[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
I was intending to warn Ben against adopting a bullying tone toward you, as his frustration seemed to be mounting. Perhaps a mistake on my part but a response in part to your own complaints about his tone, which you were construing as an attempt to silence you. Also I had been about to answer you with the same point that Ben made and didn't want to feel required to duplicate it. Joe . - Original Message - From: Jean-Marc Orliaguet [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 1:18 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Joseph Ransdell wrote: Ben: I don't think you or your position would lose any credibility by letting Jean-Marc have the last word on the matter. Joe Ransdell That's unfair in my opionion. Being accused of not answering, I answer to Ben with counter-arguments and now the question should be shoved under the carpet ... /JM - Original Message - *From:* Benjamin Udell mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] *To:* Peirce Discussion Forum mailto:peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu *Sent:* Wednesday, June 21, 2006 4:14 PM *Subject:* [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Jean-Marc: In reading Joe's response to you, I am reminded that you still haven't taken a stand on the three main trichotomies and their categorial correlations. If you do in fact understand the correlations, you may feel that it destroys your argument to admit that you understand them. But then it comes to the same thing. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.0/368 - Release Date: 6/16/2006 -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.0/368 - Release Date: 6/16/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Joseph Ransdell wrote: I was intending to warn Ben against adopting a bullying tone toward you, as his frustration seemed to be mounting. Perhaps a mistake on my part but a response in part to your own complaints about his tone, which you were construing as an attempt to silence you. Also I had been about to answer you with the same point that Ben made and didn't want to feel required to duplicate it. Joe OK, I searched the web for trichotomies + categories, found this article which I think is symptomatic of the risk entailed by mixing trichotomies with categories: http://www.chass.toronto.edu/french/as-sa/ASSA-No10/No10-A2.html I reads half-way through the article: = QUOTE == The first division of the three trichotomies is identical with Firstness and the representamen, and it consists of Qualisign, Sinsign and Legisign. It is worth noticing that the first trichotomy consists of (non)sign, i.e. signs which do not relate to anything; they are monadic and exist sui generis. But still, they form the basis for the creation of meaning. = END QUOTE == there is a confusion here: the first trichotomy is concerned with signs that *are* signs - it does not produce would-be signs or non-signs cut from all relations. this echoes what Bernard mentioned in a previous message, namely the false impression that classifications create objects when in reality these objects have no existence outside the context of the classification. /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
before answering, I'd like to comment on an obvious confusion (see below) Benjamin Udell wrote: [...] -- are defined by reference to the Sign, the Object, and the Interpretant, respectively. The Sign is the First, the Object is the Second, and the Interpretant is the Third. In CP227-229, which leads toward the discussion of the trichotomies: 66~~ *A _/Sign/_, or _/Representamen/_, is a First which stands in such genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its _/Object/_, as to be capable of detemining a Third, called its _/Interpretant/, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.* ~~99 So that settles that. [] 66~~ *A _/Sign/_, or _/Representamen/_, is a First which stands in such genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its _/Object/_, as to be capable of detemining a Third, called its _/Interpretant/, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.* ~~99 In the first trichotomy, the Sign or First is classed in terms of its own category. The first trichotomy is of the Sign or First classed in terms of _/its own/_ cenopythagorean category, _/irrespectively of/_ its Second or Object and _/irrespectively of/_ its Third or Interpretant. There's firstness. In the second trichotomy, the Sign or First is classed in terms of its relation to its Second. The second trichotomy is of the Sign or First classed in terms of the cenopythagorean category of that in _/respect or regard/_ of which it represents its Second or Object and _/irrespectively of/_ its Third or Interpretant. There's secondness. (If said respect/regard is of a quality, then the respect/regard is a ground.) In the third trichotomy, the Sign or First is classed in terms of its relation to its Third. The third trichotomy is of the Sign or First classed in terms of the cenopythagorean category in which its Third or Interpretant will represent the First or Sign as representing its Second or Object. There's thirdness. [...] Best, Ben Udell It is unfortunate that Peirce used the terms 'First', 'Second' and 'Third' in the place of ordinals when he used the same vocabulary for the categories. In the texts that you chose the terms do not refer to categories, they simply refer to 3 things presented in a given order, as in the English language, when you say: first I will make some coffee, secondly I will get some bread and thirdly I'll eat breakfast. One cannot deduce from that that making coffee is firstness, getting some bread is secondness and that eating breakfast in thirdness If the sign was a First as you commented on CP 2-274 according to the cenopythagorean category Firstness, how would you explain that the sign taken in itself can be a quality (a First), an existent (a Second) or of the nature of a law (a Third)? this is what I meant in a previous message: you are mixing