[peirce-l] question about neuroquantology journal
In case there was any misunderstanding, my recent message about the response to my question about the neuroquantology journal was not intended to discourage further response but rather to encourage further such questions from others as the occasion should arise. It struck me as a use for the list which we have not exploited sufficiently. Nor was there any intention to be critical of any of the responses. Quite the contrary, I was feeling pleased about the quality of the responses and thinking about how helpful they all were. Frank expressions of judgment and surmise are always valuable. I was merely remarking that any conclusions drawn about the journal on that basis would have to be drawn by us as individual assessments for personal purposes, rather than as pseudo-objective impersonal conclusions about its value or status.. I suppose that is all obvious enough, but sometimes I sense that my position as manager as well as participant has unintentionally suggested something unintended. Joe Ransdell -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.3/374 - Release Date: 6/23/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Fw: NeuroQuantology New Issue Published, June 2006
For what it's worth: the reason for my query about Neuroquantology was receipt of the message below. The unusual range of interests and accomplishments of the people on PEIRCE-L makes it a good place to raise questions about possible resources like this, doesn't it? Others should feel as free as I do to raise such questions as this. There is no need to summarize results since it would add nothing substantive to the opinions expressed. It's useful and sometimes important to know to what extent a journal is "mainstream" or marginal, but that in itself says nothing about its intellectual value. . Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: "NQ Editorial" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Wednesday, June 28, 2006 3:19 AM Subject: NeuroQuantology New Issue Published, June 2006 Dear NeuroQuantology Readers NeuroQuantology Journal has just published its latest issue at http://www.neuroquantology.com We invite you to review the Table of Contents here and then visit our web site to review articles FREE and items of interest. Thanks for the continuing interest in our work, Vol 4, No 2 (2006) Table of Contents * www.neuroquantology.com * Editorial Is Quantum Physics Necessary to Understanding Consciousness? Sultan Tarlaci 91-92 Men Who Made a New Science My Scientific Odyssey ¨ner TAN 93-100 Perspectives Psychomotor Theory: Mind-Brain-Body Triad in Health and Disease ¨ner TAN 101-133 Invited Article Phenomenal Awareness and Consciousness from a Neurobiological Perspective Wolf Singer 134-154 Review Article Brain Research: A Perspective from the Coupled Oscillators Field Jose Luis Perez Velazquez 155-165 Original Article Quantum, Consciousness and Panpsychism: A Solution to the Hard Problem F Gao Shan 166-185 The Mechanism of Mourning: An Anti-entropic Mechanism F Giuliana Galli Carminati, Federico Carminati 186-197 NQ-Biography Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564) 198-200 Abstract from NQ literature Selected Abstract from Literature Details 201-290 -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.3/374 - Release Date: 6/23/2006 -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.3/374 - Release Date: 6/23/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
Crick's "Astonishing Hypothesis" (the name of Crick's book on the subject) is emergence and identity theory - and the continuing focus of Crick's younger partner (Crick himself died recently) Christophe Koch at CalTech is neuronal according to Koch's recent book (as I recall). All theories dependent on emergence and identity are essentially appeals to magic - despite the wide popularity of the argument (including the popular appeals by Wolfram, Kurzweil et al.). Koch is fairly religious (Catholic) - and has recently written about his religion on his web site - and without making aspersions upon his integrity I do find that a number of scientists in the field that are prepared to accept such magic are also religious. As a result they may, in fact, be predisposed to the argument that "God did it." My own view is that these appeals to magic as the product of intellectual laziness. :-) With respect, Steven Jim Piat wrote: Make of that what you will :-) With respect, Steven Dear Steven, I think Crick of DNA fame was also seeking consciousness in the microtubials. What troubles me most about the search for the neural basis of consciousness is our lack of a coherent and satisfying working definition of consciousness. I doubt we will find the neurological basis of something we can't identify in the first place. The effort begs the question. Moreover neurons may be a necessary without being a sufficient condition for consciousness. Just one layman's opinion. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
Make of that what you will :-) With respect, Steven Dear Steven, I think Crick of DNA fame was also seeking consciousness in the microtubials. What troubles me most about the search for the neural basis of consciousness is our lack of a coherent and satisfying working definition of consciousness. I doubt we will find the neurological basis of something we can't identify in the first place. The effort begs the question. Moreover neurons may be a necessary without being a sufficient condition for consciousness. Just one layman's opinion. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
