were
>>> it utterly cut off from past and future. We can only guess; for  nothing is
>>> more occult than the absolute present. There plainly could be no  action;
>>> and without the possibility of action, to talk of binarity would be  to
>>> utter words without meaning. There might be a sort of consciousness, or
>>> feeling, with no self; and this feeling might have its tone. Notwithstanding
>>> what William James has said, I do not think there could be any continuity
>>> like space, which, though it may perhaps appear in an instant in an educated
>>> mind, I cannot think could do so if it had no time at all; and without
>>> continuity parts of the feeling could not be synthetized; and therefore
>>> there would be no recognizable parts. There could not even be a degree of
>>> vividness of the feeling; for this [the degree of vividness] is the
>>> comparative amount of disturbance of general consciousness by a feeling. At
>>> any rate, such shall be our hypothesis, and whether it is psychologically
>>> true or not is of no consequence. The world would be reduced to a quality of
>>> unanalyzed feeling. Here would be an utter absence of binarity. I cannot
>>> call it unity; for even unity supposes plurality. I may call its form
>>> Firstness, Orience, or Originality. It would be something _which is what  it
>>> is without reference to anything else_ within it or without it,  regardless
>>> of all force and of all reason. Now the world is full of this  element of
>>> irresponsible, free, Originality. Why should the middle part of  the
>>> spectrum look green rather than violet? There is no conceivable reason  for
>>> it nor compulsion in it. [...]
>>  
>> 
>> Note that there he discusses "what could appear as being in the present
>> instant were it utterly cut off from past and fu