the categories with ordinals. You have just confirmed my earlier intuition. /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Jean-Marc, list It is unfortunate that Peirce used the terms 'First', 'Second' and 'Third' in the place of ordinals when he used the same vocabulary for the categories. In the texts that you chose the terms do not refer to categories, they simply refer to 3 things presented in a given order, as in the English language, when you say: first I will make some coffee, secondly I will get some bread and thirdly I'll eat breakfast. No. Wrong. Referring to a First and a Second and a Third is _not_ normal English and certainly not normal written English. It distinctively coheres, rather glaringly to anybody fluent in English, with the specific sense lent to that set of forms by Peirce. Peirce's manner of using those ordinal words is so distinctly un-English that one sees whole discussions about Peirce which avoid quoting him saying such things, because it sounds strange in English. One cannot deduce from that that making coffee is firstness, getting some bread is secondness and that eating breakfast in thirdness If the sign was a First as you commented on CP 2-274 according to the cenopythagorean category Firstness, how would you explain that the sign taken in itself can be a quality (a First), an existent (a Second) or of the nature of a law (a Third)? It can be a First, a Second, etc., in various ways and respects. This is elementary stuff in Peirce. At this point, I honestly think that you are grasping at straws. I'm sorry, but it's over. Best, Ben Udell --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Benjamin Udell wrote: Jean-Marc, list It is unfortunate that Peirce used the terms 'First', 'Second' and 'Third' in the place of ordinals when he used the same vocabulary for the categories. In the texts that you chose the terms do not refer to categories, they simply refer to 3 things presented in a given order, as in the English language, when you say: first I will make some coffee, secondly I will get some bread and thirdly I'll eat breakfast. No. Wrong. Referring to a First and a Second and a Third is _not_ normal English and certainly not normal written English. It distinctively coheres, rather glaringly to anybody fluent in English, with the specific sense lent to that set of forms by Peirce. Peirce's manner of using those ordinal words is so distinctly un-English that one sees whole discussions about Peirce which avoid quoting him saying such things, because it sounds strange in English. One cannot deduce from that that making coffee is firstness, getting some bread is secondness and that eating breakfast in thirdness If the sign was a First as you commented on CP 2-274 according to the cenopythagorean category Firstness, how would you explain that the sign taken in itself can be a quality (a First), an existent (a Second) or of the nature of a law (a Third)? It can be a First, a Second, etc., in various ways and respects. This is elementary stuff in Peirce. At this point, I honestly think that you are grasping at straws. I'm sorry, but it's over. Best, Ben Udell Ben, you know the song? A B C It's easy as, 1 2 3 As simple as, do re mi maybe you should consider the following definition, where Peirce to avoid any confusion with the categories uses the letters A, B, C. 1902 - NEM IV pp. 20 - 2. Parts of Carnegie Applications . ... Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stand to C// ... (source is http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/rsources/76defs/76defs.htm) why would A be firstness, B secondness and C thirdness? /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Frances to Ben and others... In the decadic table or model, the ten classes of signs seem to deal with immediate objects, and dynamic objects, and sparse selections of immediate and dynamic and final interpretants. The decagon does not seem to deal with immediate representamens whatsoever, except perhaps indirectly or subsequently through immediate objects. The first class of signs, posited as qualisigns and sinsigns and legisigns, deals with the immediate objects of a representamen, and probably not with the representamen or sign vehicle itself alone. My guess is that immediate representamen are posited as potisigns and actisigns and famsigns, but are removed from the decadic table or model of semiosis, likely for some reason of expediency by way of illustrating the correlation and interrelation of signs. The present condensed table or model of semiotics as offered in its many forms does seem to serve that basic purpose well enough. The second class of signs, posited as icons and indexes and symbols, deals with the dynamic objects of immediate interpretants, of which immediate rhemes are merely one class of interpretant and indeed only one class of immediate interpretant. The third class of signs, posited as rhemes and dicents and arguments, deals partly with those interpretants that are respectively immediate and dynamic and final. They are only a partial selection, because they are not all the interpretants that are offered in semiosis. They are however trichotomic exemplars of their respected categories, in that rhemes are the first of three immediate interpretants offered, and dicents are the second of three dynamic interpretants offered, and arguments are the third of three final interpretants offered. This condensation actually yields a diagonal layout, which is unusual for categorical trichotomies, which are usually horizontal. Nonetheless, even this architectonic scaffolding is not categorically consistent with the structured trichotomies of phenomena, in that there should be only one immediate class, but two dynamic classes, yet three final classes. The class members of such monadic firstness and dyadic secondness and triadic thirdness would also each fall under there own class holder, presumably of zeroness. It is my suspicion that all the interpretants posited for semiosis are not all of grammatics, the first of the three grand