The Neuroquantology Journal invited me sometime ago to submit my paper on the limits of discovery in quantum physics, so I know something of their history. It was started as an online journal only by Sultan Tarlaci of Turkey, whom I believe is an academic, at the time of the 2003 Quantum Mind conference. Stuart Hammeroff of the University of Arizona was involved in the founding. Hammeroff and Roger Penrose are responsible for the quantum model of Orchestrated Objective Reduction (OOR) which sees the mind as the product of a quantum computation influenced by Penrose's model of quantum gravity. To quote Hammeroff, "It's in the microtubials." Hammeroff is shown on the list of advisers and I would guess that it was he that specified the "focus and scope" of the journal since he is an anesthesiologist. I also recognize Brian Josephson. Josephson is a Nobel Laurette, well known to anyone who has been in the semiconductor industry (as I have) for his invention of the "Josephson junction." Josephson currently runs a parapsychology lab at Cambridge University where he looks for quantum proof of telepathy and other psychic phenomena. Make of that what you will :-) With respect, Steven Irving Anellis wrote: Joseph Ransdell asked about the "Neuroquantology" journal. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Frances Kelly wrote: Frances to Jean-Marc... Hi, see the quote below - it's from the collected papers 1.365. especially: "... besides genuine Secondness, there is a degenerate sort *which does not exist as such*, but is only so conceived." Peirce calls them 'internal', 'relations of reason', 'degenerate thirds, seconds'. Firsts have no degenerate species. One can say without much of a doubt that the Firsts, Seconds and Thirds used to refer to the elements of a triadic relation (taken with respect to one another of course) are of that type. Their existence is due to the mind that creates them by analysing the relation. see also CP 1.530 This muse is somewhat off topic, but may be related to the subject. You recently stated here that Peirce wrote some thirds and seconds are degenerate, which means that they have no real existence. The statement that degenerate categories have no real existence is intriguing, but it does confuse me somewhat in that my understanding of Peircean degeneracy is that such categories will have real existence, but will fail to be true to the conditions of their ground. In regard to symbols for example, there are three categories called abstract symbols and singular symbols and genuine symbols, but only genuine symbols are not degenerate, because they are faithful to their conventional ground in that they are formally arbitrary, unlike the other symbols. In any event, degenerate symbols and genuine symbols would both continue to have real existence, regardless of the absence or presence of degeneracy. At issue here perhaps is likely the strict Peircean meaning of such terms as "object" and "real" and "existence" in that say representamen that are not signs have no objects, and are not real if not sensed, yet might have existence as representamen even if not sensed and not real. My reading of meaning into these Peircean terms may of course be off base here. The term "have" here for the thing categories might possess as a sensible objective property, independent of say life and mind, is also a problem for me. For example, would genuine symbols like some lingual words "have" existence or "have" arbitrarity within their form, merely waiting to be sensed and thus be real. The dependence of reality on sense also seems to imply that what is real might be a mental construct, unlike factuality and even actuality which might be held as a material construct. In other words, if an existent fact and whether it is actual or not is not sensed, then it simply is not real, so that a fact is only as real as sense. Jean-Marc Orliaguet partly wrote... "Peirce was a "three-category realist" acknowledging the reality of Firsts and Seconds and Thirds early on. ...Peirce acknowledged the reality of actuality or of secondness...the reality of firsts (the universe of possibility) and of course the reality of thirdness (the universe of thought or signs)...However he wrote that some thirds and seconds are degenerate, meaning that they have no real existence." Peirce: CP 1.365ššš >ššš365. Thus, the whole book being nothing but a continual exemplification of the triad of ideas, we need linger no longer upon this preliminary exposition of them. There is, however, one feature of them upon which it is quite indispensable to dwell. It is that there are two distinct grades of Secondness and three grades of Thirdness. There is a close analogy to this in geometry. Conic sections are either the curves usually so called, or they are pairs of straight lines. A pair of straight lines is called a degenerate conic. So plane cubic curves are either the genuine curves of the third order, or they are conics paired with straight lines, or they consist of three straight lines; so that there are the two orders of degenerate cubics. Nearly in this same way, besides genuine Secondness, there is a degenerate sort which does not exist as such, but is only so conceived. The medieval logicians (following a hint of Aristotle) distinguished between real relations and relations of reason. A real relation subsists in virtue of a fact which would be totally impossible were either of the related objects destroyed; while a relation of reason subsists in virtue of two facts, one only of which would disappear on the annihilation of either of the relates. Such are all resemblances: for any two objects in nature resemble each other, and indeed in themselves just as much as any other two; it is only with reference to our senses and needs that one resemblance counts for more than another. Rumford and Franklin resembled each other by virtue of being both Americans; but either would have been just as much an American if the other had never lived. On the other hand, the fact that Cain killed Abel cannot be stated as a mere aggregate of two facts, one concerning Cain and the other concerning Abel. Resemblances are not the only relations of reason, though they have that character in an eminent degree. Contrasts and com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Bill, Patrick, list,
Just a note. I'd just point out that "meaning" or "significance" in Peircean
semiotics is what is formed into the interpretant, particularly in respect of
informativeness (though not always). Questions of to what object does an index
refer, to what ground does the icon refer, or to what connotation does the
symbol refer, seem to correspond, more or less, to what we now call semantics.
But as to the informativeness of the sign, the information which the
interpretant brings freshly to light, i.e., the change of information which is
brought about semiotically, this seems to correspond to what is now sometimes
called "combinatorial," not in the sense of combinatorics or of combinatory
logic, but in the sense of the fresh meanings or information of informative
combinations of terms, or, in the more general Peircean view, terms (rhemes),
propositions (dicisigns), arguments, whatever kinds of signs. An interpretant,
as I understand it, does not have to be informative and in any case can't
consist purely of fresh information, but the rendering explicit of such
information is usually (though not always) what's in mind in discussions of the
interpretant.
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: "Bill Bailey" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum"
Sent: Wednesday, June 28, 2006 12:03 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Patrick: In addition to representing what I have always hoped is Peirce's
developmental teleology, your description of sign function seems to me to get
to the heart of pragmatic discourse analysis in which conventional sign
structures and meanings ("syntactics" and "semantics") serve principally as
orientation to what the situated discourse is being used to do.
I would only add that it is sometimes useful to recognize that a number of
differentiable processes occur simultaneously within the great "alpha"
process. There is the "action" processes associated with "life-forms." There
is the "motion/matter" processes associated with "non-life-forms." (I'm using
these terms only as gestures, fingers that point in a given direction, and not
as depictions.) The highly ephemeral acts of sign usage are "real" events in
several related but distinct processes--e.g, those physical, physiological,
psychological and sociological processes necessary to communication acts. It
seems to me these different processes often get confused or conflated.
Existential "objects" are also events, but typically in a much slower process
that makes them available to our exteroception for comparatively vast periods
of time, which we think makes them "empirically" real, extant. I think it is
not very useful to speak of signs as existing in the same process as
existential objects, but if we must, perhaps we can say, "Yes, signs exist,
but much faster than objects do."
Bill Bailey
Patrick Coppock wrote, in part:
> According to Peirce's developmental teleology, these three "aspects" of the
> sign (function), by way of which we are able to "experience" or "recognise"
> the "presence" of any given (manifest for someone or something) sign, are
> destined to keep on "morphing" into one another continuously, emerging,
> submerging and and re-emerging again as the meanings we singly or
> collectively attribute to the signs we encounter from day to day continue to
> grow in complexity -- at different rates of development, of course, depending
> on the relative "strength" of the habits (mental or otherwise) that
> "constrain" Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness and allow them to
> "oscillate"/ "morph" in relation to one another at different "rates" in
> different situations and contexts, and allow them to be conceived of by us as
> "conventionally" (or otherwise) representing "signifying" (or culturally
> meaningful, if you like) units/configurations/ events/ states of affairs.
>
> Every culturally significant "event" that we are able to conceive of as a
> sign (objects, thoughts, actions etc.) may then be seen to "embody" or
> "posess", to a greater or lesser degree, and more or less saliently, all
> three qualities/ aspects of the sign (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness) at
> any given time in the ongoing flow of semiosis.
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Frances to Jean-Marc... This muse is somewhat off topic, but may be related to the subject. You recently stated here that Peirce wrote some thirds and seconds are degenerate, which means that they have no real existence. The statement that degenerate categories have no real existence is intriguing, but it does confuse me somewhat in that my understanding of Peircean degeneracy is that such categories will have real existence, but will fail to be true to the conditions of their ground. In regard to symbols for example, there are three categories called abstract symbols and singular symbols and genuine symbols, but only genuine symbols are not degenerate, because they are faithful to their conventional ground in that they are formally arbitrary, unlike the other symbols. In any event, degenerate symbols and genuine symbols would both continue to have real existence, regardless of the absence or presence of degeneracy. At issue here perhaps is likely the strict Peircean meaning of such terms as "object" and "real" and "existence" in that say representamen that are not signs have no objects, and are not real if not sensed, yet might have existence as representamen even if not sensed and not real. My reading of meaning into these Peircean terms may of course be off base here. The term "have" here for the thing categories might possess as a sensible objective property, independent of say life and mind, is also a problem for me. For example, would genuine symbols like some lingual words "have" existence or "have" arbitrarity within their form, merely waiting to be sensed and thus be real. The dependence of reality on sense also seems to imply that what is real might be a mental construct, unlike factuality and even actuality which might be held as a material construct. In other words, if an existent fact and whether it is actual or not is not sensed, then it simply is not real, so that a fact is only as real as sense. Jean-Marc Orliaguet partly wrote... "Peirce was a "three-category realist" acknowledging the reality of Firsts and Seconds and Thirds early on. ...Peirce acknowledged the reality of actuality or of secondness...the reality of firsts (the universe of possibility) and of course the reality of thirdness (the universe of thought or signs)...However he wrote that some thirds and seconds are degenerate, meaning that they have no real existence." --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Patrick: In addition to representing what I have always hoped is Peirce's
developmental teleology, your description of sign function seems to me to
get to the heart of pragmatic discourse analysis in which conventional sign
structures and meanings ("syntactics" and "semantics") serve principally as
orientation to what the situated discourse is being used to do.
I would only add that it is sometimes useful to recognize that a number of
differentiable processes occur simultaneously within the great "alpha"
process. There is the "action" processes associated with "life-forms."
There is the "motion/matter" processes associated with "non-life-forms."
(I'm using these terms only as gestures, fingers that point in a given
direction, and not as depictions.) The highly ephemeral acts of sign usage
are "real" events in several related but distinct processes--e.g, those
physical, physiological, psychological and sociological processes necessary
to communication acts. It seems to me these different processes often get
confused or conflated. Existential "objects" are also events, but typically
in a much slower process that makes them available to our exteroception for
comparatively vast periods of time, which we think makes them "empirically"
real, extant. I think it is not very useful to speak of signs as existing
in the same process as existential objects, but if we must, perhaps we can
say, "Yes, signs exist, but much faster than objects do."