semiotic divisions before critics and rhetorics; and grammatics which is also the sole basis of the decagon. One thorn here for me then is whether all the subsequent signs of critics and rhetorics are indeed only various kinds of grammatic or other interpretants. Another thorn here for me is whether semiotics can be complete at least to some degree, for say nonhuman mechanisms or organisms or even for mature humans, if only the grammatic division of signs is present as information, to the exclusion of critics and grammatics in any particular situation of semiosis. This of course implies that making signs to some extent, and thus making the logic of signs to some extent, and thus making the ideal sought seem real to some extent, is not limited only to mature intelligent humans. If this speculation of mine is correct, then just what role the decadic table or model of signs is intended to fully play as a degenerate condensation of logical semiosis becomes unclear to me, and there surely must be an important role. Given what is now known of Peirce, it would not be reasonable to hold the decagon as confused. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Dear Ben, Jean-Marc, list-- For what its worth, it also struck me that Peirce's use of the terms first, second and third in the context cited by Jean-Marc is as Jean-Marc suggests merely a way of indicating the three elements involved when (A) Something --a sign, (B) stands for Something -an object, (C) to something -- an interpretant. I think it is mistaken to suppose a sign (as a function) is a example of a Peircean Firstness. A sign (as I understand the matter) is pre-eminently an example of Pericean Thirdness. OTOH is also seems to me (as Ben and others are suggesting) that Peirce's trichotomies of signs are in some fundamental way related to his categories and less arbitrary than it seems to me that Jean-Marc is suggesting. But I make both of the above comments mainly from the standpoint of an interested bystander who is both enjoying and learning from this interesting discussion which I hope will continue. That said, I am somewhat puzzled by what Peirce means when he refers to a sinsign as not actually functioning as a sign and yet having the characteristics of a sign. The only tentative explanation I can come up with is that for Peirce all that we conceive or experience (and thus all we can or do speak of ) are signs. So to speak of a quality is necessarily not to speak of a qaulity iself (because by defintions qualities are in or as themselves non existant) but to speak of the sign of a quality. IOWs a sinsign is something that stands for a quality that stands for something to something. And since this is more or less open forum I'd like to comment on a special interest of mine and that is the logic of disagreements but I will do that in a separate post. Best wishes, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] The logic of disagreement
Dear Folks, Seems I've read somewhere that the rules of logic are in some way truth preserving. I suppose this mean that these rules allow us to follow the various ways true statements can be combined to form additional true statements. Which for me makes logic very close to a form of truth presevering syntax. But the trouble is most disagreements involve not merely syntax but semantics. Ultimately the debate hinges on what one means by the terms that traditional logicians assume preserve their meaning no matter their syntactical context. If meaning is related to conceivable consequences we need to ask what the term consequence means. Seems to me a conceivable consequence is not merely what follows but what results what follows has upon the conceiveable present actions of whoever or whatever is conceiving those consequences. The logic of disagreement is that every POV has its own interests and thus its own personal meanings even though these are tied to the common interests and meanings of other POVs. IOWs every POV is to some extent unique as well as sharing something in common with other POVs.Meaning is to some extent tied to one's POV and personal interests. Despite logicians attempts to dismiss this as an ad hominen fallacy. The conceivable consequences of a given event are not necessarily the same for all those affected. In my view, meaning is not something that is fully independent of context or one's POV as some logicians seem to suppose. It seems to me that almost all lasting disagreements are the result not of faulty logic on the part of one or another of the parties involved but of a difference in meaning attached to issues being debated. The solution to such semantic disagreements is to find a meaning in common. This is called a common understanding and (in my opinion) almost always leads to agreement about the points being contested. So I take discusions (even heated ones) involving attempts to seek a common definition of terms to be a good thing and generally much more productive than most debates about the logic of one another's position. In my view a common definition ultimately depends upon a common POV or shared interest. To me conflict resolution is more about finding common ground than about attempting to deny the legitimacy of another's POV on the basis of some supposed logical inconsistancy. Which is finally to say that I admire both Ben and Jean-Marc and the discussion they are having (as well as Joe's attempts to keep it from getting overheated and de-railed). Best to all, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Aw Jim, you're a trouble maker! 66~~ *A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of detemining a Third, called its _Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.