Bill Bailey
Patrick Coppock wrote, in part:
According to Peirce's developmental teleology, these three "aspects" of
the sign (function), by way of which we are able to "experience" or
"recognise" the "presence" of any given (manifest for someone or
something) sign, are destined to keep on "morphing" into one another
continuously, emerging, submerging and and re-emerging again as the
meanings we singly or collectively attribute to the signs we encounter
from day to day continue to grow in complexity -- at different rates of
development, of course, depending on the relative "strength" of the habits
(mental or otherwise) that "constrain" Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness
and allow them to "oscillate"/ "morph" in relation to one another at
different "rates" in different situations and contexts, and allow them to
be conceived of by us as "conventionally" (or otherwise) representing
"signifying" (or culturally meaningful, if you like) units/
configurations/ events/ states of affairs.
Every culturally significant "event" that we are able to conceive of as a
sign (objects, thoughts, actions etc.) may then be seen to "embody" or
"posess", to a greater or lesser degree, and more or less saliently, all
three qualities/ aspects of the sign (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness)
at any given time in the ongoing flow of semiosis.
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Patrick, Jean-Marc. On Jun 28, 2006, at 7:27 AM, Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote: Patrick Coppock wrote: At 0:11 -0400 25-06-2006, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: I will be at the Whitehead Conference in Salzburg next week so I do not anticipate much time for replies. ... However, for us to believe that Firsts, Seconds and Thirds actually "exist", beyond their being mere transitory events in an ongoing semiosic process, would be fallibilistic in Peirce's terms, or a "Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness" in Whitehead's terms. Not at all. Peirce was a "three-category realist", acknowledging the reality fo Firsts, Seconds and Thirds early on. What you call "Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness" is just another word for "nominalism" in that context. Peirce was not a nominalist. Peirce acknowledge the reality of actuality or of secondness (around 1890). Look for "outward clash", or "Scotus" in the CPs and his criticism of Hegel's idealism. He acknowledged the reality of firsts (the universe of possibility), and of course the reality of thirdness (the universe of thought or signs) I don't have the exact references, but that's not too difficult to find if you go through the Collected Papers, look for "nominalism", "realism", "idealism" ... However he wrote that some thirds and seconds are degenerate, meaning that they have no real existence. Regards /JM Thanks for your stimulating comments. My take on the distinctions between Peirce and Whitehead is rather different. In early Peirce (1868), the analogy with distance functions and branching was the given basis for distinguishing paths of logic, relation to chemical valence and the more general concept of extension. The later writings of Peirce describing "division" of a sign in natural language is not a crisp way of looking at the concept of extension. (One might substitute for the term "division" such terms as partition, trichotomy, lattice, subtraction, incomplete parts, lack of additivity, and so forth; but I do not see how that would create a coherent concept of relational extension.) In late Whitehead, Process and Reality, he gets into bed with set theory and never re-emerges from this highly restrictive view of extension. In modern chemistry, a multitude of possibilities for extension exist . (The flow of passions in a bed are great, but they should not be conflated with the light of reason. :-) One might say that modern chemistry has in richer view of extension - valence is richer than -1,2,3- and it is richer than set theory by using irregularity as a basis of calculation. Also, the propensity of process philosophers to neglect the concept of inheritance of properties in time restricts the potential correspondence between process philosophy and scientific philosophy. A modern philosophy of chemistry must cope with numbers of relations grater than three and also recognize that islands of stability exist within the torrential seas of change. (I repeat my earlier disclaimer - I am neither a philosopher nor mathematician, my background is in biochemistry and genetics - so everyone ought to take my conjectures in these fields that are remote my personal area of concentration with a huge grain of salt.) BTW, the Whitehead conference includes sessions on Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry and Biology. Several abstracts were quite novel and may be of interest to readers of this listserve. see: http://www2.sbg.ac.at/whiteheadconference/index2.html Cheers Jerry LR Chandler (PS: Patrick, if you know David Lane, please convey my personal greetings to him.) --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
At 9:19 -0400 28-06-2006, Jim Piat wrote: In any case, what I'm doing here is asking a question and would love for someone to attempt to sort through how the terms real, existent and true are related. That's the big one Jim! I like to start out from Peirce's definition of the real as "that object for which truth stands" Regarding what is real, I think Peirce would say that we all have our opinions, more or well founded about what is real, or what the real is, and there is always a cheerful hope that we shall develop some further opinions on the matter that are even more well developed in this some respect or other. But of course, we are fallible, and thus no none, however well read, can claim any kind of absolute monopoly on the truth, so it's better to always keep an open mind (bearing in mind too, that some matters have been reasonably well settled for the time being) and keep on asking questions and making (courageous) speculations about how matters that cause us puzzlement may best be answered on the basis of what we already know, or at least think we know. Regarding existent, I think that Peirce always keeps fairly close to the whiteheadian notion of "actual occasions" in his conceptions of this, and again on this matter I think it is most profitable to make reference to his notion of matter as "effete mind", and Objects as Things or Existents that are characteristic for our experience of Secondness as a "Modality of Being". In a letter to Lady Welby (See EPII: 479), and talking of Secondness (which he actually refers to in this particular connection as "Another Universe", distinguished by a particular "Modality of Being"), Peirce writes: "Another Universe is that of, first, Objects whose Being consists in their Brute reactions, and of second, the facts (reactions, events, qualities etc.) concerning these Objects, all of which facts, in the last analysis, consist in their reactions. I call the Objects, Things, or more unambigously, Existents, and the facts about them I call Facts. Every member of this Universe is either a Single Object subject, alike to the Principles of Contradiction and to that of Excluded Middle, or it is expressible by a proposition having such a singular subject." Best regards Patrick -- Patrick J. Coppock Researcher: Philosophy and Theory of Language Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences University of Modena and Reggio Emilia Reggio Emilia Italy phone: + 39 0522.522404 : fax. + 39 0522.522512 email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] www:http://coppock-violi.com/work/ faculty:http://www.cei.unimore.it the voice: http://morattiddl.blogspot.com --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
As a non-professional neuroscience-watcher (now working on my 10th book
review to be published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies), i would
agree with Irving, ("I do not recognize any of the names from either the
AI, cognitive science, or neuroscience fields"), with the exception of
Hameroff. Broadly speaking, the "quantum consciousness" folks are part
of the current discussion in the field but very much on the fringe of
it; few researchers in cognitive or neuro-psychology or in philosophy
of mind take them seriously, but nobody wants to dismiss them altogether
until they come up with a testable theory (which they regularly claim to
be on the verge of doing). But i don't bother to read past the abstracts
of their stuff, and none of the leaders in the field seem to do so
either.
gary
}And whoso is saved from his own greed, such are the successful. [Qur'an
64:16 (Pickthall)]{
gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson & Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin University
}{ [EMAIL PROTECTED] }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/ }{
---
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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Hi Jim, and thanks for your comments. You wrote: At 8:47 -0400 28-06-2006, Jim Piat wrote: Dear Patrick, Folks-- Whitehead, yes -- and also Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance. Signs, like thought are more or less continuous and resist our attempts to pigeon hole them. OTOH contrasting mere intellectual associations with triadic thought Peirce says, "But the highest kind of synthesis is what the mind is compelled to make neither by the inward attractions of the feeling or representations themselves, nor by a transcendental force of haecceity, but in the interest of intelligibility, that is, in the interests of the the synthetising 'I think' itself; and this it does by introducing an idea not contained in the data, which gives connections which they would not otherwise have had". Connections, yes, in the habit-forming, relational aspect of Thirdness, but retaining always the possibility of chance being operative in the universe as an active element that can introduce novelty into the world and into the reality of our experience of the world, as an integral part of it. In a sense, we are the world and the world is us, but we also have the possibility of thinking about it, and about ourselves, and exchanging thoughts with one another so they can grow and develop, and that's a great ol' thing! Later in that same paragraph (from A Guess at the Riddle) Peirce continues with a further good word for those who attempt to sort and categories experience saying "Intuition is regarding of the abstract in a concrete form, by the realistic hypostatisation of relations; that is the one sole method of valuable thought. Very shallow is the prevalent notion that this something to be avoided. You might as well say at once that reasoning is to be avoided because it has led to so much error; quite in teh same philistine line of thought would that e and so well in accord with the spriit of nominalism that I wonder some one does not put it forward. The true precept is not to abstain from hypostatisation, but to do it intelligently". Yes, exactly, but then when I see presumably intelligent people getting so worked up about defending their own particular point of view on reality (or let's say on Peirce's view of reality) that they start insulting others in the process, then I often start to wonder if they haven't become momentarily "blinded" to the possibility of realty having many many "facets", as Joe often likes to put it, and that in order to get a firmer grip on as many as possible of these facets, then we all have to do a bit of grass-like "bending in the wind", just moving with the flow, so to speak, from time to time... Cheers Patrick Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- Patrick J. Coppock Researcher: Philosophy and Theory of Language Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences University of Modena and Reggio Emilia Reggio Emilia Italy phone: + 39 0522.522404 : fax. + 39 0522.522512 email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] www:http://coppock-violi.com/work/ faculty:http://www.cei.unimore.it the voice: http://morattiddl.blogspot.com --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
I know nothing about this journal but Stuart Hameroff, one of the editorial members, has very important works relating Neuroscience and Quantum Physics, most of them written with Roger Penrose. His page is at http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/ Vinicius Joseph Ransdell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Does anybody on the list know anything about the following journal or feel in position to assess -- or make a reasonable guess about -- its likely character as a journal by browsing its contents, contributors, editorial policy, etc.?http://www.neuroquantology.com/Joe Ransdell -- No virus found in this outgoing message.Checked by AVG Free Edition.Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.3/374 - Release Date: 6/23/2006---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] Want to be your own boss? Learn how on Yahoo! Small Business. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