* ~~99 Normal English? With capitalization of the ordinals, no less? In English we would say a given thing, a second thing, etc. English is characterized by intransigent normalcy. So Peirce is going to use some capitalized ordinals without explicit referents, as if he were talking about Firsts, Seconds, Thirds in the usual Peirce way, in order to say simply something, another thing, and a third thing? Peirce is complicated but he is not sadistic toward the reader. The Sign's correlate, when no further specification is provided, is the Object. On a New List of Categories: Secondness is reference to a correlate. The Object is the Correlate is the Second. On a New List of Categories: Thirdness is reference to an interpretant. The Interpretant is the Third. Argh, Ben, on three glasses of wine - Original Message - From: Jim Piat [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 10:12 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Dear Ben, Jean-Marc, list-- For what its worth, it also struck me that Peirce's use of the terms first, second and third in the context cited by Jean-Marc is as Jean-Marc suggests merely a way of indicating the three elements involved when (A) Something --a sign, (B) stands for Something -an object, (C) to something -- an interpretant. I think it is mistaken to suppose a sign (as a function) is a example of a Peircean Firstness. A sign (as I understand the matter) is pre-eminently an example of Pericean Thirdness. OTOH is also seems to me (as Ben and others are suggesting) that Peirce's trichotomies of signs are in some fundamental way related to his categories and less arbitrary than it seems to me that Jean-Marc is suggesting. But I make both of the above comments mainly from the standpoint of an interested bystander who is both enjoying and learning from this interesting discussion which I hope will continue. That said, I am somewhat puzzled by what Peirce means when he refers to a sinsign as not actually functioning as a sign and yet having the characteristics of a sign. The only tentative explanation I can come up with is that for Peirce all that we conceive or experience (and thus all we can or do speak of ) are signs. So to speak of a quality is necessarily not to speak of a qaulity iself (because by defintions qualities are in or as themselves non existant) but to speak of the sign of a quality. IOWs a sinsign is something that stands for a quality that stands for something to something. And since this is more or less open forum I'd like to comment on a special interest of mine and that is the logic of disagreements but I will do that in a separate post. Best wishes, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
I agree, Ben. Peirce used capitalization to mark his use of a term as a technical one, a term of art. It is a common practice of his and I am certain that there is at least one place where he states this explicitly. Ill try to track down a verifying passage but it may be difficult to find. Joe Ransdell . - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 9:39 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Aw Jim, you're a trouble maker! 66~~ *A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of detemining a Third, called its _Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.* ~~99 Normal English? With capitalization of the ordinals, no less? In English we would say a given thing, a second thing, etc. English is characterized by intransigent normalcy. So Peirce is going to use some capitalized ordinals without explicit referents, as if he were talking about Firsts, Seconds, Thirds in the usual Peirce way, in order to say simply something, another thing, and a third thing? Peirce is complicated but he is not sadistic toward the reader. The Sign's correlate, when no further specification is provided, is the Object. On a New List of Categories: Secondness is reference to a correlate. The Object is the Correlate is the Second. On a New List of Categories: Thirdness is reference to an interpretant. The Interpretant is the Third. Argh, Ben, on three glasses of wine - Original Message - From: Jim Piat [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 10:12 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Dear Ben, Jean-Marc, list-- For what its worth, it also struck me that Peirce's use of the terms first, second and third in the context cited by Jean-Marc is as Jean-Marc suggests merely a way of indicating the three elements involved when (A) Something --a sign, (B) stands for Something -an object, (C) to something -- an interpretant. I think it is mistaken to suppose a sign (as a function) is a example of a Peircean Firstness. A sign (as I understand the matter) is pre-eminently an example of Pericean Thirdness. OTOH is also seems to me (as Ben and others are suggesting) that Peirce's trichotomies of signs are in some fundamental way related to his categories and less arbitrary than it seems to me that Jean-Marc is suggesting. But I make both of the above comments mainly from the standpoint of an interested bystander who is both enjoying and learning from this interesting discussion which I hope will continue. That said, I am somewhat puzzled by what Peirce means when he refers to a sinsign as not actually functioning as a sign and yet having the characteristics of a sign. The only tentative explanation I can come up with is that for Peirce all that we conceive or experience (and thus all we can or do speak of ) are signs. So to speak of a quality is necessarily not to speak of a qaulity iself (because by defintions qualities are in or as themselves non existant) but to speak of the sign of a quality. IOWs a sinsign is something that stands for a quality that stands for something to something. And since this is more or less open forum I'd like to comment on a special interest of mine and that is the logic of disagreements but I will do that in a separate post. Best wishes, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.0/368 - Release Date: 6/16/2006 -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.0/368 - Release Date: 6/16/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Here is a verifying passage:, from the neglected Argument paper
Peirce: CP 6.452
The word God, so capitalized (as we Americans say), is the
definable proper name, signifying Ens necessarium; in my belief Really
creator of all three Universes of Experience.