Joseph Ransdell asked about the "Neuroquantology" journal. I took a look at the list of members of their editorial board. I cannot give an up-to-date or informed opinion on the journal, its quality, or board members. I can say only that I do not recognize any of the names from either the AI, cognitive science, or neuroscience fields that I remember from my days, in the late 1970s and early 1980s when I was actively involved in the Society for Interdisciplinary Study of the Mind (SISTM) and the SISTM & Brain Theory Quarterly. Over the past year, I've taken up a new, more active interest in issues of psychology and mental health issues, as a member of the Education & Awareness Committee of the Webster County (Iowa) Disabilities Alliance. Some of my contributions to the Committee and its newsletter have been posted to the Peirce Publishing website (go to: http://www.peircepublishing.com/page8.html) and on the blog e-journal "Phaneroscopy" (go to http://360.yahoo.com/phaneroscopy). Here is some brief general information about "Phaneroscopy". Phaneroscopy is an e-Journal devoted to pragmatic phenomenology, and includes informal and comparatively brief articles devoted to topics in philosophy of mind, philosophical psychology, and issues in mental health, as well as to brief discussions of interest to historians of pragmatism, existentialism, and phenomenology. It is hosted by Irving Anellis, and invites informal contributions by those in the philosophical, psychological, and mental health communities working either as academics in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and psychiatry and their history, and praticioners in the practice of mental health and mental health therapy, in particular those working from the perspective of pragmatism, cognitive behavior, conceptual behavior therapy, phenomenology, or existentialism. All articles appearing in Phaneroscopy are available for reproduction by users of related ezines, blogs, or websites, provided a proper credit line is added indicating the origin of the source and a copyright notice. [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://360.yahoo.com/phaneroscopy Irving H. Anellis [EMAIL PROTECTED] ; [EMAIL PROTECTED] ; [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.peircepublishing.com -- ___ Search for businesses by name, location, or phone number. -Lycos Yellow Pages http://yp.lycos.com --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Patrick wrote: However, for us to believe that Firsts, Seconds and Thirds actually "exist", beyond their being mere transitory events in an ongoing semiosic process, would be fallibilistic in Peirce's terms, or a "Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness" in Whitehead's terms. Jean-Marc responded: Not at all. Peirce was a "three-category realist", acknowledging the reality fo Firsts, Seconds and Thirds early on. What you call "Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness" is just another word for "nominalism" in that context. Peirce was not a nominalist. Dear Patrick, Jean-Marc, Folks-- I have a bit of trouble keeping track of the similarities and differences among the notions of true, real and existent as Peirce uses them. I am especially unclear about the the application of the term real to his category of Firstness.Are firsts real but non existent? Seems to me the notion of real qualities (as opposed to illusory ones) only has meaning in the context of qualities coupled with secondness as they are embodied in objects. In any case, what I'm doing here is asking a question and would love for someone to attempt to sort through how the terms real, existent and true are related. Best wishes Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Dear Patrick, Folks-- Whitehead, yes -- and also Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance. Signs, like thought are more or less continuous and resist our attempts to pigeon hole them. OTOH contrasting mere intellectual associations with triadic thought Peirce says, "But the highest kind of synthesis is what the mind is compelled to make neither by the inward attractions of the feeling or representations themselves, nor by a transcendental force of haecceity, but in the interest of intelligibility, that is, in the interests of the the synthetising 'I think' itself; and this it does by introducing an idea not contained in the data, which gives connections which they would not otherwise have had". Later in that same paragraph (from A Guess at the Riddle) Peirce continues with a further good word for those who attempt to sort and categories experience saying "Intuition is regarding of the abstract in a concrete form, by the realistic hypostatisation of relations; that is the one sole method of valuable thought. Very shallow is the prevalent notion that this something to be avoided. You might as well say at once that reasoning is to be avoided because it has led to so much error; quite in teh same philistine line of thought would that e and so well in accord with the spriit of nominalism that I wonder some one does not put it forward. The true precept is not to abstain from hypostatisation, but to do it intelligently". Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Thanks for your comments Arnold, and yes indeed, what Peirce and Whitehead probably have most in common is their respective competencies in mathematics, and the way in which they use these competncies to consolidate and explicate their respective philosophical projects. It's their maths that lets them try building a bridge between physics, phenomenology and metaphysics, if you will. One of my great frustrations is that I am no theoretical mathematician myself, and cannot read or make sense of anything rather than really quite simple mathematical proofs, so I basically have to take on trust anything that Peirce or Whitehead might have used mathematical forms of argumentation in order to "demonstrate" in detail. If you read around the lives and works of both these talented authors, you can see from many qualified commentators that both were fairly well respected in the international mathematical communities of their times for their mathematical musings. In any case, it seems quite clear to me that any philosophical or other project that is trying to really get a handle onto what they were talking about in all the various corners of their work, and to put it all into perspective needs must be a fairly inter- or transdisciplinary one... Peirce-l always seemed to me right from the beginning to be that kind of community... Best regards Patrick Jean-Marc, Patrick Patrick has a point in that Peirce's categories are such that in representation the higher-order presupposes the lower (is that the way to use `presuppose, by the way?). Jean-Marc equally has a point in noting that Peirce