Some words shall herein be capitalized when used, not as vernacular,
but as terms defined. Thus an idea is the substance of an actual unitary
thought or fancy; but Idea, nearer Plato's idea of {idea}, denotes
anything whose Being consists in its mere capacity for getting fully
represented, regardless of any person's faculty or impotence to represent
it.
Joe Ransdell
- Original Message -
From: Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 10:18 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
I agree, Ben. Peirce used capitalization to mark his use of a term as a
technical one, a term of art. It is a common practice of his and I am
certain that there is at least one place where he states this explicitly.
Ill try to track down a verifying passage but it may be difficult to find.
Joe Ransdell
.
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 9:39 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Aw Jim, you're a trouble maker!
66~~
*A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuine
triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of
detemining a Third, called its _Interpretant, to assume the same triadic
relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.*
~~99
Normal English? With capitalization of the ordinals, no less? In English we
would say a given thing, a second thing, etc. English is characterized
by intransigent normalcy. So Peirce is going to use some capitalized
ordinals without explicit referents, as if he were talking about Firsts,
Seconds, Thirds in the usual Peirce way, in order to say simply
something, another thing, and a third thing? Peirce is complicated but
he is not sadistic toward the reader.
The Sign's correlate, when no further specification is provided, is the
Object. On a New List of Categories: Secondness is reference to a
correlate. The Object is the Correlate is the Second.
On a New List of Categories: Thirdness is reference to an interpretant.
The Interpretant is the Third.
Argh,
Ben, on three glasses of wine
- Original Message -
From: Jim Piat [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 10:12 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Dear Ben, Jean-Marc, list--
For what its worth, it also struck me that Peirce's use of the terms
first, second and third in the context cited by Jean-Marc is as
Jean-Marc suggests merely a way of indicating the three elements involved
when (A) Something --a sign, (B) stands for Something -an object, (C) to
something -- an interpretant. I think it is mistaken to suppose a sign (as
a function) is a example of a Peircean Firstness. A sign (as I understand
the matter) is pre-eminently an example of Pericean Thirdness.
OTOH is also seems to me (as Ben and others are suggesting) that Peirce's
trichotomies of signs are in some fundamental way related to his categories
and less arbitrary than it seems to me that Jean-Marc is suggesting.
But I make both of the above comments mainly from the standpoint of an
interested bystander who is both enjoying and learning from this interesting
discussion which I hope will continue.
That said, I am somewhat puzzled by what Peirce means when he refers to a
sinsign as not actually functioning as a sign and yet having the
characteristics of a sign. The only tentative explanation I can come up
with is that for Peirce all that we conceive or experience (and thus all we
can or do speak of ) are signs. So to speak of a quality is necessarily not
to speak of a qaulity iself (because by defintions qualities are in or as
themselves non existant) but to speak of the sign of a quality. IOWs a
sinsign is something that stands for a quality that stands for something to
something.
And since this is more or less open forum I'd like to comment on a special
interest of mine and that is the logic of disagreements but I will do that
in a separate post.
Best wishes,
Jim Piat
---
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