became a `Three-Category Realist' in his later thinking. Both points seem to highlight the role of transitivity in Peirce's thought, and perhaps the more solid sources for understanding this may be found in his mathematical writings, I would guess. Also, the Logic Notebook perhaps has more pertinent material than the CP, the editorial dismemebrment of which is well enough known. Cheers Arnold Shepperson --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- Patrick J. Coppock Researcher: Philosophy and Theory of Language Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences University of Modena and Reggio Emilia Reggio Emilia Italy phone: + 39 0522.522404 : fax. + 39 0522.522512 email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] www:http://coppock-violi.com/work/ faculty:http://www.cei.unimore.it the voice: http://morattiddl.blogspot.com --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Thanks JM for your brief comments, I still think we need some way of distinguishing between that which is for us phenomenologically or experientally real and that which is (enduringly) existent in the world. Peirce and Whitehead both operate with notions that postulate some kind of relational continuity between what we call "mind" and "matter". In this connection Whitehead introduces into the cartesian (epistemological) chasm between mental and material substance his notions of "actual occasion" or "organism", while Peirce handles the same problem with his conception of matter as "effete mind". For both, "being" is in some sense always "becoming" -- the actualisation of a potential for what Peirce often referred to as "the growth of concrete reasonableness", and what Whitehead refered to as "satisfaction", or in one of his definitions of that notion: "the culmination of concrescence into a completely determinate matter of fact" both of which I think, can be tied to the notion of "entelecheia", which was discussed at some length here on the list previously. I may well be wrong here, of course -- indeed, I haven't been working with Whitehead's ideas so long myself, and trying to see these in relation to those of Peirce is actually quite a daunting task -- so it would be interesting to hear some opinions from other Peirce listers too... Best regards Patrick Patrick Coppock wrote: At 0:11 -0400 25-06-2006, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: I will be at the Whitehead Conference in Salzburg next week so I do not anticipate much time for replies. ... However, for us to believe that Firsts, Seconds and Thirds actually "exist", beyond their being mere transitory events in an ongoing semiosic process, would be fallibilistic in Peirce's terms, or a "Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness" in Whitehead's terms. Not at all. Peirce was a "three-category realist", acknowledging the reality fo Firsts, Seconds and Thirds early on. What you call "Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness" is just another word for "nominalism" in that context. Peirce was not a nominalist. Peirce acknowledge the reality of actuality or of secondness (around 1890). Look for "outward clash", or "Scotus" in the CPs and his criticism of Hegel's idealism. He acknowledged the reality of firsts (the universe of possibility), and of course the reality of thirdness (the universe of thought or signs) I don't have the exact references, but that's not too difficult to find if you go through the Collected Papers, look for "nominalism", "realism", "idealism" ... However he wrote that some thirds and seconds are degenerate, meaning that they have no real existence. Regards /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- Patrick J. Coppock Researcher: Philosophy and Theory of Language Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences University of Modena and Reggio Emilia Reggio Emilia Italy phone: + 39 0522.522404 : fax. + 39 0522.522512 email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] www:http://coppock-violi.com/work/ faculty:http://www.cei.unimore.it the voice: http://morattiddl.blogspot.com --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Arnold Shepperson wrote: Jean-Marc, Patrick Patrick has a point in that Peirce's categories are such that in representation the higher-order presupposes the lower (is that the way to use `presuppose, by the way?). Jean-Marc equally has a point in noting that Peirce became a `Three-Category Realist' in his later thinking. Both points seem to highlight the role of transitivity in Peirce's thought, and perhaps the more solid sources for understanding this may be found in his mathematical writings, I would guess. Also, the Logic Notebook perhaps has more pertinent material than the CP, the editorial dismemebrment of which is well enough known. Cheers Arnold Shepperson --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] Hi, I don't think there's any contradiction. semiosis being an inferential process that "reconstructs" the forms of reality, a third can be created by a combination of a dyad with a monad. A second will evolve into a Third. This will be an "internal" third or degenerate third, a third by construction --call it what you like. but a third anyway. the only forms that are directly experienced from reality are the Seconds -- with which we experience the "clash" to use a Peirce expression. Thirds are constructed by inference. Firsts are embedded in Seconds. the phenomenological approach which consists in studying how forms can be combined together have the advantage that there is no need to resort to teleology to explain how these forms (First, Second, Thirds) "can be seen to emerge" from semiosis. PS: this is an interesting discussion but I'm off the list for a while... Regards /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Jean-Marc, Patrick Patrick has a point in that Peirce's categories are such that in representation the higher-order presupposes the lower (is that the way to use `presuppose, by the way?). Jean-Marc equally has a point in noting that Peirce became a `Three-Category Realist' in his later thinking. Both points seem to highlight the role of transitivity in Peirce's thought, and perhaps the more solid sources for understanding this may be found in his mathematical writings, I would guess. Also, the Logic Notebook perhaps has more pertinent material than the CP, the editorial dismemebrment of which is well enough known. Cheers Arnold Shepperson --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Neuroquantology Journal
Does anybody on the list know anything about the following journal or feel in position to assess -- or make a reasonable guess about -- its likely character as a journal by browsing its contents, contributors, editorial policy, etc.? http://www.neuroquantology.com/ Joe Ransdell -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.3/374 - Release Date: 6/23/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Patrick Coppock wrote: At 0:11 -0400 25-06-2006, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: I will be at the Whitehead Conference in Salzburg next week so I do not anticipate much time for replies. ... However, for us to believe that Firsts, Seconds and Thirds actually "exist", beyond their being mere transitory events in an ongoing semiosic process, would be fallibilistic in Peirce's terms, or a "Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness" in Whitehead's terms. Not at all. Peirce was a "three-category realist", acknowledging the reality fo Firsts, Seconds and Thirds early on. What you call "Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness" is just another word for "nominalism" in that context. Peirce was not a nominalist. Peirce acknowledge the reality of actuality or of secondness (around 1890). Look for "outward clash", or "Scotus" in the CPs and his criticism of Hegel's idealism. He acknowledged the reality of firsts (the universe of possibility), and of course the reality of thirdness (the universe of thought or signs) I don't have the exact references, but that's not too difficult to find if you go through the Collected Papers, look for "nominalism", "realism", "idealism" ... However he wrote that some thirds and seconds are degenerate, meaning that they have no real existence. Regards /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
At 0:11 -0400 25-06-2006, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: I will be at the Whitehead Conference in Salzburg next week so I do not anticipate much time for replies. Talking of Whitehead, whose process philosophy, or "philosophy of organism" is surely an interesting and challenging read for any Peirce student or scholar, it strikes me that in all the talk on the list of late of lattices and diagrams, firsts, seconds and thirds, ordered or non ordered systems of relations, we seem along the way to have lost something of the essentially processual character of the peircean notion of semiosis. Perhaps it's the seemingly "concrete" nature of the diagrams/lattices themselves that has been leading us a bit astray? Let me try speculating a bit by merging a few notions from a Whitehead'ian process perspective with a Peircean one. This is all very sketchy and speculative, so I'm naturally open for all forms of positive or negative criticism. In the interests of saving time and energy for one and all, however, it would probably be a good idea if respondents could keep their comments fairly brief and to the point... OK, as pointed out by Joe and others here a number of times (also recently), the (phenomenological) category of Thirdness will always presuppose Secondness, which in turn presupposes Firstness, but none of these three more "basic" categories (or any of their ten or more "fine-tuned" variants as these can be seen to emerge in any form of narrative traversing of the various triadic configurational "rooms" represented in the tables of sign classes) can actually be said to "exist" as pure, or static forms or entities. They always emerge as part of a process, which could be described roughly in terms of an ongoing narrative (or argumentation, if you like) According to Peirce's developmental teleology, these three "aspects" of the sign (function), by way of which we are able to "experience" or "recognise" the "presence" of any given (manifest for someone or something) sign, are destined to keep on "morphing" into one another continuously, emerging, submerging and and re-emerging again as the meanings we singly or collectively attribute to the signs we encounter from day to day continue to grow in complexity -- at different rates of development, of course, depending on the relative "strength" of the habits (mental or otherwise) that "constrain" Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness and allow them to "oscillate"/ "morph" in relation to one another at different "rates" in different situations and contexts, and allow them to be conceived of by us as "conventionally" (or otherwise) representing "signifying" (or culturally meaningful, if you like) units/ configurations/ events/ states of affairs. Every culturally significant "event" that we are able to conceive of as a sign (objects, thoughts, actions etc.) may then be seen to "embody" or "posess", to a greater or lesser degree, and more or less saliently, all three qualities/ aspects of the sign (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness) at any given time in the ongoing flow of semiosis. However, for us to believe that Firsts, Seconds and Thirds actually "exist", beyond their being mere transitory events in an ongoing semiosic process, would be fallibilistic in Peirce's terms, or a "Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness" in Whitehead's terms. The categories/ classes are essentially functional event-states that must be seen as potentially transitory and recursive all along the line in any given semiosic process. They can pass from one to another "at will", or better "as needs be", only to "reappear" again, perhaps in a different giuse or configuration (class) on some later occasion. The specific "charactistics" that "make" Firsts appear to us as Firsts, Seconds as Seconds and Thirds as Thirds, i.e. Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, are able to emerge transitorily and make themselves "subjectively known" to us at any given moment in any given "event" (the two latter ""'ed notions I've taken from Whitehead, rather than from Peirce) that forms part of any given semiosic process, which by default must be seen as open-ended and as possessing only a potential for limits. It strikes me that might be more profitable if we were to try thinking dynamically of the ten "classes" of signs as possible emergent events that may arise as a result of any given ongoing semiosic process, and that they are all inter-related with one another, and that each "class" must possess a "subjective" organic potential for having more or less "stable" periods of duration, according to the relative strength of the specific habits or laws that (have) become culturally/ contextually associated with any given configuration/ class at any given time... It also occurred to me that someone well versed in Category Theory (cf some earlier discussions here on the list) might well be able to realise some kind of visual, dynamic model in t
